“Tell Me Who You Hang with and I’ll Tell You What You Are:” Gang Identity, Organization, and Desistance

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Coordinations in business interactions between Hong Kong Chinese, Mainland Chinese and western actors

Hong Kong firms continue to play an important role in the development of mainland China trade. This paper studies the nature of coordinations in triadic interactions between Hong Kong Chinese intermediaries and mainland Chinese sellers, and buyers from the West, and their impact on relationships development. Contrary to popular belief, the results presented here identify that interactions between Hong Kong intermediaries and mainland Chinese sellers tend to include relationships based on price and authority. These interactions tend to be classical in nature, and serve to hinder the development of relationships. On the other hand, interactions between buyers from the West and Hong Kong intermediaries tend to be relational in nature. They include different forms of personal relationships, which tends to be positive for the development of relationships. A new plural form of international business relationship triad is also identified.

Association between polymorphisms in the progesterone receptor gene and endometriosis

The progesterone receptor (PR) is a candidate gene for the development of endometriosis, a complex disease with strong hormonal features, common in women of reproductive age. We typed the 306 base pair Alu insertion (AluIns) polymorphism in intron G of PR in 101 individuals, estimated linkage disequilibrium (LD) between five single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) across the PR locus in 980 Australian triads (endometriosis case and two parents) and used transmission disequilibrium testing (TDT) for association with endometriosis. The five SNPs showed strong pairwise LD, and the AluIns was highly correlated with proximal SNPs rs1042839 ({Delta}2 = 0.877, D9 = 1.00, P < 0.0001) and rs500760 ({Delta}2 = 0.438, D9 = 0.942, P < 0.0001). TDT showed weak evidence of allelic association between endometriosis and rs500760 (P = 0.027) but not in the expected direction. We identified a common susceptibility haplotype GGGCA across the five SNPs (P = 0.0167) in the whole sample, but likelihood ratio testing of haplotype transmission and non-transmission of the AluIns and flanking SNPs showed no significant pattern. Further, analysis of our results pooled with those from two previous studies suggested that neither the T2 allele of the AluIns nor the T1/T2 genotype was associated with endometriosis.

Decomposition of Boolean Functions – Recognizing a Good Solution by Traces

The problem of sequent two-block decomposition of a Boolean function is regarded in case when a good solution does exist. The problem consists mainly in finding an appropriate weak partition on the set of arguments of the considered Boolean function, which should be decomposable at that partition. A new fast heuristic combinatorial algorithm is offered for solving this task. At first the randomized search for traces of such a partition is fulfilled. The recognized traces are represented by some "triads" - the simplest weak partitions corresponding to non-trivial decompositions. After that the whole sought-for partition is restored from the discovered trace by building a track initialized by the trace and leading to the solution. The results of computer experiments testify the high practical efficiency of the algorithm.

Guatemala: A Failing State?

 Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Although the state currently fails to provide adequate security to its citizens or an appropriate range of effective social programs, it does supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound economic management, and a promising new antipoverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO).  Guatemala is a weak state. The principal security threats represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the under-resourced and compromised criminal justice system. The UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has demonstrated that progress against organized crime is possible.  The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on short-term interests. Guatemala lacks a strong, policyoriented, mass-based political party that could develop a coherent national reform program and mobilize public support around it.  The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan state by expanding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Jazz band arranging : original big band arrangements

This paper examines five big band arrangements written during a period of two semesters from 1998-1999. I will provide an overview and performance considerations for each arrangement. Each arrangement uses common conventions such as unison lines, octave doubling, four and five part voicings, found in closed, semi-open, and open position. Approach techniques include diatonic, dominant, diminished, chromatic, and parallel. Choice was based primarily on two considerations: desired texture and the best voice leading options identified to provide each part with a swinging line and maintain melodic integrity. Other conventions applied include chord substitution, upper structure triads, and altered and diminished scales to provide harmonic contrast and color. Each arrangement supplied new challenges and the tunes selected provided the arranger with a diverse experience of styles. The inherent qualities of the melody and harmonic progression of each piece were the primary considerations for selection.

Patterns of dynamic changes in supply management – a triadic approach

Research has followed a network perspective of supply management from as early as the publication of Krajlic matrix. This portfolio approach is still static. Recently the triad is interpreted as the smallest unit of a network through which dynamics can be studied. Analyzing triads seems to be a promising way through which a deeper insight into the dynamics of supplier development can be gained. Using case study approach the paper investigates this dynamics with a special emphasis on coopetitive behavior. Analyzing a triadic sourcing setting operating in a make to engineer (and order) environment we show the importance of governance.

