A model of mistaken alibis: How innocent alibi providers generate inaccurate alibis

This dissertation comprised two experiments, which addressed three main goals: (a) to test a new paradigm for measuring objectively the accuracy of alibis, (b) to explore the effectiveness of three retrieval cues (time only, location only, and time-and-location) in an alibi context, and (c) to explore the metacognitive strategies of innocent alibi providers who experience different financial incentives as well as different motivations for reporting (be informative vs. be convincing). ^ The novel paradigm appears promising: by surreptitiously controlling the whereabouts of future alibi providers during a critical time, objective accuracy measurements were in fact possible. Such accuracy measurements revealed that time-cued retrieval can be devastating to innocent alibi providers. Participants who attempted to recall their whereabouts via a time cue were significantly less accurate than participants who attempted recall via a location cue (Experiment 1). ^ Innocent alibi providers, when cued effectively, may not, however, report their memories differently from memory reporters in non-alibi contexts. When cued effectively, participants who experienced a goal of being convincing did not differ in accuracy from participants who experienced a goal of merely being informative (Experiment 2). Similarly, participants did not differ from one another in accuracy across different levels of financial incentive (Experiment 2). ^ Despite the indistinguishable accuracy rates of alibi providers and non-alibi memory reporters when retrieval was cued effectively, proffering mistaken alibis presents a real risk for innocent suspects. Future research needs to address methods by which that risk can be reduced. ^

Memory conformity: Actors and bystanders

This dissertation explored memory conformity effects on people who interacted with a confederate and of bystanders to that interaction. Two studies were carried out. Study 1 was conducted in the field. A male confederate approached a group of people at the beach and had a brief interaction. About a minute later a research assistant approached the group and administered a target-absent lineup to each person in the group. Analyses revealed that memory conformity occurred during the lineup task. Bystanders were twice as likely to conform as those who interacted with the confederate. Study 2 was carried out in a laboratory under controlled conditions. Participants were exposed to two events during their time in the laboratory. In one event, participants were shown a brief video with no determinate roles assigned. In the other event participants were randomly assigned to interact with a confederate (actor condition) or to witness that interaction (bystander condition). Participants were given memory tests on both events to understand the effects of participant role (actor vs. bystander) on memory conformity. Participants answered second to all questions, following a confederate acting as a participant, who disseminated misinformation on critical questions. Analyses revealed no significant differences in memory conformity between actors and bystanders during the movie memory task. However, differences were found for the interaction memory task such that bystanders conformed more than actors on two of four critical questions. Bystanders also conformed more than actors during a lineup identification task. The results of these studies suggest that the role a person plays in an interaction affects how susceptible they are to information from a co-witness. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed. First, the results are explained through the use of two models of memory. Second, recommendations are made for forensic investigators.

A fresh look at decision making in international investment choices: Firm international coherence and home-host country relatedness

Understanding how decisions for international investments are made and how this affects the overall pattern of investments and firm’s performance is of particular importance both in strategy and international business research. This dissertation introduced first home-host country relatedness (HHCR) as the degree to which countries are efficiently combined within the investment portfolios of firms. It theorized and demonstrated that HHCR will vary with the motivation for investments along at least two key dimensions: the nature of foreign investments and the connectedness of potential host countries to the rest of the world. Drawing on cognitive psychology and decision-making research, it developed a theory of strategic decision making proposing that strategic solutions are chosen close to a convenient anchor. Building on research on memory imprinting, it also proposed that managers tend to rely on older knowledge representation. In the context of international investment decisions, managers use their home countries as an anchor and are more likely to choose as a site for foreign investments host countries that are ‘close’ to the home country. These decisions are also likely to rely more strongly on closeness to time invariant country factors of historic and geographic nature rather than time-variant institutions. Empirical tests using comprehensive investments data by all public multinational companies (MNC) worldwide, or over 15,000 MNCs with over half a million subsidiaries, support the claims. Finally, the dissertation introduced the concept of International Coherence (IC) defined as the degree to which an MNE’s network comprises countries that are related. It was hypothesized that maintaining a high level of coherence is important for firm performance and will enhance it. Also, the presence of international coherence mitigates some of the negative effects of unrelated product diversification. Empirical tests using data on foreign investments of over 20,000 public firms, while also developing a home-host country relatedness index for up to 24,300 home-host pairs, provided support for the theory advanced.

