Remarques introductives

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La prostitution, le port du voile et l'avortement devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme :une affaire de femmes ?

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An improved method for the detection of heterozygosity of congenital virilizing adrenal hyperplasia

SCOPUS: ar.j

La cohabitation légale :quo vadis ?

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Les conventions de cohabitation légale peuvent-elles prévoir un devoir de secours entre cohabitants et une pension après rupture de la cohabitation ?

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De la caducité de la clause de tontine en cas de séparation du couple et du partage de l’indivision ordinaire qui en résulte: note sous Cassation, 6 mars 2014

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Les violences conjugales et la pension après divorce

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La famille et son patrimoine en questions: L’usufruit du conjoint survivant et du cohabitant légal survivant, ou le purgatoire pavé de bonnes intentions

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Le tribunal de la Famille et de la Jeunesse: Les lignes de force de la réforme

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Le tribunal de la Famille et de la Jeunesse: Le Tribunal de la Jeunesse et le rôle du Parquet dans le Tribunal de la Famille et de la Jeunesse

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Le Traité de droit civil belge « De Page » -- 1

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Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con- stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.

A divide-and-conquer bound for aggregate's quality and algebraic connectivity

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