Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

Segal-Bargmann transform and Paley-Wiener theorems on M(2)

We study the Segal-Bargmann transform on M(2). The range of this transform is characterized as a weighted Bergman space. In a similar fashion Poisson integrals are investigated. Using a Gutzmer's type formula we characterize the range as a class of functions extending holomorphically to an appropriate domain in the complexification of M(2). We also prove a Paley-Wiener theorem for the inverse Fourier transform.

Segal-Bargmann Transform and Paley-Wiener Theorems on Motion Groups

We study the Segal-Bargmann transform on a motion group R-n v K, where K is a compact subgroup of SO(n) A characterization of the Poisson integrals associated to the Laplacian on R-n x K is given We also establish a Paley-Wiener type theorem using complexified representations

On Paley-Wiener Theorems for the Heisenberg Group

In this paper we prove two Paley-Wiener-type theorems for the Heisenberg group. One is for the group Fourier transform which is the analogue of the classical Paley-Wiener theorem. The other one is for the spectral projections associated to the sub-Laplacian

Analogues of the Wiener-Tauberian and Schwartz theorems for radial functions on symmetric spaces

We prove a Wiener Tauberian theorem for the L-1 spherical functions on a semisimple Lie group of arbitrary real rank. We also establish a Schwartz-type theorem for complex groups. As a corollary we obtain a Wiener Tauberian type result for compactly supported distributions.

A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks

Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.

The Wiener-Hopf solution of a class of mixed boundary value problems arising in surface water wave phenomena

Two mixed boundary value problems associated with two-dimensional Laplace equation, arising in the study of scattering of surface waves in deep water (or interface waves in two superposed fluids) in the linearised set up, by discontinuities in the surface (or interface) boundary conditions, are handled for solution by the aid of the Weiner-Hopf technique applied to a slightly more general differential equation to be solved under general boundary conditions and passing on to the limit in a manner so as to finally give rise to the solutions of the original problems. The first problem involves one discontinuity while the second problem involves two discontinuities. The reflection coefficient is obtained in closed form for the first problem and approximately for the second. The behaviour of the reflection coefficient for both the problems involving deep water against the incident wave number is depicted in a number of figures. It is observed that while the reflection coefficient for the first problem steadily increases with the wave number, that for the second problem exhibits oscillatory behaviour and vanishes at some discrete values of the wave number. Thus, there exist incident wave numbers for which total transmission takes place for the second problem. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

A game theoretical multiple resource interaction approach to resource allocation in an air campaign

In this paper we propose a multiple resource interaction model in a game-theoretical framework to solve resource allocation problems in theater level military campaigns. An air raid campaign using SEAD aircraft and bombers against an enemy target defended by air defense units is considered as the basic platform. Conditions for the existence of saddle point in pure strategies is proved and explicit feedback strategies are obtained for a simplified model with linear attrition function limited by resource availability. An illustrative example demonstrates the key features.

Two stage iterative wiener filtering for speech enhancement

We formulate a two-stage Iterative Wiener filtering (IWF) approach to speech enhancement, bettering the performance of constrained IWF, reported in literature. The codebook constrained IWF (CCIWF) has been shown to be effective in achieving convergence of IWF in the presence of both stationary and non-stationary noise. To this, we include a second stage of unconstrained IWF and show that the speech enhancement performance can be improved in terms of average segmental SNR (SSNR), Itakura-Saito (IS) distance and Linear Prediction Coefficients (LPC) parameter coincidence. We also explore the tradeoff between the number of CCIWF iterations and the second stage IWF iterations.

A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

A resource based game theoretical model for military conflicts

A resource interaction based game theoretical model for military conflicts is presented in this paper. The model includes both the spatial decision capability of adversaries (decision regarding movement and subsequent distribution of resources) as well as their temporal decision capability (decision regarding level of allocation of resources for conflict with adversary’s resources). Attrition is decided at present by simple deterministic models. An additional feature of this model is the inclusion of the possibility of a given resource interacting with several resources of the adversary.The decisions of the adversaries is determined by solving for the equilibrium Nash strategies given that the objectives of the adversaries may not be in direct conflict. Examples are given to show the applicability of these models and solution concepts.