Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1964/04 (N62)-1964/06.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1967/04 (N74)-1967/06.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1968/01 (N77)-1968/03.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1969/10 (N84)-1969/12.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1962/04 (N54)-1962/06.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1969/01 (N81)-1969/03.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1960/07 (N47)-1960/10 (N48).

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1965/10 (N68)-1965/12.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1965/07 (N67)-1965/09.

Feuillet trimestriel / ANAS, Association nationale des assistantes sociales et des assistants sociaux ; gérant D. Grunewald

1968 (N80).

Le docteur Arnold et ses assistants [inhalatorium de la rue Erlanger] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 60176

Le docteur Arnold et ses assistants de l'inhalatorium [de la rue Erlanger] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 60175

TA tales : [re]storying the teaching and learning experiences of university teaching assistants

This inquiry examines reported critical incidents that shaped the lived experience of 5 university TAs as they negotiated multiple roles and relationships within the teaching and learning context. Questions and ensuing conversations explore the ways in which these critical incidents in teaching contributed to the TAs' understanding of themselves as teachers, of teaching and learning tensions in higher education, and of the institutional contexts in which they work. The inquiry also explores the ways in which narrative, particularly creative fiction, can represent the stories TAs tell of their experiences.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Strategy-proof tie-breaking

We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained efficient, matching. A priority structure for which these two requirements are compatible is called solvable. For the general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders,we introduce three simple necessary conditions on the priority structure. We show that these conditions completely characterize solvable environments within the class of indifferences at the bottom (IB) environments, where ties occur only at the bottom of the priority structure. This generalizes and unifies previously known results on solvable and unsolvable environments established in school choice, housing markets and house allocation with existing tenants. We show how the previously known solvable cases can be viewed as extreme cases of solvable environments. For sufficiency of our conditions we introduce a version of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with exogenous and preference-based tie-breaking.