Alternation and Cooperation in a Two-party System: Implications for Resource-Based Developing Economies

This paper studies cooperation in a political system dominated by two opportunistic parties competing in a resource-based economy. Since a binding agreement as an external solution might be difficult to enforce due to the close association between the incumbent party and the government, the paper explores the extent to which co-operation between political parties that alternate in office can rely on self-enforcing strategies to provide an internal solution. We show that, for appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount factor cooperation in maintaining the value of a state variable is possible, but fragile. Another result is that, in such political framework, debt decisions contain an externality element linked to electoral incentives that creates a bias towards excessive borrowing.

Las posiciones de los diferentes grupos políticos israelíes sobre la resolución de la situación de los refugiados

La cuestión de los refugiados palestinos es uno de los asuntos clave para alcanzar una resolución firme del conflicto palestino-israelí. Para ello debe resolverse la situación de los cientos de miles de palestinos que fueron expulsados y/o huyeron con la guerra de 1948, y sus descendientes, que hoy suman casi 5 millones. En el proceso de paz, este es uno de los asuntos que ni siquiera fue tenido en cuenta con la profundidad que lo requiere. Los palestinos se acogen a la resolución 194 de la Asamblea de Naciones Unidas y reivindican el Derecho al Retorno. Pero del lado israelí tres argumentos ponen en duda este derecho al retorno: A) El asunto de la responsabilidad en la huida/expulsión de cientos de miles de palestinos de sus hogares. B) La «necesidad» existencial de ser un estado de mayoría judía, que el retorno podría poner en cuestión. C) El hecho de que Israel ya acogió a cientos de miles de judíos originarios de los países árabes. Analizaremos cómo los partidos políticos israelíes tratan este asunto, y cómo los «nuevos historiadores israelíes» pueden ayudar a cambiar el punto de vista israelí al poner en cuestión la narrativa sionista de la guerra del 48.

Social Policy Preferences and Party Choice in the 2011 Swiss Elections

To what extent do social policy preferences explain party choice? This question has received little attention over the past years, because the bulk of the literature has argued that electoral choice is increasingly shaped by identity-based attitudes, rather than by preferences for economic-distributive social policies. We argue that in the wake of this debate, the significance of social policy preferences for electoral choice has been underestimated, because most contributions neglect social policy debates that are specific to post-industrial societies. In particular, they merely focus on income redistribution, while neglecting distributive conflicts around social investment. The Selects 2011 data allows investigating this crucial distinction for Switzerland. Our empirical analyses confirm that it is pivotal to take the pluridimensionality of distributive conflicts seriously: when looking at preferences for social investment rather than income redistribution, we find that social policy preferences are significant explanatory factors for the choice of the five major Swiss political parties.

The Nationalism of stateless nations and Europe. The Catalan case

This paper analyzes how the ideas and concepts of Europe have developed in Catalonia, under the conditions of a decentralizing “nation-state” (Spain) on one hand, and the European integration process on the other. It analyzes the programmes, manifestations of political leaders, and political actions of the Catalan political parties, specially the nationalists, from the setting up of the Spanish state of autonomies (1977-1982) until today. The paper tries to show how, in multilevel governance, holistic and enthusiastic visions of an economically and political integrating Europe as a “natural ally” of a Catalan nationalism were partially replaced by more pragmatic and even more critical assessments.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Networks of Coordination : Swiss Business Associations as an Intermediary between Business, Politics and Administration during the 20th Century

