A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

Assédio Moral e Sexual nas Relações de trabalho: Os factores que potenciam o assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho e as atitudes das pessoas perante tal fenómeno. Caso Enapor

Esta pesquisa monográfica, ora apresentada, visa analisar e compreender os factores que os funcionários da ENAPOR percepcionam como estando na origem do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, bem como as atitudes dos mesmos perante o fenómeno. Os aspectos apresentados derivam de interpretações feitas durante a investigação sobre a temática em estudo, assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, tendo como bases as autoras BARRETO (2000) e FREITAS (2001). Estas são as autoras nas quais pretendemos centralizar, mas, outras abordagens teóricas darão suporte a esta nossa investigação. Pretendemos estudar o tema com base na análise documental, Pesquisas na Internet e aplicação das entrevistas aos directores e outros funcionários de outro escalão. A escolha destas duas autoras como suportes teóricos para esta pesquisa tem a ver, sobretudo, com o facto de elas estarem intrinsecamente relacionadas com os objectivos que norteiam a nossa investigação. Utilizaremos também como suporte teórico as contribuições de outros autores em relação à problemática do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalhos. As mesmas razões apresentadas nos parágrafos anteriores em relação às outras contribuições teóricas dos outros autores também se aplicam de forma específica a este autor. Para uma análise aprofundada desta pesquisa, recorreu-se ao método qualitativa para a análise de resultados, utilizando como instrumentos de recolha dos dados a entrevistas. Esta pesquisa monográfica está estruturada em cinco capítulos: no primeiro capítulo, uma reflexão sobre a definição do objecto de estudo e da metodologia; no segundo, assédio moral e sexual; no terceiro, temos as estratégias, motivos que encoraja a pratica do assédio, as atitudes e as politica de prevenção. No quarto, capítulo procede-se à apresentação, análise e interpretação dos resultados obtidos, por último, as principais conclusões a que se chegou nesta pesquisa e as considerações finais do mesmo.

Patterns of split sex ratio in ants have multiple evolutionary causes based on different within-colony conflicts.

Split sex ratio-a pattern where colonies within a population specialize in either male or queen production-is a widespread phenomenon in ants and other social Hymenoptera. It has often been attributed to variation in colony kin structure, which affects the degree of queen-worker conflict over optimal sex allocation. However, recent findings suggest that split sex ratio is a more diverse phenomenon, which can evolve for multiple reasons. Here, we provide an overview of the main conditions favouring split sex ratio. We show that each split sex-ratio type arises due to a different combination of factors determining colony kin structure, queen or worker control over sex ratio and the type of conflict between colony members.

La licitud de l’interès: evolució històrica d’un tema de moral econòmica

[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.