Perceivers' impressions of self -presentation tactics: The effects of age and gender

Eighty-four young and 84 older men and women participants, read scenarios in which a male or female target uses either a self-enhancement or a self-deprecation tactic to present him/herself in front of either a close friend or a new acquaintance. Then participants i.e., perceivers) rated their impressions of the self-enhancing or self-deprecating target on six scales: likable, self-knowledgeable, honest, depressed, happy, and anxious. Overall, both young and old perceivers gave more favorable ratings to self-enhancing targets than to self-deprecating targets. Both young and old perceivers' impressions did not differ for a target who presented him/herself in front of a friend or in front of an acquaintance. Also, perceivers completed Singelis' (1994) Self-Construal Measurement, which measures both interdependent and independent self-construals. As predicted, older perceivers had a higher level of interdependent self-construal than did young perceivers. Unexpectedly, female perceivers had a higher level of independent self-construal than did male perceivers. Neither the age-related nor gender-related differences in self-construals were associated with any age-related or gender-related differences in perceivers' impressions of the self-enhancing and self-deprecating targets. That is, the moderator effects of self-construals on the relationships between self-presentation tactic conditions and ratings of targets were not-significant. ^

Effect of delay of first interview and repetition of interview on accuracy and confidence of recall of a flashbulb -type memory

Hearing of the news of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in a traffic accident, is taken as an analogue for being a percipient but uninvolved witness to a crime, or a witness to another person's sudden confession to some illegal act. This event (known in the literature as a “reception event”) has previously been hypothesized to cause one to form a special type of memory commonly known as a “flashbulb memory” (FB) (Brown and Kulik, 1977). FB's are hypothesized to be especially resilient against forgetting, highly detailed including peripheral details, clear, and inspiring great confidence in the individual for their accuracy. FB's are dependent for their formation upon surprise, emotional valence, and impact, or consequentiality to the witness of the initiating event. FB's are thought to be enhanced by frequent rehearsal. FB's are very important in the context of criminal investigation and litigation in that investigators and jurors usually place great store in witnesses, regardless of their actual accuracy, who claim to have a clear and complete recollection of an event, and who express this confidently. Therefore, the lives, or at least the freedom, of criminal defendants, and the fortunes of civil litigants hang on the testimony of witnesses professing to have FB's. ^ In this study, which includes a large and diverse sample (N = 305), participants were surveyed within 2–4 days after hearing of the fatal accident, and again at intervals of 2 and 4 weeks, 6, 12, and 18 months. Contrary to the FB hypothesis, I found that participants' FB's degraded over time beginning at least as early as two weeks post event. At about 12 months the memory trace stabilized, resisting further degradation. Repeated interviewing did not have any negative affect upon accuracy, contrary to concerns in the literature. Analysis by correlation and regression indicated no effect or predictive power for participant age, emotionality, confidence, or student status, as related to accuracy of recall; nor was participant confidence in accuracy predicted by emotional impact as hypothesized. Results also indicate that, contrary to the notions of investigators and jurors, witnesses become more inaccurate over time regardless of their confidence in their memories, even for highly emotional events. ^

Perceptions of alibi evidence as a function of the strength of incriminating *evidence