Until the 1990's, Switzerland could be classified as either a corporatist, cooperative or coordinated market economy where non-market mechanisms of coordination among economic and political actors were very important. In this respect, Business Interest Associations (BIAs) played a key role. The aim of this paper is to look at the historical evolution of the five main peak Swiss BIAs through network analysis for five assorted dates during the 20th century (1910, 1937, 1957, 1980 and 2000) while relying on a database that includes more than 12,000 people. First, we examine the logic of membership in these associations, which allows us to analyze their position and function within the network of the Swiss economic elite. Until the 1980's, BIAs took part in the emergence and consolidation of a closely meshed national network, which declined during the two last decades of the 20th century. Second, we investigate the logic of influence of these associations by looking at the links they maintained with the political and administrative worlds through their links to the political parties and Parliament, and to the administration via the extra-parliamentary commissions (corporatist bodies). In both cases, the recent dynamic of globalization called into question the traditional role of BIAs.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

En busca del ciudadano Kane : los dueños de medios de comunicación y su utilización política

Aquesta recerca té com a objecte d'estudi la utilització dels mitjans de comunicació per a finalitats polítiques i intenta analitzar la relació que els polítics professionals mantenen amb els mitjans i com aquests poden ser importants dins d'un procés polític-electoral i per a la formació de l'opinió pública. El nostre objectiu general és, entre d’altres, analitzar l'estructura d’aquests mitjans i grups polítics i descriure com estan situats, utilitzant com a exemple l'estat del Rio Grande do Norte (RN), al Nord-est de Brasil. Partint de les preguntes, ¿a qui pertanyen els mitjans de comunicació i qui té el poder d'informar en l'aquest Estat? anem construïm el marc teòric, analitzant el monopoli i oligopoli en la comunicació a Brasil, especialment a la radiodifusió, en la qual hi ha una gran concentració de concessions públiques en propietat dels polítics professionals amb mandats electius i/o de grups partidaris, què pot ser anomenat de ‘coronelismo electrònic’

Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies

``Negativity effect'' refers to the psychological phenomenon that peopletend to attach greater weight to negative information than to equallyextreme and equally likely positive information in a variety of informationprocessing tasks. Numerous studies of impression formation have found thatnegative information is weighted more heavily than positive information asimpressions of others are formed. There is empirical evidence in politicalscience that shows the importance of the negativity effect in the informationprocessing of the voters. This effect can explain the observed decreaseof popularity for a president the longer he is in office. \\We construct a dynamic model of political competition, incorporating thenegativity effect in the decision rule of the voters and allowing their preferencesto change over time, according to the past performance of the candidateswhile in office. Our model may explain the emergence of ideologies out ofthe competition for votes of myopic candidates freely choosing policypositions. This result gives rise to the formation of political parties,as infinitely--lived agents with a certain ideology. Furthermore, in thismodel some voters may start out by switching among parties associated withdifferent policies, but find themselves supporting one of the parties fromsome point on. Thus, the model describes a process by which some votersbecome identified with a ``right'' or ``left'' bloc, while others ``swing''between the two parties.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Generalized canonical correlation analysis of matrices with different row and column orders

A Method is offered that makes it possible to apply generalized canonicalcorrelations analysis (CANCOR) to two or more matrices of different row and column order. The new method optimizes the generalized canonical correlationanalysis objective by considering only the observed values. This is achieved byemploying selection matrices. We present and discuss fit measures to assessthe quality of the solutions. In a simulation study we assess the performance of our new method and compare it to an existing procedure called GENCOM,proposed by Green and Carroll. We find that our new method outperforms the GENCOM algorithm both with respect to model fit and recovery of the truestructure. Moreover, as our new method does not require any type of iteration itis easier to implement and requires less computation. We illustrate the methodby means of an example concerning the relative positions of the political parties inthe Netherlands based on provincial data.

The left-right dimension in Latin America

We present voters' self-placement and 68 political party locations on the left-right dimension in 17 Latin American countries. Innovative calculations are based on data from Latinobarometer annual surveys from 1995 to 2002. Our preliminary analysis of the results suggests that most Latin American voters are relatively highly ideological and rather consistently located on the left-right dimension, but they have very high levels of political alienation regarding the party system. Both voters' self-placement and the corresponding party locations are presently highly polarized between the center and the right, with a significant weakness of leftist or broadly appealing 'populist' positions.