976 resultados para endogenous spillovers
Resumo:
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.
Resumo:
Applying the competing--risks model to multi--cause mortality,this paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the positive complementarities that occur between disease--specific policy interventions. We argue that since an individual cannot die twice, competing risks imply that individuals will not waste resources on causes that are not the most immediate, but will make health investments so as to equalize cause--specific mortality. However, equal mortality risk from a variety of diseases does not imply that disease--specific public health interventions are a waste. Rather, a cause--specific intervention produces spillovers to other disease risks, so that the overall reduction in mortality will generally be larger than the direct effect measured on the targeted disease. The assumption that mortality from non--targeted diseases remains the same after a cause--specific intervention under--estimates the true effect of such programs, since the background mortality is also altered as a result of intervention. Analyzing data from one of the most important public health programs ever introduced, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) of the United Nations, we find evidence for the existence of such complementarities, involving causes that are not biomedically, but behaviorally, linked.
Resumo:
Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.
Resumo:
The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.
Resumo:
I study the relation between the delay in the transmission of spilloversof information and diffusion. When a firm enters or innovates it benefitsfrom the information it gets by observing past entry. Delays in the processof receiving the information reduce the benefits of the spillover and affectthe entry process.I derive the effects this delay has on diffusion, on the dynamics of priceand cost of entry, and on efficiency. I explain why, when spillovers ofinformation are delayed, a zero profit condition requires an initial set ofentrants bigger than zero. I also illustrate how an S-shaped diffusion curvecan be generated. I show that competitive equilibrium entails a slowergeneration of information relative to the social optimum and how a socialplanner can improve efficiency.
Resumo:
Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations withprivately informed agents. In those models the information structure isassumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether suchmodels, and the results they produce, are robust with respect theendogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whetherinformation acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategicsituation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we findthat only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous,the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly butmoves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, privateinformation acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.
Resumo:
This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationshipbetween R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.
Resumo:
We analyze a model where a multinational firm can use its superiortechnology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate trainingof local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign directinvestment arise when such managers are later hired by a localfirm. Benefits for the host economy may also take the form of therent that trained managers receive by the foreign affiliate toprevent them from moving to local competitors. We study conditionsunder which technological spillovers occur. We also show that undercertain circumstances the multinational firm might find it optimalto resort to export instead of foreign direct investment, to avoiddissipation of its intangible assets.
Resumo:
A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.
Resumo:
Tolerance against superantigens (SAgs) encoded by endogenous mouse mammary tumor virus (Mtv) loci involves the intrathymic deletion of SAg-reactive T cells expressing a particular TCR V beta-chain, presumably upon presentation of the SAg by specialized APC. However, although the role of dendritic cells (DC) in the induction of tolerance against conventional Ags has been demonstrated, little is known about the role played by DC in tolerance induction against Mtv SAgs. Moreover, there is conflicting evidence concerning the capacity of DC to express and present Mtv SAgs. In this report we have analyzed the expression of Mtv SAgs in highly purified thymic and splenic DC and B cells by reverse transcriptase-PCR, using primers amplifying Mtv SAg-specific spliced mRNAs. DC express Mtv SAgs at levels comparable to B cells, but display a differential expression pattern of the various Mtv loci compared with B cells. Furthermore, our results show that DC are able to induce the deletion of SAg-reactive thymocytes in an in vitro assay, indicating that Mtv SAgs are functionally expressed on the DC surface. Collectively, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that DC play a role in the induction of intrathymic tolerance to Mtv SAgs.
Resumo:
Carbon isotope ratio (CIR) analysis has been routinely and successfully used in sports drug testing for many years to uncover the misuse of endogenous steroids. One limitation of the method is the availability of steroid preparations exhibiting CIRs equal to endogenous steroids. To overcome this problem, hydrogen isotope ratios (HIR) of endogenous urinary steroids were investigated as a potential complement; results obtained from a reference population of 67 individuals are presented herein. An established sample preparation method was modified and improved to enable separate measurements of each analyte of interest where possible. From the fraction of glucuronidated steroids; pregnanediol, 16-androstenol, 11-ketoetiocholanolone, androsterone (A), etiocholanolone (E), dehydroepiandrosterone (D), 5α- and 5β-androstanediol, testosterone and epitestosterone were included. In addition, sulfate conjugates of A, E, D, epiandrosterone and 17α- and 17β-androstenediol were considered and analyzed after acidic solvolysis. The obtained results enabled the calculation of the first reference-population-based thresholds for HIR of urinary steroids that can readily be applied to routine doping control samples. Proof-of-concept was accomplished by investigating urine specimens collected after a single oral application of testosterone-undecanoate. The HIR of most testosterone metabolites were found to be significantly influenced by the exogenous steroid beyond the established threshold values. Additionally, one regular doping control sample with an extraordinary testosterone/epitestosterone ratio of 100 without suspicious CIR was subjected to the complementary methodology of HIR analysis. The HIR data eventually provided evidence for the exogenous origin of urinary testosterone metabolites. Despite further investigations on HIR being advisable to corroborate the presented reference-population-based thresholds, the developed method proved to be a new tool supporting modern sports drug testing procedures.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the issue of the interiority of the optimal population growth rate in a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, we show that the introduction of a cost of raising children allows for the possibility of the existence of an interior global maximum in the planner¿s problem, contrary to the exogenous fertility case
Resumo:
The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.