The current study investigated the exculpatory value of alibi evidence when presented together with various types of incriminating evidence. Previous research has reported that alibi evidence could weaken the effects of DNA evidence and eyewitness identification. The present study assessed the effectiveness of alibi evidence in counteracting defendant's confession (experiment 1) and eyewitness evidence (experiment 2). In experiment 1, three levels of alibi evidence (none, weak, strong) were combined with three levels of confession evidence (voluntary, elicited under low pressure, elicited under high pressure). Results indicated significant main effects of confession and alibi and an alibi by confession interaction. Of participants exposed to high-pressure confession, those in the strong alibi condition rendered lower guilt estimates than those in the no alibi condition. In experiment 2, three levels of alibi were combined with two levels of eyewitness evidence (bad view, good view). A main effect of alibi was obtained, but no interaction between alibi and eyewitness evidence. ^ An explanation of this pattern is based in part on the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) and a novel “culpability threshold” model of juror decision-making. The Story Model suggests that jurors generate verdict stories (interpretations of events consistent with a guilty or not guilty verdict) based on trial evidence. If the evidence in favor of guilt exceeds jurors' threshold for perceiving culpability, jurors will fail to properly consider exonerating evidence. However, when the strength of incriminating evidence does not exceed the jurors' threshold, they are likely to give appropriate consideration to exculpatory evidence in their decisions. ^ Presentation of a reliable confession in Experiment 1 exceeded jurors' culpability threshold and rendered alibi largely irrelevant. In contrast, presentation of a high-pressure confession failed to exceed jurors' culpability threshold, so jurors turned to alibi evidence in their decisions. Similarly, in the second experiment, eyewitness evidence (in general) was not strong enough to surpass the culpability threshold, and thus jurors incorporated alibi evidence in their decisions. A third study is planned to further test this “culpability threshold” model, further explore various types of alibi evidence, and clarify when exculpatory evidence will sufficiently weaken the prosecution's “story.” ^

A theoretical analysis of eyewitness identification: Dual -process theory, signal detection theory and eyewitness confidence

Given the growing number of wrongful convictions involving faulty eyewitness evidence and the strong reliance by jurors on eyewitness testimony, researchers have sought to develop safeguards to decrease erroneous identifications. While decades of eyewitness research have led to numerous recommendations for the collection of eyewitness evidence, less is known regarding the psychological processes that govern identification responses. The purpose of the current research was to expand the theoretical knowledge of eyewitness identification decisions by exploring two separate memory theories: signal detection theory and dual-process theory. This was accomplished by examining both system and estimator variables in the context of a novel lineup recognition paradigm. Both theories were also examined in conjunction with confidence to determine whether it might add significantly to the understanding of eyewitness memory. ^ In two separate experiments, both an encoding and a retrieval-based manipulation were chosen to examine the application of theory to eyewitness identification decisions. Dual-process estimates were measured through the use of remember-know judgments (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In Experiment 1, the effects of divided attention and lineup presentation format (simultaneous vs. sequential) were examined. In Experiment 2, perceptual distance and lineup response deadline were examined. Overall, the results indicated that discrimination and remember judgments (recollection) were generally affected by variations in encoding quality and response criterion and know judgments (familiarity) were generally affected by variations in retrieval options. Specifically, as encoding quality improved, discrimination ability and judgments of recollection increased; and as the retrieval task became more difficult there was a shift toward lenient choosing and more reliance on familiarity. ^ The application of signal detection theory and dual-process theory in the current experiments produced predictable results on both system and estimator variables. These theories were also compared to measures of general confidence, calibration, and diagnosticity. The application of the additional confidence measures in conjunction with signal detection theory and dual-process theory gave a more in-depth explanation than either theory alone. Therefore, the general conclusion is that eyewitness identifications can be understood in a more complete manor by applying theory and examining confidence. Future directions and policy implications are discussed. ^

