Health, Justice, and Fairness

In this study I will endeavor to show that the American system of health care violates any conception of distributive justice understood as equality of opportunity. This system fails to provide equal access through a lack of universal insurance, a consumer driven conception of quality, and a system wide focus on cost control, leaving millions of Americans exposed to the ravages of disease. However, if health is understood as an antecedent for one's ability to function across a number of categories that have been objectively deemed as vital to engage in a life that is fully human than the commitment our nation has to the protection of fair equality of opportunity, established by our adoption of a Rawlsian conception of justice, necessitates a revision of our nation's conception of quality to encapsulate health outcomes as well as the advent of a system of universal coverage. Quality care will come to be understood as care that returns to the patient the ability to function across those categories of functioning that illness has jeopardized, and this conception of quality will precipitate system wide reform geared at the creation of positive health outcomes. This paper will articulate this argument by reconstructing and synthesizing precepts from the contemporary philosophical sources and then applying these to the practical workings of our healthcare system, while concurrently demonstrating that a system of distributive justice is compatible with the creation of a universal system of healthcare.

Governor Forrest Anderson’s Leadership & Political Acumen -- Alec Hansen “In the Crucible of Change”

Montana Governor Forrest Anderson was perhaps the most experienced and qualified person ever to be elected as Governor of Montana. Having previously served as a county attorney, a member of the legislature, a Supreme Court Justice, and twelve years as Attorney General, Anderson roared to a large victory in 1968 over the Incumbent GOP Governor Tim Babcock. Though the progressive change period in Montana began a few years earlier, Anderson’s 1968 win catapulted progressive policy-making into the mainstream of Montana political and governmental affairs. He used his unique skills and leadership to craftily architect the reorganization of the executive branch which had been kept weak since statehood so that the peoples’ government would not be able to challenge corporations who so dominated Montana. Anderson, whose “Pay More, What For?” campaign slogan strongly separated him from Tim Babcock and the GOP on the sales tax issue, not only beat back the regressive sales tax in the 1968 election, but oversaw its demise at the polls in 1971, shaping politics in Montana for decades to come. Anderson also was a strong proponent of the concept of a new Montana Constitution and contributed strategically to its calling and passage. Anderson served only one term as Governor for health reasons, but made those four years a launch pad for progressive politics and government in Montana. In this film, Alec Hansen, Special Assistant to Governor Anderson, provides an insider’s perspective as he reflects on the unique way in which Governor Anderson got things done at this critical period “In the Crucible of Change.” Alec Hansen is best known in Montana political and governmental circles as the long-time chief of the Montana League of Cities and Towns, but he cut his teeth in public service with Governor Forrest Anderson. Alec was born in Butte in 1941, attended local schools graduating from Butte High in 1959. After several years working as a miner and warehouseman for the Anaconda Company in Butte, he attended UM and graduated in History and Political Science in 1966. He joined the U.S. Navy and served with amphibious forces in Vietnam. After discharge from the Navy in 1968, he worked as a news and sports reporter for The Montana Standard in Butte until in September of 1969 he joined Governor Anderson as a Special Assistant focused on press, communications and speech-writing. Alec has noted that drafts were turned into pure Forrest Anderson remarks by the man himself. He learned at the knee of “The Fox” for the rest of Anderson’s term and continued with Governor Tom Judge for two years before returning to Butte to work for the Anaconda Company as the Director of Communications for Montana operations. In 1978, after Anaconda was acquired by the Atlantic Richfield Company, Alec went to work in February for U.S. Senator Paul Hatfield in Washington D.C., leaving after Hatfield’s primary election loss in June 1978. He went back to work for Gov. Judge, remaining until the end of 1980. In 1981 Alec worked as a contract lobbyist and news and sports reporter for the Associated Press in Helena. In 1982, the Montana League of Cities and Towns hired him as Executive Director, a position he held until retirement in 2014. Alec and his wife Colleen, are the parents of two grown children, with one grandson.

Social Work, Social Politics and Justice

"The disaster does not primarily lie in people and in the way that they perceive the circumstances, rather in the circumstances that doom people to powerlessness and apathy - circumstances which they could, however, change" (Adorno, 1966, p. 189). When Karl Marx writes to Friedrich Sorge in his letter of the 19.10.1877, regarding his critique of the opinion of his opponents Dühring & Co., that one must deal with "a whole crowd of immature students and pompous doctors who claim to give socialism a 'higher, ideal' turn, that is to say, to replace the materialistic basis (that demands serious, objective study if one wants to operate on it)… with modern mythology by means of their goddesses of justice, freedom, equality and fraternité" (Marx, 1973, p. 303; cf. Schiller, 1993, p. 199 onwards), this thus refers to fundamental problems with the concept of "justice" up until today. As the debate shows, it concerns the contextualization of the term "justice", its meaning in historically concrete as well as socio-political circumstances, and therefore a social analysis that is both representation and critique. Essentially it also concerns the question of the relationship between ideas and reality and the development of standards of historical systematic 'nature' out of social frameworks (see Frey, 1978; Theunissen, 1989).

