943 resultados para immaterial property rights
Resumo:
We have compared three cases of payments for water-related environmental services (PES) in Central America, in terms of socioeconomic background, opportunity costs of forest conservation and stakeholders’ perceptions on the conditions of water resources and other issues. We found that, in general, the foregone benefits from land uses alternative to forest cover are larger than the amount paid, which apparently contradicts the economic foundation of PES schemes. A number of possible explanations are explored. The results also suggest that trade-offs between different environmental and social goals are likely to emerge in PES schemes, posing some doubts on their ability to be multipurpose instruments for environmental improvement and rural development. We also found that PES schemes may work as a conflictresolution instrument, facilitating downstream -upstream problem solving, though at the same time they might introduce changes in social perceptions of property rights.
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It is usually assumed that the appraisal of the impacts experienced by present generations does not entail any difficulty. However, this is not true. Moreover, there is not a widely accepted methodology for taking these impacts into account. Some of the controversial issues are: the appropriate value for the discount rate, the choice of the units for expressing the impacts, physical or monetary units -income, consumption or investment- and the valuation of tangible and intangible goods. When approaching the problem of very long term impacts, there is also the problem of valuing the impacts experienced by future generations, through e.g., the use of an intergenerational discount rate. However, if this were the case, the present generation perspective would prevail, as if all the property rights on the resources were owned by them. Therefore, the sustainability requirement should also be incorporated into the analysis. We will analyze these problems in this article and show some possible solutions.
Resumo:
In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.
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Growth models which imply a scale effect are commonly refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. A focus on the extent of the market as opposed to the scale of the country has led recent studies to reconsider the role that country scale plays when conditioning on other factors. We consider a variant of a simple learning by doing model to account for the potential role for institutions in determining the strength – and direction – of the scale effect. Using cross-country data, we find a significant interaction between property rights institutions and the effect of scale on long-run growth: In countries with poor property rights institutions, scale is positively related with income per capita; where property rights institutions are good, higher scale is associated with lower per capita ncomes. We find no evidence of such role for contracting institutions.
Resumo:
The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution, we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth, and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.
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This is the third edition of the compendium. It documents the status of important projects on nanomaterial toxicity and exposure monitoring, integrated risk management, research infrstructure and coordination and support activities. The compendium is not intended to be a guidance document for human health and environmental safety management of nanotechnologies, as such guidance documents already exist and are widely available. Neither is the compendium intended to be a medium for the publication of scientific papers and research results, as this task is covered by scientific conferences and the reviewed press. The compendium aims to bring researchers closer together and show them the potential for synergy in their work. It is a means to establish links and communication between them during the actual research phase and well before the publication of their results. It thus focuses on the communication of projects' strategic aims, extensively covers specific work objectives and the methods used in research, and documents human capacities and available laboratory infrastructure. As such, the compendium supports collaboration on common goals and the joint elaboration of future plans, whilst compromising neither the potential for scientific publication, nor intellectual property rights. [Auteurs]
Resumo:
This paper shows how one of the developers of QWERTY continued to use the trade secret that underlay its development to seek further efficiency improvements after its introduction. It provides further evidence that this was the principle used to design QWERTY in the first place and adds further weight to arguments that QWERTY itself was a consequence of creative design and an integral part of a highly efficient system rather than an accident of history. This further serves to raise questions over QWERTY's forced servitude as 'paradigm case' of inferior standard in the path dependence literature. The paper also shows how complementarities in forms of intellectual property rights protection played integral roles in the development of QWERTY and the search for improvements on it, and also helped effectively conceal the source of the efficiency advantages that QWERTY helped deliver.
Resumo:
In recent years various studies have examined the factors that may explain academic patents. Existing analyses have also underlined the substantial differences to be found in European countries in the institutional framework that defines property rights for academic patents. The objective of this study is to contribute to the empirical literature on the factors explaining academic patents and to determine whether the incentives that universities offer researchers contribute towards explaining the differences in academic patenting activity. The results of the econometric analysis for the Spanish universities point towards the conclusion that the principal factor determining the patents is funding of R&D while royalty incentives to researchers do not appear to be significant.
