Os efeitos da modalidade pregão na execução dos contratos continuados: um estudo de caso

O presente trabalho investiga os impactos das licitações do tipo menor preço, realizadas por meio de Pregão eletrônico, no desempenho das execuções dos contratos contínuos, efetivados pela Superintendência de Administração da AGU em Pernambuco - SAD/PE -, no período de 2006 a 2010. Teve como proposição a premissa de que a contratação do tipo menor preço pode, em função de suas próprias características, estimular uma redução excessiva nos preços ofertados pelos licitantes e originar contratações com valores muito baixos que interferem de forma negativa no desempenho da prestação dos serviços, gerando infrações contratuais e diminuindo a vida útil dos contratos contínuos. A aparente economia, consequência da acirrada competição nos leilões invertidos, que caracterizam a modalidade licitatória Pregão, em médio e longo prazo, pode ser questionada. Os resultados confirmaram a proposição, evidenciando um percentual de 55% dos contratos, oriundos de Pregão eletrônico, com infrações e 31%, rescindidos unilateralmente por descumprimento de cláusulas contratuais. Foi identificada uma relação, de força moderada, inversamente proporcional entre a economia inicial gerada na licitação e o tempo de execução dos contratos, sugerindo uma tendência no sentido de que - quanto maior a diferença entre o valor referencia e o contratado na licitação, menor o tempo de execução do contrato, pois, parte das contratações muito abaixo do preço de mercado, geraram contratos com pequena vida útil e com muitas infrações. As análises dos dados apontam para a necessidade de se relativizar a adoção da modalidade licitatória Pregão, repensando-se a sua indicação para serviços continuados

Market coupling in the power markets

The thesis analyses the European Unions’ effort to create an integrated pan-European electricity market based on “market coupling” as the proposed allocation mechanism for interconnector transfer capacity. Thus, the thesis’ main focus is if market coupling leads to a price convergence in interlinked markets and how it affects the behavior of electricity price data. The applied research methods are a qualitative, structured literature review and a quantitative analysis of electricity price data. The quantitative analysis relies on descriptive statistics of absolute price differentials and on a Cointegration analysis according to Engle & Granger (1987)’s two step approach. Main findings are that implicit auction mechanisms such as market coupling are more efficient than explicit auctions. Especially the method of price coupling leads to a price convergence in involved markets, to social welfare gains and reduces market power of producers, as shown on the example of the TLC market coupling. The market coupling initiative between Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, is evaluated as less successful and illustrates the complexity and difficulties of implementing market coupling initiatives. The cointegration analysis shows that the time series were already before the coupling date cointegrated, but the statistical significance increased. The thesis suggests that market coupling leads to a price convergence of involved markets and thus functions as method to create a single, integrated European electricity market.

What really matters in auction design

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circum- stances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal, but this author (and others) correctly predicted the same for- mat would fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not one size Þts all . We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions in Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, and football TV-rights, TV franchise and other radiospectrum auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles.

O conjunto dos equilíbrios dos leilões de primeiro preço

In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions.

Representando o vendedor e a sociedade : mecanismos com dois critérios para leilões combinatórios com demandas unitárias

This work focuses on obtaining truthful mechanisms that aim at maximizing both the revenue and the economic efficiency (social welfare) for the unitdemand combinatorial auction problem (UDCAP), in which a set of k items is auctioned to a set of n consumers. Although each consumer bids on all items, no consumer can purchase more than one item in the UDCAP. We present a framework for devising poly-time randomized competitive truthful mechanisms that can be used to either favor economic efficiency or revenue.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Trem de alta velocidade RJ-SP: estudo de caso sobre sua não implementação durante os governos Lula e Dilma

This work refers to one of the greatest infrastructure projects planned by the Federal Public Administration entitled Trem de Alta Velocidade RJ-Campinas (TAV Brasil) [High Speed Rail Rio de Janeiro – Campinas], also know as bullet train. The intent of this research is not to explore the technical issues of the project bu the description of some details contributes for a better understanting of the evolved technology. The focus of this work is found under the actions promoted by diverse political actors in such enterprise as well as the context which made the public grant not possible along the two mandates of President Lula and the first one of President Dilma Rousseff. This contemporary matter required a huge documentary investigation performed by available material on the internet, news report of the most important press vehicles in the country, essays and articles published by experts. Some people involved in this policy process were interviewed. These inputs enriched the data explaining the conceived actions and structure of the project by the federal government. The results and final considerations target the complexity of the project and the TAV auctions failure from 2010 to 2014, suggesting further researches concerning the retaking of the bullet train project.

