A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2005

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2005

On the computational security of a distributed key distribution scheme

In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted group. In this work, we formalize the security analysis of one such scheme which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme is secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in which allows us to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2005

SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM, August 2005

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2005

Supplemental Security Income Program

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, October 2005

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program - October 2005

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, November 2005

A-A1 - Supplemental Security Income Program - November 2005

Iowa Homeland Security & Emergency Management Division Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program January 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, December 2005

Supplemental Security Income Program December 2005

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006