Resumo:
ISAFRUIT is an integrated European Union Project focussed on increasing fruit consumption as a means to improve human health, through evaluating the fruit chain and addressing bottlenecks therein.The innovations which are being developed throughout the ISAFRUIT Project have been analysed to determine both the success factors and the obstacles in reaching the commercialisation stage. Only 9.58% of the deliverables planned within the Project were focussed on developing technological innovations.There is evidence, however, of successes in the development of new innovations arising from the ISAFRUIT Project, with several other potential innovations in the pipeline. Of the technologies identified, 67% are still at the “invention stage”; that is, the stage prior to bridging the so-called “valley of death”, the stage between an invention and an innovation. Those which are considered to have moved over the “valley of death” either had industry partners included in the Project, or had consulted with industry to ensure that the technology was relevant, or met a recognised industry need. Many of the technologies which made less progress did not have the same interactions with industry. A number of other issues were identified which prevented further progress towards innovation. The need for scientists to publish scientific papers, both for their career pathways and to increase their chances of future funding, was identified as one issue, although the filing of patents is now becoming more accepted and recognised. The patenting system is considered complex by many scientists and is not well-understood. Finally, agreements between partners on the sharing of intellectual property rights can cause a delay in the innovation process.
Resumo:
En este trabajo se analiza la política petrolera mexicana durante el período 1938-2000 y su aportación al crecimiento económico mexicano. La orientación de la producción petrolera permite distinguir dos modelos de gestión de la industria petrolera. El primero de ellos; entre 1938-1976 tuvo por finalidad el aprovisionamiento energético del mercado interior a bajos precios. El segundo a partir de 1976 orientado hacia la exportación y la captura de la renta petrolera internacional. Esta ruptura en la política petrolera asociada constituye un caso interesante en sí mismo porque permite comparar los efectos de dos políticas totalmente opuestas sobre el crecimiento económico y sobre el desempeño de la propia industria petrolera en un país donde el Estado tiene derechos de propiedad exclusivos sobre el sector petrolero. Por ello, se aborda el tema como una problemática institucional que toma en cuenta tanto las características internas de México como la dinámica del mercado petrolero internacional. Se incide en el hecho de que el Estado mexicano ha utilizado a la industria petrolera y; concretamente los recursos que ésta genera no sólo como un instrumento para favorecer el crecimiento económico del país sino también para mantener el control del poder político frente a la élite económica. Así el inmovilismo institucional; la falta de ingresos e inversiones propias y el comportamiento rentista del Estado parecen haber condenado al sector petrolero mexicano al atraso y la ineficiencia. De este modo; se focaliza en las interrelaciones entre las instituciones económicas y políticas como elemento explicativo del por qué la industria petrolera no ha logrado convertirse en un elemento dinamizador del crecimiento económico mexicano en el largo plazo.
Resumo:
Cette thèse est construite en quatre parties : trois annexes qui présentent six études de cas (env. 800 pages), précédées par une analyse transversale, plus synthétique (env. 150 pages), dont traite ce résumé. Chaque annexe contient une synthèse détaillée des études de cas. Cette thèse aborde la « gestion des ressources naturelles » en affirmant d'emblée que l'appellation est inappropriée, car ce ne sont pas les ressources qui sont gérées, mais leurs usages. Il s'agit donc d'identifier et d'analyser ce qui influence les comportements humains en lien avec la ressource. Cette affirmation fonde la perspective des sciences sociales sur la gestion des ressources naturelles, dans laquelle s'inscrit cette thèse. L'approche néo-institutionnaliste considère que les usages sont influencés par des institutions, qui sont elles-mêmes influencées par les usagers. Ces institutions sont des constructions humaines qui composent le contexte institutionnel dans lequel les acteurs décident de leurs usages (abattre un arbre, prélever de l'eau, etc.). Les usages des ressources ne sont donc jamais libres et il s'agit de comprendre comment ces règles du jeu influencent les pratiques. Elles sont nombreuses, interdépendantes et forment la trame sur laquelle se décident les usages. Pour saisir cette complexité, l'auteur applique le cadre d'analyse des régimes institutionnels des ressources (RIR) qui se limite à l'analyse de deux types de droits d'usages : ceux issues des règles de la propriété (titres de propriété, servitudes, etc.) et ceux issus des politiques publiques (lois, ordonnances, etc.). Le RIR permet d'identifier un « régime institutionnel », spécifique à la ressource étudiée, dont les évolutions peuvent être comparées dans le temps ou entre plusieurs lieux. Dans cette recherche, ce cadre d'analyse a été appliqué au même objet - la gestion forestière dans les zones de captage d'eau souterraine destinée au réseau public - dans trois pays : en France, en Suisse et en Indonésie. Trois années de recherche de terrain ont permis à l'auteur de s'intéresser non seulement aux règles prédéterminées (la réglementation), mais aussi aux règles effectivement activées sur le terrain (la régulation) par les acteurs rencontrés. Les études de cas montrent que les règles prévues sont inégalement activées et que les acteurs privilégient parfois la négociation directe pour résoudre leurs rivalités d'usages, à la place d'invoquer leurs droits acquis. Ce constat conduit l'auteur à proposer un élargissement de la focale du RIR, qui constitue le coeur de sa thèse. On ne s'intéresse plus seulement à ce qui « est » régulé, mais aussi à ce qui ne l'« est pas » et qui échappe à l'application classique du RIR. Ce renversement de perspective est crucial pour comprendre les usages concrets des ressources dans les régimes peu intégrés, où les pratiques s'expliquent davantage par la marge de manoeuvre laissée aux acteurs que par les règles prédéterminées. Cette relecture, testée avec succès dans cette thèse, permet d'intégrer la marge de manoeuvre à l'analyse au moyen du RIR. Elle se concrétise par l'identification des lacunes et incohérences dans les régimes institutionnels étudiés. Le champ d'application du RIR s'en trouve élargi et sa vulgarisation pour des non-spécialistes est facilitée, notamment pour les environnementalistes. La complémentarité entre les approches s'en trouve renforcée. Les résultats montrent deux choses : premièrement les acteurs disposent toujours d'une marge de manoeuvre pour négocier des régulations ponctuelles, qui sont autant d'alternatives à l'application des règles prévues. Deuxièmement, la conclusion d'accords issus de la négociation bi-/multilatérale dépend directement de la marge de manoeuvre laissée par le contexte institutionnel. Ceci explique pourquoi la négociation entre les propriétaires forestiers et les exploitants de captages s'imposent en Indonésie, est envisageable en France, mais n'aboutit pas en Suisse. Les nombreuses tentatives infructueuses de mise en oeuvre de solutions négociées, notamment sous forme de paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE), trouvent ici une explication. - This thesis (written in French) is built in four parts: three annexes that present six case studies (approx. 800 pages), preceded by a transverse, more conceptual analysis (approx. 150 pages), which this summary is about. Each annexe contains a detailed summary of the case studies. 'Natural resource management' is an inappropriate designation because it is not the resources that are managed but the uses made of them, therefore this thesis addresses the identification and analysis of the influences on human behaviour in relation to the resource. This statement roots the social sciences perspective on the management of natural resources, in which this thesis fits. A neoinstitutionalist approach considers that the uses are influenced by institutions, which are themselves influenced by users. These institutions are human constructions that form the institutional context in which the actors decide on the use of resources (felling a tree, collecting water, etc.). Thus, the uses of resources are never independent from institutional influences and it becomes necessary to understand how these rules of the game affect practices. They are numerous, interrelated and form the basis for the uses of resources. To understand this complexity, the author applies the institutional regime resource framework (IRR) which limits the analysis to two types of use rights: those resulting from the property rights (deeds, easements, etc.) and those from public policies (laws, ordinances, etc.). The IRR identifies an 'institutional regime', specific to the resource, from which developments can be compared over time or between several places. In this research, this analytical framework has been applied to the same topic - forest management in the recharging areas of groundwater piped for public supply - in three countries: France, Switzerland and Indonesia. Three years of field research allow the author to look not only at predetermined rules (rules), but also at regulations that are actually activated on the ground (rules-in-use). The case studies show that the predetermined rules are unevenly applied and that sometimes actors favour direct negotiation to resolve their rivalry of uses, instead of invoking their vested rights. From this observation the author proposes an enlargement of the IRR's scope, forming the core of his thesis. The interest covers not only what 'is' regulated, but what 'is not' and so is beyond the classical application of the IRR. This shift in perspective is crucial to understand the concrete uses of resources in poorly integrated regimes, where practices are explained by the margin