947 resultados para leader election
Resumo:
Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.
Coverage and nonresponse errors in an individual register frame-based Swiss telephone election study
Resumo:
A guide describing the steps, requirements and procedures necessary to register to vote in Iowa.
Resumo:
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.
Resumo:
Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore the identification of testable predictions isvery difficult. We study a vertical product differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However, we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some initial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis totest whether the risk dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour oflaboratory agents. We show that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.
Resumo:
As of January 1, 2008, Iowa law allows you to register to vote on Election Day at the polling place for the precinct you currently live in. After showing proper identification you may register and vote at the precinct the same day. Please open file for more information.
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education
Resumo:
Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education