Primary Cardiac Angiosarcoma: A Therapeutical Dilemma

Cardiac angiosarcomas are malignant tumors that almost invariably have a short and fatal evolution. The therapeutic approach includes surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation therapy, alone or in combination. Heart transplantation is an attractive option in nonresectable tumors, even though the current experience is still limited. However, in most patients, the diagnosis is still established late, and survival is only slightly altered by the proposed treatments, mainly due to previously existing and undetected metastases. We report a case that illustrates the therapeutic dilemma faced with this neoplasia, and we discuss the case based on a literature review.

Annual report of the Commissioners on Fisheries and Game.

1912

Annual report of the Commissioners on Fisheries and Game.

1916

Children, computer and creativity : usability guidelines for designing a game authoring tool for children

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2009

Zwischen Aufholwachstum und Nephrokalzinose : das therapeutische Dilemma bei X-chromosomaler hypophosphatämischer Rachitis (XLHR)

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2011

A collection of Colombian game birds.

v.37:no.1(1955)

Two new game birds from Peru.

v.39:no.32(1959)

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.