An Audit and Feedback Intervention for Reducing Antibiotic Prescribing in General Dental Practice : The RAPiD Cluster Randomised Controlled Trial

Funding: This study was conducted as part of the TRiaDS programme of implementation research which is funded by NHS Education for Scotland (NES). The Health Services Research Unit which is funded by the Chief Scientist Office of the Scottish Government Health and Social Care Directorates supported the study. The funder had no influence over the design, conduct, analysis and write up of the study.

Reframing reporting of childhood sexual exploitation: three journalists reflect

This article explores three national and local journalists’ experiences of reporting on child sexual exploitation by so-called “Asian street grooming gangs” in UK towns and cities, with a particular emphasis on journalists framing journalists. In response to coverage of a series of cases, journalists have been accused by academics, policymakers and rival media organizations of fixating on perpetrators’ ethnicity and creating distorted, racist media frames. Few, if any, studies have garnered practitioners’ perspectives on how framing occurs, so we interview three prominent journalists who have covered such cases in order to deepen our understanding of the processes and causative factors behind particular editorial angles. While offering only a snapshot view, our findings reveal these individual journalists to be caught at the nexus of a range of factors that impact upon their work, both internally and externally driven.

Les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés chez les jeunes contrevenants

Chaque année, des adolescents québécois sont soumis à des sanctions judiciaires en raison de leurs actes de délinquance (Association des centres jeunesse du Québec, 2015). Plusieurs recherches récentes indiquent que ces jeunes sont plus à risque de répondre aux critères diagnostiques d’au moins un trouble mental que les adolescents de la population générale (Fazel, Doll, & Langstrom, 2008; Vermeiren, 2003). Les jeunes contrevenants sont également plus nombreux à présenter des symptômes et des troubles intériorisés (Abram et al., 2014; Skowyra & Cocozza, 2007; Teplin et al., 2006), soit des comportements anxieux, dépressifs, de retrait et des plaintes somatiques (Achenbach & McConaughy, 1992). Cette thèse contribue aux connaissances quant aux symptômes et aux troubles intériorisés chez les jeunes contrevenants en traitant de deux sujets peu étudiés : les problèmes intériorisés des jeunes contrevenants associés aux gangs de rue et l’identification de ces problèmes par les intervenants travaillant auprès d’eux. Le premier article composant la thèse présente une étude descriptive où le nombre de symptômes et de troubles intériorisés a été comparé entre des jeunes contrevenants révélant être ou avoir été associés aux gangs de rue (n = 62) et des jeunes contrevenants n’ayant pas révélé une telle association (n = 41). Les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés ont été mesurés à l’aide d’un questionnaire et d’une entrevue diagnostique semi-structurée. Les résultats indiquent que les jeunes associés aux gangs présentent davantage de symptômes de dépression-anxiété et sont plus nombreux à répondre aux critères diagnostiques d’au moins un trouble anxieux que ceux qui n’y sont pas associés. De plus, près de la moitié des participants, associés ou non aux gangs de rue, répondent aux critères diagnostiques d’au moins un trouble intériorisé. Cette forte prévalence de troubles intériorisés soulève l’importance que ceux-ci soient dépistés par les intervenants travaillant auprès des jeunes contrevenants. En effet, considérant que les troubles mentaux non traités entrainent de la souffrance, nuisent au fonctionnement et sont liés à des taux de tentatives de suicide, d’arrestations et de récidive plus élevés (Abram et al., 2014; Cottle, Lee, & Heilbrun, 2001; Hoeve, McReynolds, & Wasserman, 2013; Schonfeld et al., 1997), leur identification s’avère primordiale afin qu’ils puissent bénéficier des services dont ils auraient besoin. Le deuxième article de cette thèse est une étude exploratoire où sont recensés les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés mentionnés par les intervenants au rapport prédécisionnel (RPD) de 22 participants. La concordance entre ces symptômes et troubles intériorisés et ceux autorapportés par les jeunes contrevenants par un questionnaire et une entrevue semi-structurée est ensuite évaluée. Plusieurs symptômes et troubles intériorisés seraient « sous-identifiés » dans le RPD des jeunes contrevenants en comparaison de ce qui est révélé par les participants. Les résultats de ces deux études laissent croire qu’il serait pertinent d’offrir de la formation aux intervenants quant aux symptômes et aux troubles intériorisés chez les adolescents, d’implanter une procédure de dépistage systématique des troubles mentaux, et d’inclure les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés dans les programmes de prévention et de traitement offerts aux jeunes contrevenants.