Transition and Justice: Negotiating the Terms of New Beginnings in Africa

Transition and Justice examines a series of cases from across the African continent where peaceful ‘new beginnings’ were declared after periods of violence and where transitional justice institutions helped define justice and the new socio-political order. Offers a new perspective on transition and justice in Africa transcending the institutional limits of transitional justice Covers a wide range of situations, and presents a broad range of sites where past injustices are addressed Examines cases where peaceful ‘new beginnings’ have been declared after periods of violence Addresses fundamental questions about transitions and justice in societies characterized by a high degree of external involvement and internal fragmentation

Transition and Justice: An Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, political new beginnings have increasingly been linked to questions of transitional justice. The contributions to this collection examine a series of cases from across the African continent where peaceful ‘new beginnings’ have been declared after periods of violence and where transitional justice institutions played a role in defining justice and the new socio-political order. Three issues seem to be crucial to the understanding of transitional justice in the context of wider social debates on justice and political change: the problem of ‘new beginnings’, of finding a foundation for that which explicitly breaks with the past; the discrepancies between lofty promises and the messy realities of transitional justice in action; and the dialectic between logics of the exception and the ordinary, employed to legitimize or resist transitional justice mechanisms. These are the particular focus of this Introduction.

From Truth to Justice: How Does Amnesty Factor In? A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) have emerged in the last few decades as a mechanism for a state to overcome widespread, grave, human rights violations. There are numerous approaches to a TRC all with an ultimate goal: that formerly warring factions, perpetrators, witnesses, and victims can move forward as a united people. I propose that the provision of amnesty is critical to the success of a TRC. I hypothesize that the form of amnesty chosen (i.e. blanket v. conditional amnesty) determines the revelation of truth and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can achieve reconciliation. To test this hypothesis, I use two case studies: South Africa, which has utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed blanket amnesty. I create a model for measuring reconciliation. I can then look at the implications of both types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective. My overarching conclusion is that the provision of conditional amnesty is more effective than blanket amnesty in achieving reconciliation. Ultimately, I hope that this conclusion can be generalized to other TRCs.

Justice, emotions and satisfaction in complaint behavior in services

This study proposes a marketing approach to service recovery (SR) models in order to help to explain what factors affect cumulative satisfaction, loyalty and word-of-mouth following complaint behavior. The model has its base on the definition of perceived justice and its influence on satisfaction with service recovery (SSR) and on emotions (positive and negative). Trust acts as a central construct in the model, receiving influence from the affective and cognitive aspect and mediating the relationship between SSR and cumulative satisfaction and between positive/negative emotions and loyalty. The sample for this study consists of 303 Spanish B2C-EC users who made a complaint after an electronic transaction. Results from the analysis show the influence of perceived justice ?mainly interactional justice and procedural justice? on SSR, and the relevance of positive emotions as a key factor in SSR processes, in contrast to the major role which negative emotions have traditionally played in these models. Furthermore, trust mediates the relation between SSR and cumulative satisfaction, and is the factor which has a higher influence on loyalty, whilst cumulative satisfaction becomes the more relevant factor affecting WOM.

Islamic Political Thought: Reviving a Rationalist Tradition

This work develops the foundations of an Islamic argument for secular, liberal democracy from within the Islamic discursive tradition. First, it challenges the presentation of contemporary Islamic political thought as a unified, continuous development of the classical canon by showing the influence of the now marginalized medieval rationalists in the development of Islamic political thought. The classical rationalist concern with divine justice forced the founders of Sunni orthodoxy to state their epistemologies and their positions on ethical ontology. The orthodox positions, and their related methods of legal-juristic reasoning, are shown to be incapable of accommodating the modern Islamic positions on political representation, slavery, and just war. This leads to the second argument of the work, that the modern Islamic discourse is better understood as a reflection of the central concern with justice and its rationalist epistemology and ethical ontology we find in the writings of classical rationalists. This argument is made by examining the works of three classical rationalists, a theologian, a philosopher, and a historian. Their political positions, shaped by their rationalism and concern with justice, challenged their orthodox contemporaries, and provide substantive critiques of the classical political accommodations, methods of politico-legal reasoning, and hence, of modern Islamist political projects. The final chapter reveals how far the mainstream of Islamic political thought has deviated from the classical discourses, since the 19th century, by adopting the language and ideals of the European Enlightenment. This shift is presented as a triumph of classical rationalism over literalism, whose epistemological foundations and ontological implications have yet to be acknowledged and appreciated.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).

The Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the Trail of the Data Retention Directive. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 65, May 2014

This paper examines the challenges facing the EU regarding data retention, particularly in the aftermath of the judgment Digital Rights Ireland by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of April 2014, which found the Data Retention Directive 2002/58 to be invalid. It first offers a brief historical account of the Data Retention Directive and then moves to a detailed assessment of what the judgment means for determining the lawfulness of data retention from the perspective of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: what is wrong with the Data Retention Directive and how would it need to be changed to comply with the right to respect for privacy? The paper also looks at the responses to the judgment from the European institutions and elsewhere, and presents a set of policy suggestions to the European institutions on the way forward. It is argued here that one of the main issues underlying the Digital Rights Ireland judgment has been the role of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, and in particular the extent to which the retention of metadata for law enforcement purposes is consistent with EU citizens’ right to respect for privacy and to data protection. The paper offers three main recommendations to EU policy-makers: first, to give priority to a full and independent evaluation of the value of the data retention directive; second, to assess the judgment’s implications for other large EU information systems and proposals that provide for the mass collection of metadata from innocent persons, in the EU; and third, to adopt without delay the proposal for Directive COM(2012)10 dealing with data protection in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.