How Much “Safety” Is Available under the U.S. Proposal to the WTO?, November 2005

Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm programs. Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.

Optimal public rationing and price response

We study optimal public rationing of an indivisible good and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and costs of provisions. Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Public rationing determines the characteristics of consumers who seek supply from the private sector, where a firm sets prices based on consumers' cost information and in response to the rationing rule. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information. In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Supplying all poor consumers would leave only rich consumers in the private market, and the firm would react by setting a high price. Rationing some poor consumers is optimal, and implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold. Wealth information is not used. Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium total consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth. [Authors]

The impotence of price controls: failed attempts to constrain pharmaceutical expenditures in Greece.

BACKGROUND: While the prices of pharmaceuticals are relatively low in Greece, expenditure on them is growing more rapidly than almost anywhere else in the European Union. OBJECTIVE: To describe and explain the rise in drug expenditures through decomposition of the increase into the contribution of changes in prices, in volumes and a product-mix effect. METHODS: The decomposition of the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures in Greece over the period 1991-2006 was conducted using data from the largest social insurance fund (IKA) that covers more than 50% of the population. RESULTS: Real drug spending increased by 285%, despite a 58% decrease in the relative price of pharmaceuticals. The increase in expenditure is mainly attributable to a switch to more innovative, but more expensive, pharmaceuticals, indicated by a product-mix residual of 493% in the decomposition. A rising volume of drugs also plays a role, and this is due to an increase in the number of prescriptions issued per doctor visit, rather than an increase in the number of visits or the population size. CONCLUSIONS: Rising pharmaceutical expenditures are strongly determined by physicians' prescribing behaviour, which is not subject to any monitoring and for which there are no incentives to be cost conscious.

Is There a Crime Drop in Western Europe?

Combining data from police statistics and crime victim surveys, this article analyses the evolution of crime in Western Europe from 1988 to 2007. The results show that there is no general drop in crime. Property offences and homicide have been decreasing since the mid 1990s, while violent and drug offences have increased during the period under study. These trends highlight the limits of the explanations to the crime drop in the United States, which are based on the premise of a correlation in the evolution of all offences. The drop in property offences seems related to changes in the socioeconomic situation in Europe as well as to increases in security measures in households, and the reinforcement of private security. The increase in violent offences can be explained by the combination of several factors, including changes in youth's free time provoked by the development of the Internet, changing demographics, and the rise of episodic heavy alcohol consumption and street gangs.

Emerging Biofuels: Outlook of Effects on U.S. Grain, Oilseed, and Livestock Markets, 2007

Projections of U.S. ethanol production and its impacts on planted acreage, crop prices, livestock production and prices, trade, and retail food costs are presented under the assumption that current tax credits and trade policies are maintained. The projections were made using a multi-product, multi-country deterministic partial equilibrium model. The impacts of higher oil prices, a drought combined with an ethanol mandate, and removal of land from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) relative to baseline projections are also presented. The results indicate that expanded U.S. ethanol production will cause long-run crop prices to increase. In response to higher feed costs, livestock farmgate prices will increase enough to cover the feed cost increases. Retail meat, egg, and dairy prices will also increase. If oil prices are permanently $10-per-barrel higher than assumed in the baseline projections, U.S. ethanol will expand significantly. The magnitude of the expansion will depend on the future makeup of the U.S. automobile fleet. If sufficient demand for E-85 from flex-fuel vehicles is available, corn-based ethanol production is projected to increase to over 30 billion gallons per year with the higher oil prices. The direct effect of higher feed costs is that U.S. food prices would increase by a minimum of 1.1% over baseline levels. Results of a model of a 1988-type drought combined with a large mandate for continued ethanol production show sharply higher crop prices, a drop in livestock production, and higher food prices. Corn exports would drop significantly, and feed costs would rise. Wheat feed use would rise sharply. Taking additional land out of the CRP would lower crop prices in the short run. But because long-run corn prices are determined by ethanol prices and not by corn acreage, the long-run impacts on commodity prices and food prices of a smaller CRP are modest. Cellulosic ethanol from switchgrass and biodiesel from soybeans do not become economically viable in the Corn Belt under any of the scenarios. This is so because high energy costs that increase the prices of biodiesel and switchgrass ethanol also increase the price of cornbased ethanol. So long as producers can choose between soybeans for biodiesel, switchgrass for ethanol, and corn for ethanol, they will choose to grow corn. Cellulosic ethanol from corn stover does not enter into any scenario because of the high cost of collecting and transporting corn stover over the large distances required to supply a commercial-sized ethanol facility.

Safety Impacts of Pavement Edge Drop-offs, 2006

A vehicle may leave its travel lane for a number of reasons, such as driver error, poor surface conditions, or avoidance of a collision with another vehicle in the travel lane. When a vehicle leaves the travel lane, pavement edge drop-off poses a potential safety hazard because significant vertical differences between surfaces can affect vehicle stability and reduce a driver’s ability to handle the vehicle. Numerous controlled studies have tested driver response to encountering drop-offs under various conditions, including different speeds, vehicle types, drop-off height and shape, and tire scrubbing versus non-scrubbing conditions. The studies evaluated the drivers’ ability to return to and recover within their own travel lane after leaving the roadway and encountering a drop-off. Many of these studies, however, have used professional drivers as test subjects, so results may not always apply to the population of average drivers. Furthermore, test subjects are always briefed on what generally is to be expected and how to respond; thus, the sense of surprise that a truly naïve driver may experience upon realizing that one or two of his or her tires have just dropped off the edge of the pavement, is very likely diminished. Additionally, the studies were carried out under controlled conditions. The actual impact of pavement edge drop-off on drivers’ ability to recover safely once they leave the roadway, however, is not well understood under actual driving conditions. Additionally, little information is available that quantifies the number or severity of crashes that occur where pavement edge drop-off may have been a contributing factor. Without sufficient information about the frequency of edge drop-off-related crashes, agencies are not fully able to measure the economic benefits of investment decisions, evaluate the effectiveness of different treatments to mitigate edge drop-off, or focus maintenance resources. To address these issues, this report details research to quantify the contribution of pavement edge drop-off to crash frequency and severity. Additionally, the study evaluated federal and state guidance in sampling and addressing pavement edge drop-off and quantified the extent of pavement edge drop-off in two states. This study focused on rural two-lane paved roadways with unpaved shoulders, since they are often high speed facilities (55+ mph), have varying levels of maintenance, and are likely to be characterized by adverse roadway conditions such as narrow lanes or no shoulders.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.