of manoeuvre left to the actors rather than predetermined rules. This reinterpretation, tested successfully in this research, allows the margin of manoeuvre to be integrated in the analysis using the IRR and is made concrete by the identification of gaps and inconsistencies in the investigated institutional context. The new interpretation of the IRR in this thesis complements and enhances its classical application. In particular, its use and understanding by non-specialists, especially environmentalists, is facilitated. The results show two things: first the actors always have leeway to negotiate ad hoc regulations, which are alternatives to the application of the predefined rules. Second, the conclusion of bi/multilateral negotiated agreements depends directly on the leeway left by the institutional context. This explains why the negotiation between forest owners and operators of water catchments is needed in Indonesia, is possible in France, but does not succeed in Switzerland. This offers an explanation for many unsuccessful attempts to implement negotiated solutions, notably payments for environmental services (PES).
Resumo:
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.
Resumo:
This paper aims at presenting the stakes related to the access to protected land in the United States and to its conservation, through the analysis of the professional practice of U.S. mountain guides. From a methodological standpoint, this research is based both on a theoretical analysis grounded in the field of environmental economics and on an empirical study. The authors' starting point is Garrett Hardin's paper, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (Science, 1968), even if it introduces some confusion on the notion of common goods. So as to avoid this confusion, the authors use two theoretical tools pertaining to a typology of common goods and the different property rights that can be applied in National Parks. Finally, they apply this framework to the observations made on the field in Colorado in July 2009.
Resumo:
We build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour (i.e., fighting efforts) and for endogenous natural resource exploitation (i.e., speed, ownership, and investments). While depletion is spread in a balanced Hotelling fashion during peace, the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction, as this lowers the stakes of future contest. This voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue, especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government's weapon advantage is weak. Some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons. The shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction, as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee. Furthermore, the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation, which leads to more government turnover. Without credible commitment to future fighting efforts, private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government's non-oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful, which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe.
Resumo:
La station touristique représente un espace urbain consacré principalement au tourisme, tout en comprenant également une population résidente permanente. Du point de vue de la gestion des réseaux urbains de l'eau, cette caractéristique induit pour ce type de lieu des usages propres à tout espace urbain mais également des spécificités liées à la forte fluctuation saisonnière de la population résidente ou encore à la présence d'usages particuliers tels que l'irrigation des golfs, la production de neige artificielle ou le thermalisme. Dès lors, la planification de l'approvisionnement est délicate et peu prévisible. Ces difficultés sont renforcées par le fait que les concentrations temporelles de la demande coïncident généralement avec des périodes de stress hydrique notable. Dans le cas de stations balnéaires, les pics de fréquentation interviennent en général durant l'été lorsque la ressource en eau est peu disponible. Le problème est similaire dans les stations touristiques de montagne où l'eau est généralement indisponible car stockée sous forme de neige durant les mois de forte fréquentation. De plus, ces difficultés sont souvent renforcées par la localisation géographique des stations touristiques, fréquemment situées dans des espaces sensibles du point de vue de la ressource en eau, avec des situations de pénuries temporelles, voire structurelles. Ces problématiques propres à la plupart des stations touristiques mènent souvent à de fortes rivalités entre, d'une part, les différents usages touristiques de la ressource, et d'autre part, les usages autochtones et touristiques. Les particularités liées au tourisme tendent ainsi à renforcer les rivalités entre différents types de secteurs d'activité (approvisionnement en eau potable, tourisme, hydroélectricité, enneigement artificiel, irrigation, etc.). Ces différents usages de la ressource mis en concurrence nécessitent dès lors la mise en oeuvre de réglementations structurées à travers des politiques publiques ainsi que des droits