The influence of the cross -race effect on lineup construction and fairness

Lineup procedures have recently garnered extensive empirical attention, in an effort to reduce the number of mistaken identifications that plague the criminal justice system. Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the influence of the lineup constructor or the lineup construction technique on the quality of the lineup. This study examined whether the cross-race effect has an influence on the quality of lineups constructed using a match-to-suspect or match-to-description technique in a series of three phases. Participants generated descriptions of same- and other-race targets in Phase 1, which were used in Phase 2. In Phase 2, participants were asked to create lineups for own-race targets and other-race targets using one of two techniques. The lineups created in this phase were examined for lineup quality in Phase 3 by calculating lineup fairness assessments through the use of a mock witness paradigm. ^ Overall, the results of these experiment phases suggest that the race of those involved in the lineup construction process influences lineups. There was no difference in witness description accuracy in Phase 1, which ran counter to predictions based on the cross-race effect. The cross-race effect was observed, however, in Phases 2 and 3. The lineup construction technique used also influenced several of the process measures, selection estimates, and fairness judgments in Phase 2. Interestingly, the presence of the cross-race effect was in the opposite direction as predicted for some measures in both phases. In Phase 2, the cross-race effect was as predicted for number of foils viewed, but in the opposite direction for average time spent viewing each foil. In Phase 3, the cross-race effect was in the opposite direction than predicted, with higher levels of lineup fairness in other-race lineups. The practical implications of these findings are discussed in relation to lineup fairness within the legal system. ^

Eyewitness decision -making with showups: Probative or perilous?

Showups are a technique of eyewitness identification in which a single suspect is presented to a witness for identification. Showups are controversial. Defense attorneys argue that they are suggestive and place suspects at undue risk of false identification. Prosecutors and police officers argue that showups are an indispensable investigative tool and are no more suggestive than other identification techniques. Are showups probative or perilous? If so, what can be done to improve their accuracy? This investigation converged on this question by addressing three interrelated goals. The first was to examine the effect of two system variables, retention interval and suspect clothing, on showup accuracy. The second was to determine if showups are more suggestive than lineups. The third goal was to explore carryover effects from showups to subsequent lineup identifications. ^ Eyewitness performance was evaluated with the Eyewitness Identification Paradigm. Approximately 500 undergraduate students at FIU witnesses a staged event (i.e., a "crime") in their classrooms and subsequently participated in a showup and/or lineup identification test. Half of the identification tests contained the target (i.e., the "perpetrator") and half contained a target-substitute (i.e., an "innocent suspect"). ^ The results of this study indicated that, overall, showups are not unusually prejudicial and are no more suggestive than lineups. However this study identified two specific conditions under which showups are likely to lead to false identifications of an innocent suspect. First, false identification are likely to occur in showups that are conducted shortly after a crime when the suspect is wearing clothing similar to that worn by the perpetrator. Second, placing an innocent suspect in both a showup and then a lineup substantially increases the chances that the suspect will be falsely identified in the lineup. The implications of these findings for the conduct of eyewitness investigations are discussed. ^

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Intuition and its component parts in the heuristic processing of deception detection: Hunch, *evidence, and reliance on intuitive efficacy

Rated trust in intuitive efficacy (measured as trust, belief, use, accuracy and weighting of intuition) was investigated as a predictor of self-designated use of intuitive (hunch and hunch plus evidential belief) vs. deliberative (evidential belief and evidential belief plus hunch) deception detection judgments and actual accuracy. Twenty-nine student participants were filmed as they made true and deceptive statements about their everyday activities on a given evening (last Friday night), and college students (N=238) judged 20 (10=true, 10=deceptive) of these filmed statements as truthful or deceptive. Participants provided ratings of reliance on hunches vs. evidential belief, confidence in film judgments, intuitive efficacy, accuracy in deception detection, reliance on cues to deception, and experiences with intuition. Generalized estimated equation modeling using binary logistics demonstrated accuracy in identifying true vs. deceptive statements was predicted by film number, hunch-evidence ratings, weighting of intuition, and total cues cited. Weighting of intuition was predictive of accuracy across participants, with higher weighting predictive of higher accuracy in general. Participants who cited evidential belief plus hunch and moderate to high weighting incorrectly reversed their true vs. deceptive judgments. Accuracy for true statements was higher for hunches and hunch plus evidential belief, whereas accuracy for deceptive statements was higher for evidential belief Accuracy for participants who relied on evidential belief plus hunch was at chance. Subjective experiences underlying judgments differed by participant and type of film viewed (true vs. deceptive) and were predicted by hunch-evidence ratings, trust, use, intuitive accuracy, and total cues cited. Trust predicted increases in judging films to be true, whereas use and accuracy predicted increases in judging films as deceptive; none were predictive of accuracy. Increased number of cues cited predicted judgments of deception, whereas decreased number of cues cited predicted truth. The study concluded that participants have the capacity to self-define their judgments as subjectively vs. deliberately based, provide subjective assessments of the influence of intuitive vs. objective information on their judgments, and can apply this self-knowledge, through effective weighting of intuition vs. other types of information, in making accurate judgments of true and deceptive everyday statements.

