Browser security : a requirements-based approach

A browser is a convenient way to access resources located remotely on computer networks. Security in browsers has become a crucial issue for users who use them for sensitive applications without knowledge ofthe hazards. This research utilises a structure approach to analyse and propose enhancements to browser security. Standard evaluation for computer products is important as it helps users to ensure that the product they use is appropriate for their needs. Security in browsers, therefore, has been evaluated using the Common Criteria. The outcome of this was a security requirements profile which attempts to formalise the security needs of browsers. The information collected during the research was used to produce a prototype model for a secure browser program. Modifications to the Lynx browser were made to demonstrate the proposed enhancements.

Information sharing in the 21st century : progress and challenges

With the increasing threat of cyber and other attacks on critical infrastructure, governments throughout the world have been organizing industry to share information on possible threats. In Australia the Office of the Attorney General has formed Trusted Information Sharing Networks (TISN) for the various critical industries such as banking and electricity. Currently the majority of information for a TISN is shared at physical meetings. To meet cyber threats there are clearly limitations to physical meetings. Many of these limitations can be overcome by the creation of a virtual information sharing network (VISN). However there are many challenges to overcome in the design of a VISN both from a policy and technical viewpoint. We shall discuss some of these challenges in this talk.

Integrating information security policy management with corporate risk management for strategic alignment

Information security policy defines the governance and implementation strategy for information security in alignment with the corporate risk policy objectives and strategies. Research has established that alignment between corporate concerns may be enhanced when strategies are developed concurrently using the same development process as an integrative relationship is established. Utilizing the corporate risk management framework for security policy management establishes such an integrative relationship between information security and corporate risk management objectives and strategies. There is however limitation in the current literature on presenting a definitive approach that fully integrates security policy management with the corporate risk management framework. This paper presents an approach that adopts a conventional corporate risk management framework for security policy development and management to achieve alignment with the corporate risk policy. A case example is examined to illustrate the alignment achieved in each process step with a security policy structure being consequently derived in the process. It is shown that information security policy management outcomes become both integral drivers and major elements of the corporate-level risk management considerations. Further study should involve assessing the impact of the use of the proposed framework in enhancing alignment as perceived in this paper.

Requirements for enhancing trust, security and integrity of GNSS location services

The paper describes a number of requirements for enhancing the trust of location acquisition from Satellite Navigation Systems, particularly for those applications where the location is monitored through a remote GNSS receiver. We discuss how the trust of a location acquisition could be propagated to an application through the use of a proposed tamper-­resistant GNSS receiver which quantifies the trust of a location solution from the signaling used (ie. P(Y) code, Galileo SOL, PRS, CS) and provides a cryptographic proof of this to a remote application. The tamper­-resistance state of the receiver is also included in this cryptographic proof.

Automatic generation of assertions to detect potential security vulnerabilities in C programs that use union and pointer types

Type unions, pointer variables and function pointers are a long standing source of subtle security bugs in C program code. Their use can lead to hard-to-diagnose crashes or exploitable vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to attain privileged access over classified data. This paper describes an automatable framework for detecting such weaknesses in C programs statically, where possible, and for generating assertions that will detect them dynamically, in other cases. Exclusively based on analysis of the source code, it identifies required assertions using a type inference system supported by a custom made symbol table. In our preliminary findings, our type system was able to infer the correct type of unions in different scopes, without manual code annotations or rewriting. Whenever an evaluation is not possible or is difficult to resolve, appropriate runtime assertions are formed and inserted into the source code. The approach is demonstrated via a prototype C analysis tool.

Reinforcing bad behaviour : the misuse of security indicators on popular websites

Before making a security or privacy decision, Internet users should evaluate several security indicators in their browser, such as the use of HTTPS (indicated via the lock icon), the domain name of the site, and information from extended validation certificates. However, studies have shown that human subjects infrequently employ these indicators, relying on other indicators that can be spoofed and convey no cryptographic assurances. We identify four simple security indicators that accurately represent security properties of the connection and then examine 125 popular websites to determine if the sites' designs result in correctly displayed security indicators during login. In the vast majority of cases, at least some security indicators are absent or suboptimal. This suggests users are becoming habituated to ignoring recommended security indicators.