de propriété et selon des composantes nationales, régionales et locales ; soit un cadre institutionnel que nous proposons d'appeler Régime Institutionnel de Ressource (RIR) (Knoepfel et al. 2001, 2007). A travers cette thèse de doctorat, nous répondons à différentes questions de recherche. Nous tentons d'abord de comprendre comment ces différents RIR sont-ils mis en oeuvre dans le cadre d'espaces touristiques ? Comment ceux-ci sont-ils concrétisés par les acteurs et quels sont leurs effets en termes de durabilité technique, environnementale, sociale et économique des réseaux urbains de l'eau ? Nous questionnons ensuite les effets du tourisme sur la gestion des infrastructures de réseau à l'échelle de la station touristique et de son bassin versant et nous interrogeons sur les effets du tourisme en termes de gestion des eaux urbaines. Nous portons notre attention sur deux stations touristiques situées dans deux contextes institutionnels différents (Crans-Montana en Suisse et Morzine-Avoriaz en France) et y étudions trois types de régimes institutionnels en particulier : la régie directe (gestion publique), l'affermage (gestion déléguée) et la gestion privée des infrastructures. Les résultats de cette thèse de doctorat indiquent tout d'abord dans quelle mesure le tourisme modifie de façon significative la perception et les modalités de gestion de la ressource en eau et des infrastructures. Ils montrent ensuite que l'espace fonctionnel de la gestion de ces infrastructures correspond rarement aux limites du réseau hydrographique naturel et quelles en sont les implications en termes de durabilité. Enfin, la comparaison de différents régimes institutionnels révèle les forces et les faiblesses de chaque modèle de gestion dans le cas spécifique des stations touristiques et également les différentes solutions adoptées localement pour la mise en oeuvre d'un arrangement institutionnel permettant un usage plus ou moins durable des infrastructures de réseau et du réseau hydrographique naturel. - Tourism resort represents an urban area mainly dedicated to tourism while including at the same time a permanent residential population. From the point of view of urban water networks, this characteristic induces a strong seasonal fluctuation of residential population and involves special water uses such as golf irrigation, production of artificial snow or functioning of thermal baths. Therefore, water supply planning can be tricky and difficult to predict. These difficulties are reinforced by the fact that temporary concentrations of water demand coïncidé generally with periods of water stress. In the case of seaside resorts, frequenting peaks arise in general during summer when water resource is less available. The problem is similar in mountainous tourist resorts where water is generally unavailable as it is stored as snow during months of highest frequenting. Furthermore, these difficulties are often reinforced by resorts' geographical localisations, which are often situated in sensitive areas in terms of temporary or structural water shortages. These problematic issues often lead to strong rivalries between tourists' water uses on the one hand, and between locals and tourists uses on the other hand. Thus, features of tourism tend to reinforce rivalries between different sectors of activity (supply of drinking water, tourism, hydroelectricity, artificial snow, irrigation, etc.). These different and competing water uses need the implementation of rules structured through public policies and property rights and through national, regional and local legal components; We propose to call this framework as an Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) (Knoepfel et al. 2001, 2007, 2009). Through this PhD thesis, we answer different research questions. We firstly aim to understand how those different IRR are implemented within tourism spaces? How do actors materialize them and what are their effects in term of technical, environmental, social and economical sustainability of urban water networks? We then, investigate effects of tourism on water networks infrastructures' management at the scale of the tourist resort and its river basin. We focus our attention on two tourist resorts situated within two different institutional contexts (Crans-Montana, Switzerland and Morzine-Avoriaz, France) and study three types of institutional regime in particular: public, delegated and private management of infrastructures. Results of this PhD thesis indicate firstly how tourism modifies in a significant way the perception and management modalities of water resource and infrastructures. Results also show that functional space of infrastructures management rarely matches with the limits of the natural river basin and indicates what it means in terms of sustainability. Finally, the comparison of different institutional regimes reveals the strengths and weakness of each management model in the specific case of tourist resorts and shows the different solutions in locally implementing an institutional arrangement for a more or less sustainable management of network infrastructures and natural water system.