Confirmation bias in witness interviewing: Can interviewers ignore their preconceptions?

Basic research on expectancy effects suggests that investigative interviewers with pre-conceived notions about a crime may negatively influence the interview process in meaningful ways, yet many interviewing protocols recommend that interviewers review all available information prior to conducting their interviews. Previous research suggests that interviewers with no pre-interview knowledge elicit more detailed and accurate accounts than their informed counterparts (Cantlon, et al., 1996; Rivard et al., under review). The current study investigated whether (a) the benefit of blind versus informed interviewing is moderated by cautionary interviewer instructions to avoid suggestive questions and (b) whether any possible effects of pre-interview information extend beyond the immediate context of the forensic interview. ^ Paired participants (N = 584) were assigned randomly either to the role of interviewer or witness. Witnesses viewed a mock crime video and were interviewed one week later by an interviewer who received either correct, incorrect, or no information about the crime event. Half of the interviewers were assigned randomly to receive additional instructions to avoid suggestive questions. All participants returned 1 week after the interview to recall the crime video (for the witness) or the information recalled by the witness during the interview (for the interviewer). All interviews and delayed recall measures were scored for the quantity and accuracy of information reported. ^ Results replicate earlier findings that blind interviewers elicit more information from witnesses, without a decrease in accuracy rate. However instructions to avoid suggestive questions did not moderate the effect of blind versus informed interviewing on witness recall during the interview. Results further demonstrate that the effects of blind versus non-blind interviewing may extend beyond the immediate context of the interview to a later recall attempt. With instructions to avoid suggestive questions, witnesses of blind interviewers were more accurate than witnesses of incorrectly informed interviewers when recalling the event 1 week later. In addition, blind interviewers had more accurate memories for the witnesses' account of the event during the interview compared to non-blind interviewers.^

The Role of Social Cognition and Person Perception in Economic Social Decision-Making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make social inferences about another person in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes. However, until recently, much research in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics has examined social decision-making while failing to take into account the importance of the social context and social cognitive processes that are engaged when viewing another person. Using social psychological theory to guide our hypotheses, four research studies investigate the role of social cognition and person perception in guiding economic decisions made in social contexts. The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that only specific types of social information engage brain regions implicated in social cognition and hinder learning in social contexts. Study 2 (Chapter 3) extends these findings and examines contexts in which this social information is used to generalize across contexts to form predictions about another person’s behavior. Study 3 (Chapter 4) demonstrates that under certain contexts these social cognitive processes may be withheld in order to more effectively complete the task at hand. Last, Study 4 (Chapter 5) examines how this knowledge of social cognitive processing can be used to change behavior in a prosocial group context. Taken together, these studies add to the growing body of literature examining decision-making in social contexts and highlight the importance of social cognitive processing in guiding these decisions. Although social cognitive processing typically facilitates social interactions, these processes may alter economic decision-making in social contexts.

Le décours temporel de l'utilisation des fréquences spatiales dans les troubles du spectre autistique