Um modelo de leilões com conteúdo local: análise e modelagem dos leilões de concessão de blocos exploratórios de petróleo e gás promovidos pela ANP no Brasil

Os leilões para concessão de blocos de petróleo no Brasil utilizam uma equação para formar a pontuação que define o vencedor. Cada participante deve submeter ao leiloeiro um lance composto por três atributos: Bônus de Assinatura (BA), Programa Exploratório Mínimo (PEM) e Conteúdo Local (CL). Cada atributo possui um peso na equação e a nota final de cada participante também depende dos lances ofertados pelos outros participantes. Apesar de leilões de petróleo serem muito estudados na economia, o leilão multi-atributos, do tipo máxima pontuação, ainda é pouco analisado, principalmente como mecanismo de alocação de direitos minerários. Este trabalho destaca a inserção do CL como atributo que transforma a estrutura, do que poderia ser um leilão simples de primeiro preço, em um leilão multi-atributos de máxima pontuação. Demonstra-se como o CL, através da curva de custos do projeto, está relacionado também ao Bônus de Assinatura, outro importante atributo da equação. Para compreender o impacto do fenômeno da inserção do CL, foram criados três casos de leilões hipotéticos, onde, dentre outras simplificações, o programa exploratório mínimo foi fixado para todas as empresas envolvidas. No caso base (Sem CL), simula-se a estrutura de um leilão de primeiro preço, onde apenas o BA define o vencedor do leilão. Já no caso forçado (CLO=CLR), há inserção do atributo CL, sendo o participante obrigado a cumprir o CL ofertado. Por fim, o caso completo (Com Multa) permite que o participante preveja a aplicação de multa por descumprimento do CL ofertado e, caso haja benefício econômico, descumpra efetivamente o CL ofertado. Considerando estes casos, argumenta-se que, apesar do o lucro das empresas e a eficiência do leilão não serem alterados, a inclusão do conteúdo local na estrutura do leilão pode ter reflexos consideráveis na receita do governo.

Causas de variação nos preços de bovinos nelore elite no Brasil

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

O impacto dos custos não-gerenciáveis na determinação das tarifas de energia elétrica: um estudo nas companhias distribuidoras do nordeste que tiveram revisão tarifária nos exercícios de 2003 e 2004

This work presents results derived from a study related to impact on non-controllable costs in the determination of energy taxes. This is done analyzing tax review practiced by concessionaries responsible for the distribution of electrical energy located in the Northeastern Region of Brazil, between 2003 and 2004. This Region was chosen as a study area due to the researcher s expectation in congregating companies that deliver services to markets that have similar social-economical profiles. A brief explanation related to the restructuring of the electrical sector in Brazil is presented, pointing out that there was privatization of the great majority of these companies. The study also points out the definition of regulating rules in service delivery process. The components of taxes that are practiced by these companies aimed at final consumers, as well as the market as a whole and the revision process that is executed by Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica ANEEL for the definition of these taxes are demonstrated in the research. A brief historical of the concessionaires that were focus of the research is presented, totaling five companies. Some data used by ANEEL in the tax review process was analyzed as well as data on components of approved taxes. It is concluded that as a media 47, 49% of the components of taxes in the researched companies correspond to the non-controllable costs. These is done considering previous classification by ANEEL in the tax review process. Although, if it is considered that these companies since 2006, by the means of participation in energy auctions are able to negotiate energy prices for their own needs, it is concluded that these concession contracts guarantee the delivery of the service to the costumer in the total tribute. The percentage of non-controllable costs is 16, 27% average of the tax. This means, amongst other information, that the government has a great deal of responsibility in the formation of price practiced by these companies and its target markets

Valorização da reserva operativa em um ambiente competitivo para geradores hidrelétricos

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

O 'Grupo Tapir'e a pintura de casarios (1960-1980)

Pós-graduação em Artes - IA

O investimento em transmissão de energia elétrica no Brasil: uma análise da atratividade das concessões por leilão

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)