There is 'hope for you yet': The female drug offender in sentencing discourse

Language and gender research has, in recent years, emphasised the importance of examining the context-specific ways in which people ‘do gender’ in different situations. In this paper, we explore how women involved in drug offences, specifically methamphetamine manufacture offences, are constructed within the language of the courts. Thirty-six sentencing transcripts from the New Zealand courts were examined to investigate how such offences, committed by women, are understood. In order to explore the representation of female offenders, a critical discourse analytic approach was adopted. Such an approach recognises that linguistic modes not only create and legitimise power inequalities but also embody a specific worldview. Three gendered discourses were identified in the sentencing texts: (i) the discourse of femininity, reinforcing the socially prescribed female role; (ii) the discourse of aberration, concerning women who breach traditional gender role expectations, and; (iii) the discourse of salvation, presenting aberrant women with an opportunity to become ‘good’ women once again. The findings illustrate the ways in which processes of gendering take place within a specific community of practice: the courtroom.

Exclusive consumers: The discourse of privilege in elite Indian school websites

This chapter undertakes a study of how elite schools in India have a historical, colonial legacy while incorporating global, market oriented, international agenda to fit in with present times. Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of elite schools and Foucault’s theory of discourse, a qualitative analysis is undertaken of 21 elite schools. The primary argument advanced is that the websites of the schools contain the discourses of privilege and distinction along with the discourses of inclusion and exclusion, market ideology and individual merit with the aim being to promote a local, global elite ascendancy.

From workplace to profession: New focus for the information literacy discourse

The present paper suggests articulating the general context of workplace in information literacy research. The paper considers distinguishing between information literacy research in workplaces and professions. Referring to the results of a phenomenographic enquiry into web professionals’ information literacy as an example, it is indicated that work-related information literacy in particular contexts and depending on the nature of the context, is experienced beyond physical workspaces and at professional level. This involves people interacting with each other and with information at a broader level in comparison to a physically bounded workspace. Regarding the example case discussed in the paper, virtuality is identified as the dominant feature of the profession that causes information literacy to be experienced at a professional level. It is anticipated that pursuing the direction proposed in the paper will result in a more segmented image of work-related information literacy.

Käytännöt ja ajattelu Michel Foucault'n filosofiassa

Practices and Thought in Michel Foucault s Philosophy The present thesis examines Michel Foucault s (1926-1984) notion of practice and argues that it is an essential concept in his philosophy, especially in his analysis of knowledge, power and ethics. The thesis reveals a previously neglected chronological and methodological unity in Foucault s work. The first chapter clarifies Foucault s philosophy by outlining it according to four central themes. First, the main philosophical goal of his historical studies is to analyse how human subjects have become objects of their own thinking. Second, this goal calls for methodological precaution to avoid all anthropological universals. Third, Foucault s studies are directed towards fields of practices. Fourth, the analysis of practices is executed along three axes: knowledge, power and ethics. The second chapter concerns the notion of practice in Foucault s archaeological method. Foucault s archaeological analysis is not directed towards objects and subjects as such, but to the way that the rules of discursive practice form them in the discourse. Many commentators have neglected Foucault s concept of practice when discussing his ideas concerning rules of discourse and limits of knowledge. I argue that Foucault s analysis concerning the limits of knowledge relates to local and contingent rules of discursive practice, not to transcendental rules of thinking in general. The third chapter deals with power relations and practices. I clarify Foucault s concept of dispositif by defining it as a functional ensemble of practices, and argue that this concept is crucial to his understanding of power relations. I stress a conceptual definition, which separates relations of power from the practices of government and show that the latter is based on the idea that power relations are integrated into practices. This conceptual clarification also helps in understanding Foucault s critique concerning modern practices of power. The fourth chapter examines Foucault s way of perceiving ethics as a practice. He separates three essential dimensions in morals: moral codes, moral behaviour and practices of self. His ethics concern practices of self and he studies how these practices have constituted different relations that subjects have to themselves, to others and to their societies. I argue that Foucault s own ethical views can be found in the ideas on the importance of practices of self in the modern world, and emphasize that these ideas should be connected to his views concerning the tradition of the Enlightenment, and to his own political action.

Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Discourse on the centennial of Neve Shalome, Surinam, by Judah A. Devries

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Conrad Summenhart's theory of individual rights and its medieval background

This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.

