768 resultados para Logic programs
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Separating programs into modules is a well-known technique which has proven very useful in program development and maintenance. Starting by introducing a number of possible scenarios, in this paper we study different issues which appear when developing analysis and specialization techniques for modular logic programming. We discuss a number of design alternatives and their consequences for the different scenarios considered and describe where applicable the decisions made in the Ciao system analyzer and specializer. In our discussion we use the module system of Ciao Prolog. This is both for concreteness and because Ciao Prolog is a second-generation Prolog system which has been designed with global analysis and specialization in mind, and which has a strict module system. The aim of this work is not to provide a theoretical basis on modular analysis and specialization, but rather to discuss some interesting practical issues.
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We describe lpdoc, a tool which generates documentation manuals automatically from one or more logic program source files, written in ISO-Prolog, Ciao, and other (C)LP languages. It is particularly useful for documenting library modules, for which it automatically generates a rich description of the module interface. However, it can also be used quite successfully to document full applications. A fundamental advantage of using lpdoc is that it helps maintaining a true correspondence between the program and its documentation, and also identifying precisely to what version of the program a given printed manual corresponds. The quality of the documentation generated can be greatly enhanced by including within the program text assertions (declarations with types, modes, etc.) for the predicates in the program, and machine-readable comments. One of the main novelties of lpdoc is that these assertions and comments are written using the Ciao system assertion language, which is also the language of communication between the compiler and the user and between the components of the compiler. This allows a significant synergy among specification, documentation, optimization, etc. A simple compatibility library allows conventional (C)LP systems to ignore these assertions and comments and treat normally programs documented in this way. The documentation can be generated in many formats including texinfo, dvi, ps, pdf, info, html/css, Unix nroff/man, Windows help, etc., and can include bibliographic citations and images. lpdoc can also generate “man” pages (Unix man page format), nicely formatted plain ascii “readme” files, installation scripts useful when the manuals are included in software distributions, brief descriptions in html/css or info formats suitable for inclusion in on-line indices of manuals, and even complete WWW and info sites containing on-line catalogs of documents and software distributions. The lpdoc manual, all other Ciao system manuals, and parts of this paper are generated by lpdoc.
Resumo:
We describe lpdoc, a tool which generates documentation manuals automatically from one or more logic program source files, written in ISO-Prolog, Ciao, and other (C)LP languages. It is particularly useful for documenting library modules, for which it automatically generates a rich description of the module interface. However, it can also be used quite successfully to document full applications. The documentation can be generated in many formats including t e x i n f o, dvi, ps, pdf, inf o, html/css, Unix nrof f/man, Windows help, etc., and can include bibliographic citations and images, lpdoc can also genérate "man" pages (Unix man page format), nicely formatted plain ascii "readme" files, installation scripts useful when the manuals are included in software distributions, brief descriptions in html/css or inf o formats suitable for inclusión in on-line Índices of manuals, and even complete WWW and inf o sites containing on-line catalogs of documents and software distributions. A fundamental advantage of using lpdoc is that it helps maintaining a true correspondence between the program and its documentation, and also identifying precisely to what versión of the program a given printed manual corresponds. The quality of the documentation generated can be greatly enhanced by including within the program text assertions (declarations with types, modes, etc. ...) for the predicates in the program, and machine-readable comments. These assertions and comments are written using the Ciao system assertion language. A simple compatibility library allows conventional (C)LP systems to ignore these assertions and comments and treat normally programs documented in this way. The lpdoc manual, all other Ciao system manuals, and most of this paper, are generated by lpdoc.
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The purpose of this document is to serve as the printed material for the seminar "An Introductory Course on Constraint Logic Programming". The intended audience of this seminar are industrial programmers with a degree in Computer Science but little previous experience with constraint programming. The seminar itself has been field tested, prior to the writing of this document, with a group of the application programmers of Esprit project P23182, "VOCAL", aimed at developing an application in scheduling of field maintenance tasks in the context of an electric utility company. The contents of this paper follow essentially the flow of the seminar slides. However, there are some differences. These differences stem from our perception from the experience of teaching the seminar, that the technical aspects are the ones which need more attention and clearer explanations in the written version. Thus, this document includes more examples than those in the slides, more exercises (and the solutions to them), as well as four additional programming projects, with which we hope the reader will obtain a clearer view of the process of development and tuning of programs using CLP. On the other hand, several parts of the seminar have been taken out: those related with the account of fields and applications in which C(L)P is useful, and the enumerations of C(L)P tools available. We feel that the slides are clear enough, and that for more information on available tools, the interested reader will find more up-to-date information by browsing the Web or asking the vendors directly. More details in this direction will actually boil down to summarizing a user manual, which is not the aim of this document.