Security metrics for object-oriented designs

Several studies have developed metrics for software quality attributes of object-oriented designs such as reusability and functionality. However, metrics which measure the quality attribute of information security have received little attention. Moreover, existing security metrics measure either the system from a high level (i.e. the whole system’s level) or from a low level (i.e. the program code’s level). These approaches make it hard and expensive to discover and fix vulnerabilities caused by software design errors. In this work, we focus on the design of an object-oriented application and define a number of information security metrics derivable from a program’s design artifacts. These metrics allow software designers to discover and fix security vulnerabilities at an early stage, and help compare the potential security of various alternative designs. In particular, we present security metrics based on composition, coupling, extensibility, inheritance, and the design size of a given object-oriented, multi-class program from the point of view of potential information flow.

Assessing the impact of refactoring on security-critical object-oriented designs

Refactoring focuses on improving the reusability, maintainability and performance of programs. However, the impact of refactoring on the security of a given program has received little attention. In this work, we focus on the design of object-oriented applications and use metrics to assess the impact of a number of standard refactoring rules on their security by evaluating the metrics before and after refactoring. This assessment tells us which refactoring steps can increase the security level of a given program from the point of view of potential information flow, allowing application designers to improve their system’s security at an early stage.

Dealing with the problem of cybercrime

Lack of a universally accepted and comprehensive taxonomy of cybercrime seriously impedes international efforts to accurately identify, report and monitor cybercrime trends. There is, not surprisingly, a corresponding disconnect internationally on the cybercrime legislation front, a much more serious problem and one which the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) says requires „the urgent attention of all nations‟. Yet, and despite the existence of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, a proposal for a global cybercrime treaty was rejected by the United Nations (UN) as recently as April 2010. This paper presents a refined and comprehensive taxonomy of cybercrime and demonstrates its utility for widespread use. It analyses how the USA, the UK, Australia and the UAE align with the CoE Convention and finds that more needs to be done to achieve conformance. We conclude with an analysis of the approaches used in Australia, in Queensland, and in the UAE, in Abu Dhabi, to fight cybercrime and identify a number of shared problems.

How HCI design influences web security decisions

Even though security protocols are designed to make computer communication secure, it is widely known that there is potential for security breakdowns at the human machine interface. This paper reports on a diary study conducted in order to investigate what people identify as security decisions that they make while using the web. The study aimed to uncover how security is perceived in the individual's context of use. From this data, themes were drawn, with a focus on addressing security goals such as confidentiality and authentication. This study is the first study investigating users' web usage focusing on their self-documented perceptions of security and the security choices they made in their own environment.

Enhancing security and continuity management at international airports

Operators of busy contemporary airports have to balance tensions between the timely flow of passengers, flight operations, the conduct of commercial business activities and the effective application of security processes. In addition to specific onsite issues airport operators liaise with a range of organisations which set and enforce aviation-related policies and regulations as well as border security agencies responsible for customs, quarantine and immigration, in addition to first response security services. The challenging demands of coordinating and planning in such complex socio-technical contexts place considerable pressure on airport management to facilitate coordination of what are often conflicting goals and expectations among groups that have standing in respect to safe and secure air travel. What are, as yet, significantly unexplored issues in large airports are options for the optimal coordination of efforts from the range of public and private sector participants active in airport security and crisis management. A further aspect of this issue is how airport management systems operate when there is a transition from business-as-usual into an emergency/crisis situation and then, on recovery, back to ‘normal’ functioning. Business Continuity Planning (BCP), incorporating sub-plans for emergency response, continuation of output and recovery of degraded operating capacity, would fit such a context. The implementation of BCP practices in such a significant high security setting offers considerable potential benefit yet entails considerable challenges. This paper presents early results of a 4 year nationally funded industry-based research project examining the merger of Business Continuity Planning and Transport Security Planning as a means of generating capability for improved security and reliability and, ultimately, enhanced resilience in major airports. The project is part of a larger research program on the Design of Secure Airports that includes most of the gazetted ‘first response’ international airports in Australia, key Aviation industry groups and all aviation-related border and security regulators as collaborative partners. The paper examines a number of initial themes in the research, including: ? Approaches to integrating Business Continuity & Aviation Security Planning within airport operations; ? Assessment of gaps in management protocols and operational capacities for identifying and responding to crises within and across critical aviation infrastructure; ? Identification of convergent and divergent approaches to crisis management used across Austral-Asia and their alignment to planned and possible infrastructure evolution.