Social and medical vulnerability factors of emergency department frequent users in a universal health insurance system.

OBJECTIVES: The objectives were to identify the social and medical factors associated with emergency department (ED) frequent use and to determine if frequent users were more likely to have a combination of these factors in a universal health insurance system. METHODS: This was a retrospective chart review case-control study comparing randomized samples of frequent users and nonfrequent users at the Lausanne University Hospital, Switzerland. The authors defined frequent users as patients with four or more ED visits within the previous 12 months. Adult patients who visited the ED between April 2008 and March 2009 (study period) were included, and patients leaving the ED without medical discharge were excluded. For each patient, the first ED electronic record within the study period was considered for data extraction. Along with basic demographics, variables of interest included social (employment or housing status) and medical (ED primary diagnosis) characteristics. Significant social and medical factors were used to construct a logistic regression model, to determine factors associated with frequent ED use. In addition, comparison of the combination of social and medical factors was examined. RESULTS: A total of 359 of 1,591 frequent and 360 of 34,263 nonfrequent users were selected. Frequent users accounted for less than a 20th of all ED patients (4.4%), but for 12.1% of all visits (5,813 of 48,117), with a maximum of 73 ED visits. No difference in terms of age or sex occurred, but more frequent users had a nationality other than Swiss or European (n = 117 [32.6%] vs. n = 83 [23.1%], p = 0.003). Adjusted multivariate analysis showed that social and specific medical vulnerability factors most increased the risk of frequent ED use: being under guardianship (adjusted odds ratio [OR] = 15.8; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.7 to 147.3), living closer to the ED (adjusted OR = 4.6; 95% CI = 2.8 to 7.6), being uninsured (adjusted OR = 2.5; 95% CI = 1.1 to 5.8), being unemployed or dependent on government welfare (adjusted OR = 2.1; 95% CI = 1.3 to 3.4), the number of psychiatric hospitalizations (adjusted OR = 4.6; 95% CI = 1.5 to 14.1), and the use of five or more clinical departments over 12 months (adjusted OR = 4.5; 95% CI = 2.5 to 8.1). Having two of four social factors increased the odds of frequent ED use (adjusted = OR 5.4; 95% CI = 2.9 to 9.9), and similar results were found for medical factors (adjusted OR = 7.9; 95% CI = 4.6 to 13.4). A combination of social and medical factors was markedly associated with ED frequent use, as frequent users were 10 times more likely to have three of them (on a total of eight factors; 95% CI = 5.1 to 19.6). CONCLUSIONS: Frequent users accounted for a moderate proportion of visits at the Lausanne ED. Social and medical vulnerability factors were associated with frequent ED use. In addition, frequent users were more likely to have both social and medical vulnerabilities than were other patients. Case management strategies might address the vulnerability factors of frequent users to prevent inequities in health care and related costs.

Department of Commerce Iowa Insurance Division Performance Report, FY 2004

Agency Performance Report from the Insurance Division

Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2005

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations

Report of the Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Workforce Development on a Review of Selected General and Application Controls Over the Unemployment Insurance System, May 1, 2006 to May 24, 2006

State Audit Reports

Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Calibration of Matching Models

This paper points out an empirical puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, both sticky wages and match-specific productivity shocks help the model reproduce the stylized facts: both make the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, thus making hiring more procyclical too.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.

Pedagogical reflective practice of nursing undergraduates: the portfolio as an instrument

Objective Analyzing the narratives related to the pedagogical practice experienced during the Supervised Curricular Internship reported in the portfolios of Nursing undergraduate students, regarding the levels of reflection. Method This is a documentary descriptive exploratory study that examined two of the activities proposed for the portfolio preparation. Results Among the 28 analyzed portfolios, all showed the three levels of reflection (technical, critical and metacritical). Conclusion The students had the opportunity to experience the pedagogical practice and presented reflections at metacritical level, reflecting on their performance, the construction of their teaching identity, and about the importance of reflecting on the practice with the objective of transforming it and transforming themselves.

Get a GRIP: Should Area Revenue Coverage Be Offered through the Farm Bill or as a Crop Insurance Program? 2007

The successful expansion of the U.S. crop insurance program has not eliminated ad hoc disaster assistance. An alternative currently being explored by members of Congress and others in preparation of the 2007 farm bill is to simply remove the “ad hoc” part of disaster assistance programs by creating a standing program that would automatically funnel aid to hard-hit regions and crops. One form such a program could take can be found in the area yield and area revenue insurance programs currently offered by the U.S. crop insurance program. The Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) programs automatically trigger payments when county yields or revenues, respectively, fall below a producer-elected coverage level. The per-acre taxpayer costs of offering GRIP in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa for corn and soybeans through the crop insurance program are estimated. These results are used to determine the amount of area revenue coverage that could be offered to farmers as part of a standing farm bill disaster program. Approximately 55% of taxpayer support for GRIP flows to the crop insurance industry. A significant portion of this support comes in the form of net underwriting gains. The expected rate of return on money put at risk by private crop insurance companies under the current Standard Reinsurance Agreement is approximately 100%. Taking this industry support and adding in the taxpayer support for GRIP that flows to producers would fund a county target revenue program at the 93% coverage level.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2006

Iowa Department of Commerce - Insurance Division, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

From severance pay to self-insurance: Effects of severance payments savings accounts in Colombia

In 1990 Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance paymentswith a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Althoughseverance payments often are justified on the grounds that they provideinsurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employersand distort employment decisions. The impact of severance payments dependslargely on how much of the costs to employers can be shifted to workers.The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that, in contrast to atraditional system of severance payments, the system of SPSAs facilitatesthe shifting of severance payments costs to workers in the form of lowerwages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveysindicate that the introduction of SPSAs shifted around 80% of the totalseverance payments contributions to wages and had a positive effect onweekly hours. Results using the 1997 Colombian Living Standards MeasurementSurvey suggest that, although SPSAs in part replaced employer insurancewith self-insurance, SPSAs continue to play a consumption smoothing rolefor the non-employed.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

Portfolio choice and the effects of liquidity

This paper shows how to introduce liquidity into the well known mean-variance framework of portfolio selection. Either by estimating mean-variance liquidity constrained frontiers or directly estimating optimal portfolios for alternative levels of risk aversion and preference for liquidity, we obtain strong effects of liquidity on optimal portfolio selection. In particular, portfolio performance, measured by the Sharpe ratio relative to the tangency portfolio, varies significantly with liquidity. Moreover, although mean-variance performance becomes clearly worse, the levels of liquidity onoptimal portfolios obtained when there is a positive preference for liquidity are much lower than on those optimal portfolios where investors show no sign of preference for liquidity.

Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.