Corporate Governance in Indonesia: A Study on Governance of Business Groups

This study deals with the issue of corporate governance in the case of Indonesian business groups. It examines what factors can be attributed to failures of corporate governance. Through case studies of six different types of business groups, it evidences that self-governance by owner-managers can function well if there is no other key stakeholder and no collusion with the government. When this is not the case, however, self-governance does not work, and governance by creditors or professional managers over owner-managers has limitations. For better corporate governance, there is a need not only for building internal governance mechanism of business groups, but also for strengthening external monitoring institutions including creditors, capital markets, the governmental as well as non-governmental systems.

Staying in the Delaware Corporate Governance Lane: Fee Shifting Bylaws and a Legislative Reaffirmation of the Rules of the Road

The Delaware legislature has taken steps towards the adoption of amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) that would prohibit fee shifting provisions in the articles and bylaws. The language in the legislative proposal, however, addresses fee shifting provisions only in the context of "internal corporate claims." Some have raised concerns that this language would allow for fee shifting provisions that applied to other types of actions, including at least some cases brought under the securities laws. This piece suggests that in fact the Delaware General Corporation Law already prohibits the adoption of bylaws and certificate provisions that apply to causes of action unrelated to internal corporate claims. As a result, there was no reason for the Delaware legislature to expressly bar fee shifting provisions in these types of actions.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

The influence of corporate governance characteristics on changes in risk following the global financial crisis evidence from companies listed in the portuguese stock market

Apesar da crescente regulação da atividade empresarial e do estabelecimento de normas e recomendações relativamente ao governo das sociedades verificados desde o início da década passada, as empresas de grande parte dos sectores de atividade económica foram seriamente afetadas durante a crise financeira global. Este estudo permite concluir que houve aumentos significativos no risco total e idiossincrático das empresas não financeiras cotadas na Euronext Lisboa após a falência do banco Lehman Bothers, a 15 de Setembro de 2008. Estes resultados são coerentes com o aumento da incerteza dos investidores verificado durante o período de crise, resultante do colapso de alguns dos maiores bancos do último século, que se traduziu numa falta de confiança generalizada nas instituições financeiras que resultou em maiores dificuldades na obtenção de créditos bancários e num aumentos dos custos de capital, durante este período. Os resultados sugerem que as alterações verificadas nas medidas do risco variaram de acordo com as características de governação e características específicas das empresas, quer num horizonte temporal mais curto, quer num horizonte temporal mais alargado. O mercado de capitais premiou as empresas com um número relativamente maior de administradores não-executivos e com administradores que exercem (em média) cargos de gestão num maior número de empresas ou instituições. Por outro lado, o mercado de capitais penalizou as empresas com um número relativamente maior de administradores independentes, maior concentração de capital, maiores oportunidades de crescimento, maior alavancagem financeira e maior liquidez corrente.

Corporate governance codes in Australia and New Zealand: Propriety and prosperity

Overview of the central features of corporate governance codes, 'Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations' (released by the ASX Corporate Governance Council) and 'Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines' (released by New Zealand Securities Commission) - whether the codes address the right problem - are the solutions of independence and disclosure conceptually and practically viable - whether codes pay sufficient attention to wealth creation.

Corporate governance options for the local subsidiaries of multinational enterprises

While the corporate governance literature generally focuses on the parent legal entity, many organisations are now multinational enterprises (MNEs) with subsidiaries that are most often legal entities in their host countries. Despite the strengthening of corporate governance regimes internationally, the boards of these subsidiaries are in many instances perfunctory. This paper examines the question of whether developments in corporate governance theory and practice can add value for the local subsidiaries of MNEs. This paper provides a theoretical basis for evaluating governance models in MNEs. The paper commences with a review of the key concepts from the MNE and conglomerates literature with respect to core MNE strategies. The paper then discusses what the "governance roles" are that must be performed in MNE subsidiaries. We propose four governance frameworks for subsidiary corporations. These frameworks are: (1) Direct Control; (2) Dual Reporting; (3) Advisory Board; (4) Local Board. We consider the strengths and weaknesses of each model in relation to international strategy theory. We conclude with recommendations for the conditions under which the various models may be appropriate and practical guidelines for the utilisation of corporate governance theory to improve MNE performance.