Inversión privada extranjera en el desarrollo latinoamericano = Role of foreign private investment in the development of Latin America

Incluye Bibliografía

Economic relations of Latin America with Europe. III: Direct private investment

Includes bibliography

Terceiro setor: interesses públicos ou privados? Um estudo de caso comparativo entre duas instituições com atuação na área social

Pós-graduação em Psicologia - FCLAS

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue

The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs' expected recovery at trial compared to their filing costs, whereas the social value consists of the incentives suits create for injurers to invest in accident avoidance. Generally, there is no relationship between these two values: there may be either too many or too few suits from a social perspective. Thus, there is scope for corrective measures, although there is no simple policy. Extending the model to consider a negligence rule rather than strict liability, and to allow for pretrial settlements, leads to some modified conclusions but does not alter the basic insights.

A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral

This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims can take care. The basic conclusions of that literature remain valid in this context: the private and social values generally differ, and there is no necessary relationship between them, meaning that there may be either too many or too few suits. Introducing the possibility of victim care does, however, alter the calculation of the deterrent effect of lawsuits. In particular, because allowing suits tends to reduce the incentives for victims to invest in precaution, the social value of prohibiting suits increases in direct relation to the productivity of victim care in lowering accident risk.

Integration of congestion pricing and intertemporal preference rate in social welfare function

Assessing social benefits in transport policy implementation has been studied by many researchers using theoretical or empirical measures. However, few of them measure social benefit using different discount rates including the inter-temporal preferences rate of users, the private investment discount rate and the inter-temporal preferences rate of the government. In general, the social discount rate used is the same for all social actors. Therefore, this paper aims to assess a new method by integrating different types of discount rate belonging to different social actors in order to measure the real benefits of each actor in the short, medium and long term. A dynamic simulation is provided by a strategic Land-Use and Transport Interaction (LUTI) model. The method is tested by optimizing a cordon toll scheme in Madrid considering socio- economic efficiency and environmental criteria. Based on the modified social welfare function (WF), the effects on the measure of social benefits are estimated and compared with the classical WF results as well. The results of this research could be a key issue to understanding the relationship between transport system policies and social actors' benefits distribution in a metropolitan context. The results show that the use of more suitable discount rates for each social actor had an effect on the selection and definition of optimal strategy of congestion pricing. The usefulness of the measure of congestion toll declines more quickly overtime.

Integration of congestion pricing and intertemporal preferences rate integration in social welfare function

Many researchers have used theoretical or empirical measures to assess social benefits in transport policy implementation. However, few have measured social benefits by using discount rates, including the intertemporal preference rate of users, the private investment discount rate, and the intertemporal preference rate of the government. In general, the social discount rate used is the same for all social actors. This paper aims to assess a new method by integrating different types of discount rates belonging to different social actors to measure the real benefits of each actor in the short term, medium term, and long term. A dynamic simulation is provided by a strategic land use and transport interaction model. The method was tested by optimizing a cordon toll scheme in Madrid, Spain. Socioeconomic efficiency and environmental criteria were considered. On the basis of the modified social welfare function, the effects on the measure of social benefits were estimated and compared with the classical welfare function measures. The results show that the use of more suitable discount rates for each social actor had an effect on the selection and definition of optimal strategy of congestion pricing. The usefulness of the measure of congestion toll declines more quickly over time. This result could be the key to understanding the relationship between transport system policies and the distribution of social actors? benefits in a metropolitan context.

Exploring users inter-temporal preferences for measuring transport social equity effects

There exist different ways for defining a welfare function. Traditionally, welfare economic theory foundation is based on the Net Present Value (NPV) calculation where the time dependent preferences of considered agents are taken into account. However, the time preferences, remains a controversial subject. Currently, the traditional approach employs a unique discount rate for various agents. Nevertheless, this way of discounting appears inconsistent with sustainable development. New research work suggests that the discount rate may not be a homogeneous value. The discount rates may change following the individual’s preferences. A significant body of evidence suggests that people do not behave following a constant discount rate. In fact, UK Government has quickly recognized the power of the arguments for time-varying rates, as it has done in its official guidance to Ministries on the appraisal of investments and policies. Other authors deal with not just time preference but with uncertainty about future income (precautionary saving). In a situation in which economic growth rates are similar across time periods, the rationale for declining social optimal discount rates is driven by the preferences of the individuals in the economy, rather than expectations of growth. However, these approaches have been mainly focused on long-term policies where intergenerational risks may appear. The traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) uses a unique discount rate derived from market interest rates or investment rates of return for discounting the costs and benefits of all social agents included in the CBA. However, recent literature showed that a more adequate measure of social benefit is possible by using different discount rates including inter-temporal preferences rate of users, private investment discount rate and intertemporal preferences rate of government. Actually, the costs of opportunity may differ amongst individuals, firms, governments, or society in general, as do the returns on savings. In general, the firms or operators require an investment rate linked to the current return on savings, while the discount rate of consumers-users depends on their time preferences with respect of the current and the future consumption, as well as society can take into account the intergenerational well-being, adopting a lower discount rate for today’s generation. Time discount rate of social actors (users, operators, government and society) places a lower value in a future gain, but the uncertainty about future income strongly determines the individual preferences. These time and uncertainty depends on preferences and should be integrated into a transport policy formulation that may have significant social impacts. The discount rate of a user cannot be the same than the operator’s discount rate. The preferences of both are different. In addition, another school of thought suggests that people, such as a social group, may have different attitudes towards future costs and benefits. Particularly, the users have different discount rates related to their income. Some research work tried to modify user discount rates using a compensating weight which represents the inverse of household income level. The inter-temporal preferences are a proxy of the willingness to pay during the time. Its consideration is important in order to make acceptable or not a policy or investment

The role of private sector in development: The relation between public-private investment in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries

Increasing foreign private investment in developing countries explains why the Public-Private Investment (PPI) is becoming a key tool to reach the development goal. This article analyzes the relation between PPI in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries. We use the panel data approach (52 countries and 17 years). Results show that PPI in infrastructure has a positive impact on agricultural exports of developing countries. The impact is greater in developing countries with higher income rates. This suggests that the lower income countries require the intervention of public sector without which private investment cannot help to economic development.