Therese Godshaw (Gottschalk) nee Molling reading with her daughter Elizabeth; Hannover, Germany.

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Francine Durand, Aenny Catzenstein and Maren Matthiesen reading telegrams on Aenny's 80th birthday; London.

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Aenny Catzenstein nee Gottschalk reading the "Israelitisches Wochenblatt"; Israel.

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Portrait of Friedrich Bergammer (Fritz Glueckselig) reading Portraits Men

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Therese Godshaw (Gottschalk) nee Molling reading with her daughter Elizabeth; Hannover, Germany.

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Herbert Strauss seated under trees in a park reading the newspaper; Potsdam.

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Dr. Bernhard Bardach reading at birchwood desk; Russia Military; Portraits

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Reading the Announcements

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Observations on the Architecture of Evil: A New Reading of Eichmann on Kant

En route from Birmingham to Syria in 2013, British-Jihadi neophytes aged 22, Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed purchased two books via Amazon to prepare for their mission in Syria after joining ISIS: The Koran for Dummies and Islam for Dummies. Journalists were swift to disparage their reading. The book’s author, Princeton University campus imam, Sohaib Nazeer Sultan remarked “Even though they may have ordered it, I don't think they read it.” In 1933, aged 27, Adolf Eichmann moved to Berlin to join the Sicherheitsdienst SD whereupon he read Immanuel Kant’s book the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (The Critique of Practical Reason) for the first time. After his trial in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt of course dismissed Eichmann’s reading of the German philosopher as thoroughly vacuous. Ever since, writers have sought to undermine the veracity of Eichmann’s account. The global Jihadis are illiterate, a journalist recently commented: they’re not well read in the Qur’an, and if they have read it, they have thoroughly misunderstood it. He cited as evidence Abdul Raqib Amin’s YouTube rhetorical: Forget everyone. Read the Koran, read the instruction of life. Find out what is jihad. Eichmann on the other hand was not illiterate in his youth. Before Berlin, he had already read Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ; he would also re-read the Critique of Practical Reason, and from his testimony and terminology we can infer he was familiar with Kantian concepts that extend beyond both books...

Workmen's Circle collection, undated, 1903-1993.

Collection consists of material from the administration, services, individual branches, and schools of the Workmen's Circle. The majority of the collection are publications of the Workmen's Circle relating to conventions and education. The collection also includes annual reports, newsletters, bulletins, and pamphlets.

Reflexivity and self-care for creative facilitators: Stepping outside the circle

Those who work with others to explore new and creative ways of thinking about community and organizational participation, ways of engaging with others, individual well-being and creative solutions to problems, have a significant role in a cohesive society. Creative forms of learning can stimulate reflexive practices of self-care and lead to enhanced relationships and practices both personally and professionally. We argue that those who facilitate such practices for others do not always practice their own self-care, which potentially leads to burnout and disillusionment. This research sought to explore understandings and practices of self-care with such facilitators in order to develop resources or techniques to support more sustainable professional identities. A key finding is that reflexive processes are most effective and transforming when shared as a social practice.

Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.