Driving better vegetable irrigation through profitable practice change

The availability and quality of irrigation water has become an issue limiting productivity in many Australian vegetable regions. Production is also under competitive pressure from supply chain forces. Producers look to new technologies, including changing irrigation infrastructure, exploring new water sources, and more complex irrigation management, to survive these stresses. Often there is little objective information investigating which improvements could improve outcomes for vegetable producers, and external communities (e.g. meeting NRM targets). This has led to investment in inappropriate technologies, and costly repetition of errors, as business independently discover the worth of technologies by personal experience. In our project, we investigated technology improvements for vegetable irrigation. Through engagement with industry and other researchers, we identified technologies most applicable to growers, particularly those that addressed priority issues. We developed analytical tools for ‘what if’ scenario testing of technologies. We conducted nine detailed experiments in the Lockyer Valley and Riverina vegetable growing districts, as well as case studies on grower properties in southern Queensland. We investigated root zone monitoring tools (FullStop™ wetting front detectors and Soil Solution Extraction Tubes - SSET), drip system layout, fertigation equipment, and altering planting arrangements. Our project team developed and validated models for broccoli, sweet corn, green beans and lettuce, and spreadsheets for evaluating economic risks associated with new technologies. We presented project outcomes at over 100 extension events, including irrigation showcases, conferences, field days, farm walks and workshops. The FullStops™ were excellent for monitoring root zone conditions (EC, nitrate levels), and managing irrigation with poor quality water. They were easier to interpret than the SSET. The SSET were simpler to install, but required wet soil to be reliable. SSET were an option for monitoring deeper soil zones, unsuitable for FullStop™ installations. Because these root zone tools require expertise, and are labour intensive, we recommend they be used to address specific problems, or as a periodic auditing strategy, not for routine monitoring. In our research, we routinely found high residual N in horticultural soils, with subsequently little crop yield response to additional nitrogen fertiliser. With improved irrigation efficiency (and less leaching), it may be timely to re-examine nitrogen budgets and recommendations for vegetable crops. Where the drip irrigation tube was located close to the crop row (i.e. within 5-8 cm), management of irrigation was easier. It improved nitrogen uptake, water use efficiency, and reduced the risk of poor crop performance through moisture stress, particularly in the early crop establishment phases. Close proximity of the drip tube to the crop row gives the producer more options for managing salty water, and more flexibility in taking risks with forecast rain. In many vegetable crops, proximate drip systems may not be cost-effective. The next best alternative is to push crop rows closer to the drip tube (leading to an asymmetric row structure). The vegetable crop models are good at predicting crop phenology (development stages, time to harvest), input use (water, fertiliser), environmental impacts (nutrient, salt movement) and total yields. The two immediate applications for the models are understanding/predicting/manipulating harvest dates and nitrogen movements in vegetable cropping systems. From the economic tools, the major influences on accumulated profit are price and yield. In doing ‘what if’ analyses, it is very important to be as accurate as possible in ascertaining what the assumed yield and price ranges are. In most vegetable production systems, lowering the required inputs (e.g. irrigation requirement, fertiliser requirement) is unlikely to have a major influence on accumulated profit. However, if a resource is constraining (e.g. available irrigation water), it is usually most profitable to maximise return per unit of that resource.

Vegetable Farming

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On trade-off solution pairs in a special type of transportation problem

Abstract is not available.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Correcting trade distortions in a small open economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.

The transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade

In this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two-country, two-period model. When intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference, a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country. Alternatively, when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods, the effect of a transfer depends on (a) the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and (b) the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.