Critical Discourse Analysis research methods for the English classroom

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an approach to analysing the discourses that operate in social contexts, such as classrooms in schools, and their material effects on people, such as teachers and learners. CDA offers a range of ways of engaging with the relationship between texts in context and the power they exercise. In this article, I overview key approaches and provide detail of Fairclough’s (1992, 2003) textually-oriented, linguistic method of CDA, with an example from my own research. I offer a challenge for English teachers, as researchers, to ‘make strange’ the familiar world of their classroom work, and in so doing, identify possibilities for productive change.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

With the best of intentions: A critical discourse analysis of HPE curriculum materials

Much of physical education curriculum in the developed world and specifically in Australia tends to be guided in principle by syllabus documents that represent, in varying degrees, some form of government education priorities. Through the use of critical discourse analysis we analyze one such syllabus example (an official syllabus document of one of the Australian States) to explore the relationships between the emancipatory/social justice expectations presented in the rubric of and introduction to the official syllabus document, and the language details of learning outcomes that indicate how the expectations might be satisfied. Given the complexity and multilevel pathways of message systems/ideologies we question the efficacy of such documents oriented around social justice principles to genuinely deliver more radical agendas which promote social change and encourage a preparedness to engage in social action leading to a betterment of society.

Understanding teachers: The potential and possibility of discourse analysis

Understanding the ways in which teachers make sense of what they do and why is critical to a broader understanding of pedagogy. Historically, teachers have been understood through the thematic and content analysis of their beliefs or philosophies. In this paper, we argue that discourse analysis (DA) involves a much finer-grained analysis of the ‘lifeworlds’ of teachers and, in our view, provides a more detailed canvas from which inferences can be made. Our argument is structured in four parts. We begin by locating DA within the physical education (PE) literature and discuss what others have referred to as its relatively modest use. Following our location of DA, we outline a conceptual framework that we regard as useful, which contains six interrelated principles. We then introduce the idea of interpretive repertoires, which we consider to have particular explanatory power as well as being a sophisticated way to represent the subjectivities of PE teachers. Finally, we discuss the methodological strengths of interpretive repertoires. The paper concludes with a discussion on the theoretical and practical merits of adopting DA to analyse problems within PE.

A discourse of ‘abnormality’: Exploring discussions of people living in Australia with a deafness or hearing loss

Adopting a social constructionist framework, the authors conducted a synthetic discourse analysis to explore how people living in Australia with deafness construct their experience of deafness. An online forum facilitated access and communication between the lead author and 24 widely dispersed and linguistically diverse forum contributors. The authors discuss the productive and restrictive effects of the emergent discourse of deafness as abnormal and the rhetorical strategies mobilized in people’s accounts: fitting in, acceptance as permission to be different, and the need to prove normality. Using these strategies was productive in that the forum respondents were enabled to reposition deafness as a positive, socially valued identity position. However, the need to manage deafness was reproduced as an individual concern, disallowing any exploration of how deafness could be reconstructed as socially valued. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the deafness as abnormal discourse.

Kriitkko Einari J. Vehmas ja moderni taide

The doctoral dissertation Critic Einari J. Vehmas and Modern Art deals with one of the central figures of the Finnish art scene and his work as an art critic, art museum curator and cultural critic. The main body of research material consists of the writings of Einari J. Vehmas (1902 1980) from 1937 to the late 1960s. Vehmas wrote art reviews for magazines, and from the year 1945 he was a regular art critic for one of the major newspapers in Finland. Vehmas was heavily inclined towards French literature and visual arts. Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire influenced his views on the nature of art from the late 1920s onwards. Vehmas is commonly regarded as the most influential art critic of post-war Finland. His writings have been referred to and cited in numerous research papers on Finnish 20th-century art. A lesser known aspect of his work is his position as the deputy director of the Ateneum Art Museum, the Finnish national gallery. Through his art museum work, his opinions also shaped the canon of modern art considered particularly Finnish following the second world war. The main emphasis of the dissertation is on studying Vehmas s writings, but it also illustrates the diversity of his involvement in Finnish cultural life through biographical documents. The long chronological span of the dissertation emphasises how certain central themes accumulate in Vehmas s writings. The aim of the dissertation is also to show how strongly certain philosophical and theoretical concepts from the early 20th century, specifically Wassily Kandinsky s principle of inner necessity and Henri Bergson s epistemology highlighting intuition and instinct, continued to influence the Finnish art discourse even in the early 1960s, in part thanks to the writings of Vehmas. Throughout his production, Vehmas contemplated the state and future of modern art and humanity. Vehmas used a colourful, vitalistic rhetoric to emphasise the role of modern art as a building block of culture and humanity. At the same time, however, he was a cultural pessimist whose art views became infused with anxiety, a sense of loss, and a desire to turn his back on the world.