Notre système visuel extrait d'ordinaire l'information en basses fréquences spatiales (FS) avant celles en hautes FS. L'information globale extraite tôt peut ainsi activer des hypothèses sur l'identité de l'objet et guider l'extraction d'information plus fine spécifique par la suite. Dans les troubles du spectre autistique (TSA), toutefois, la perception des FS est atypique. De plus, la perception des individus atteints de TSA semble être moins influencée par leurs a priori et connaissances antérieures. Dans l'étude décrite dans le corps de ce mémoire, nous avions pour but de vérifier si l'a priori de traiter l'information des basses aux hautes FS était présent chez les individus atteints de TSA. Nous avons comparé le décours temporel de l'utilisation des FS chez des sujets neurotypiques et atteints de TSA en échantillonnant aléatoirement et exhaustivement l'espace temps x FS. Les sujets neurotypiques extrayaient les basses FS avant les plus hautes: nous avons ainsi pu répliquer le résultat de plusieurs études antérieures, tout en le caractérisant avec plus de précision que jamais auparavant. Les sujets atteints de TSA, quant à eux, extrayaient toutes les FS utiles, basses et hautes, dès le début, indiquant qu'ils ne possédaient pas l'a priori présent chez les neurotypiques. Il semblerait ainsi que les individus atteints de TSA extraient les FS de manière purement ascendante, l'extraction n'étant pas guidée par l'activation d'hypothèses.

Traitement des émotions évoquées par les expressions faciales, vocales et musicales à la suite d’un traumatisme craniocérébral

Le traitement des émotions joue un rôle essentiel dans les relations interpersonnelles. Des déficits dans la reconnaissance des émotions évoquées par les expressions faciales et vocales ont été démontrés à la suite d’un traumatisme craniocérébral (TCC). Toutefois, la majorité des études n’ont pas différencié les participants selon le niveau de gravité du TCC et n’ont pas évalué certains préalables essentiels au traitement émotionnel, tels que la capacité à percevoir les caractéristiques faciales et vocales, et par le fait même, la capacité à y porter attention. Aucune étude ne s’est intéressée au traitement des émotions évoquées par les expressions musicales, alors que la musique est utilisée comme méthode d’intervention afin de répondre à des besoins de prise en charge comportementale, cognitive ou affective chez des personnes présentant des atteintes neurologiques. Ainsi, on ignore si les effets positifs de l’intervention musicale sont basés sur la préservation de la reconnaissance de certaines catégories d’émotions évoquées par les expressions musicales à la suite d’un TCC. La première étude de cette thèse a évalué la reconnaissance des émotions de base (joie, tristesse, peur) évoquées par les expressions faciales, vocales et musicales chez quarante et un adultes (10 TCC modéré-sévère, 9 TCC léger complexe, 11 TCC léger simple et 11 témoins), à partir de tâches expérimentales et de tâches perceptuelles contrôles. Les résultats suggèrent un déficit de la reconnaissance de la peur évoquée par les expressions faciales à la suite d’un TCC modéré-sévère et d’un TCC léger complexe, comparativement aux personnes avec un TCC léger simple et sans TCC. Le déficit n’est pas expliqué par un trouble perceptuel sous-jacent. Les résultats montrent de plus une préservation de la reconnaissance des émotions évoquées par les expressions vocales et musicales à la suite d’un TCC, indépendamment du niveau de gravité. Enfin, malgré une dissociation observée entre les performances aux tâches de reconnaissance des émotions évoquées par les modalités visuelle et auditive, aucune corrélation n’a été trouvée entre les expressions vocales et musicales. La deuxième étude a mesuré les ondes cérébrales précoces (N1, N170) et plus tardives (N2) de vingt-cinq adultes (10 TCC léger simple, 1 TCC léger complexe, 3 TCC modéré-sévère et 11 témoins), pendant la présentation d’expressions faciales évoquant la peur, la neutralité et la joie. Les résultats suggèrent des altérations dans le traitement attentionnel précoce à la suite d’un TCC, qui amenuisent le traitement ultérieur de la peur évoquée par les expressions faciales. En somme, les conclusions de cette thèse affinent notre compréhension du traitement des émotions évoquées par les expressions faciales, vocales et musicales à la suite d’un TCC selon le niveau de gravité. Les résultats permettent également de mieux saisir les origines des déficits du traitement des émotions évoquées par les expressions faciales à la suite d’un TCC, lesquels semblent secondaires à des altérations attentionnelles précoces. Cette thèse pourrait contribuer au développement éventuel d’interventions axées sur les émotions à la suite d’un TCC.