The political economy of cross-border relations : the TNI and East Timor

Within a framework of formally increasingly cordial bilateral relations, the Indonesian military, the TNI, was engaging in and allowing extensive cross-border trade and smuggling while pursuing a policy of limited cross-border destabilization of East Timor. This seemingly contradictory policy, run from the TNI's 'strategic command centre' in Atambua, West Timor, met the TNI's continuing need to fund its own activities (and those of its proxies) through both legal and illegal means, to provide leverage for the coming talks about the formal demarcation of the border, and to provide a foothold to longer-term irredentist claims to the former occupied province and now independent state.

The Permian of Timor : stratigraphy, palaeontology and palaeography

The Permian of Timor in the Lesser Sunda Islands has attracted the attention of palaeontologists since the middle of the nineteenth century because of the richness, diversity and excellent state of preservation of its fauna. These abundant fossil data have been compiled and updated for the present account. The Permian rocks of Timor were deposited on the northern margin of Australia. At the present time the northern margin of Australia, in the region of Timor, is involved in a continent–arc collision, where Australia is colliding with the Banda Arcs. As a result of this collision, Permian rocks of the Australian margin have been disrupted by folding and faulting with the generation of mud-matrix mélange, and uplifted to form part of the island of Timor. Due to this tectonic disruption, it has proved difficult to establish a reliable stratigraphy for the Permian units on Timor, especially as the classic fossil collections were obtained largely from the mélange or purchased from the local people, and do not have adequate stratigraphic control. Detailed systematic, structural, stratigraphic and sedimentological studies since the 1960s have provided a firmer stratigraphic and palaeogeographic background for reconsideration of the significance of the classic fossil collections. Permian rocks on Timor belong either to a volcanic-carbonate sequence (Maubisse Formation), or to a clastic sequence (Atahoc and Cribas formations) in which volcanics are less prominent. The Permian sequences were deposited on Australian continental basement which was undergoing extension with spasmodic volcanic activity. Carbonates of the Maubisse Formation were deposited on horst blocks and volcanic edifices, while clastic sediments of the Atahoc and Cribas formations were deposited in grabens. The clastic sediments are predominantly fine-grained, derived from a distant siliciclastic source, and are interbedded with sediments derived from the volcanics and carbonates of adjacent horst blocks. Bottom conditions in the graben were often anoxic. In the present account, events on Timor during the Permian are related to the regional tectonic context, with the northward movement of Australia leading to the amelioration of the climate from sub-glacial to sub-tropical, together with the separation of crustal blocks from the northern Australian margin to form the Meso-Tethys.

East Timor : beyond independence

The chapters in this book examine the major themes of development, borders and security, politics and justice, resource and land management, education, and language policy. Though the country was initially lauded as a case study in successful state-building, the crisis of 2006 demonstrated that East Timor had more in common with other post-colonial, post-conflict societies than some of thse earlier optimistic assessments suggested. East Timor continues to attract the interest and attention of governments, scholars, development institutions and aid workers as a society rebuilding itself after almost a quarter of a century of profound trauma, and the consecutive eras of colonialism. Covering the era from the independence referendum in August 1999 to the political crisis in 2006, and future prospects and challenges, this book is an invaluable resource for understanding the challenges facing the first new nation of the 21st century.

Same blind eyes turned on Timor

Given advance notice that the street bully is about to beat up your neighbour, three courses of action are open to you. The first is to try to dissuade the bully from his violent intent. The second is to warn your neighbour so that he can make preparations to defend himself or flee. The third is to do nothing, sit back and watch the attack. Last week, Captain Andrew Plunkett claimed the Australian Government failed to act on intelligence that could have prevented the massacre of 47 civilians at a police station in Maliana in September 1999. If his claims are true, it will be the second time in 24 years that Canberra chose option three in its dealings with the people of East Timor.

Australia and East Timor : elitism, pragmatism and the national interest

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

East Timor : the price of liberty

This book is based on extensive research and regaulr visits to East Timor since 1995. It considers the trials that the people of East Timor have undergone in their long struggle for independence, and issues that have arisen out of independence. This account places East Timor within the context of other post-colonial states, noting the problems that most of them have faced in coming to grips with their new-found freedoms, and how they have managed, or mismanaged, such freedoms. It also traces the themes and issues within the independence movement, noting how these have contibuted to post-independence outcomes, in particular the poltiical tensions that almost saw East Timor collapse as a viable state in 2006. The books concludes with an assessment of the 2007 elections which, depsite some post-election violence, saw the consolidation of democratic processes in East Timor, and which marked it as having a brighter future in this one critical respect.

East Timor in 2008 : year of reconstruction

The article discusses reconstruction of East Timor in 2008 after the near-fatal shooting of President Jose Ramos-Horta and the death of his rival Major Alfredo Reinado. It notes near state collapse following the desertion of soldiers in 2006 and returning displaced persons to their homes in the aftermath.

Institution building problems in East Timor, 1999-2002

Institution building in East Timor from 1999 to 2002 was undermined by numerous ineffective practices. These ineffective practices were partly due to international organizations' conflicting priorities, including donors' preference for short program timelines, some individuals' preference for "the easy path", and UNTAET'S preoccupation with maintaining security and administering the territory.