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The concept of independence has been recently generalized to the constraint logic programming (CLP) paradigm. Also, several abstract domains specifically designed for CLP languages, and whose information can be used to detect the generalized independence conditions, have been recently defined. As a result we are now in a position where automatic parallelization of CLP programs is feasible. In this paper we study the task of automatically parallelizing CLP programs based on such analyses, by transforming them to explicitly concurrent programs in our parallel CC platform (CIAO) as well as to AKL. We describe the analysis and transformation process, and study its efficiency, accuracy, and effectiveness in program parallelization. The information gathered by the analyzers is evaluated not only in terms of its accuracy, i.e. its ability to determine the actual dependencies among the program variables, but also of its effectiveness, measured in terms of code reduction in the resulting parallelized programs. Given that only a few abstract domains have been already defined for CLP, and that none of them were specifically designed for dependency detection, the aim of the evaluation is not only to asses the effectiveness of the available domains, but also to study what additional information it would be desirable to infer, and what domains would be appropriate for further improving the parallelization process.
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La seguridad verificada es una metodología para demostrar propiedades de seguridad de los sistemas informáticos que se destaca por las altas garantías de corrección que provee. Los sistemas informáticos se modelan como programas probabilísticos y para probar que verifican una determinada propiedad de seguridad se utilizan técnicas rigurosas basadas en modelos matemáticos de los programas. En particular, la seguridad verificada promueve el uso de demostradores de teoremas interactivos o automáticos para construir demostraciones completamente formales cuya corrección es certificada mecánicamente (por ordenador). La seguridad verificada demostró ser una técnica muy efectiva para razonar sobre diversas nociones de seguridad en el área de criptografía. Sin embargo, no ha podido cubrir un importante conjunto de nociones de seguridad “aproximada”. La característica distintiva de estas nociones de seguridad es que se expresan como una condición de “similitud” entre las distribuciones de salida de dos programas probabilísticos y esta similitud se cuantifica usando alguna noción de distancia entre distribuciones de probabilidad. Este conjunto incluye destacadas nociones de seguridad de diversas áreas como la minería de datos privados, el análisis de flujo de información y la criptografía. Ejemplos representativos de estas nociones de seguridad son la indiferenciabilidad, que permite reemplazar un componente idealizado de un sistema por una implementación concreta (sin alterar significativamente sus propiedades de seguridad), o la privacidad diferencial, una noción de privacidad que ha recibido mucha atención en los últimos años y tiene como objetivo evitar la publicación datos confidenciales en la minería de datos. La falta de técnicas rigurosas que permitan verificar formalmente este tipo de propiedades constituye un notable problema abierto que tiene que ser abordado. En esta tesis introducimos varias lógicas de programa quantitativas para razonar sobre esta clase de propiedades de seguridad. Nuestra principal contribución teórica es una versión quantitativa de una lógica de Hoare relacional para programas probabilísticos. Las pruebas de correción de estas lógicas son completamente formalizadas en el asistente de pruebas Coq. Desarrollamos, además, una herramienta para razonar sobre propiedades de programas a través de estas lógicas extendiendo CertiCrypt, un framework para verificar pruebas de criptografía en Coq. Confirmamos la efectividad y aplicabilidad de nuestra metodología construyendo pruebas certificadas por ordendor de varios sistemas cuyo análisis estaba fuera del alcance de la seguridad verificada. Esto incluye, entre otros, una meta-construcción para diseñar funciones de hash “seguras” sobre curvas elípticas y algoritmos diferencialmente privados para varios problemas de optimización combinatoria de la literatura reciente. ABSTRACT The verified security methodology is an emerging approach to build high assurance proofs about security properties of computer systems. Computer systems are modeled as probabilistic programs and one relies on rigorous program semantics techniques to prove that they comply with a given security goal. In particular, it advocates the use of interactive theorem provers or automated provers to build fully formal machine-checked versions of these security proofs. The verified security methodology has proved successful in modeling and reasoning about several standard security notions in the area of cryptography. However, it has fallen short of covering an important class of approximate, quantitative security notions. The distinguishing characteristic of this class of security notions is that they are stated as a “similarity” condition between the output distributions of two probabilistic programs, and this similarity is quantified using some notion of distance between probability distributions. This class comprises prominent security notions from multiple areas such as private data analysis, information flow analysis and cryptography. These include, for instance, indifferentiability, which enables securely replacing an idealized component of system with a concrete implementation, and differential privacy, a notion of privacy-preserving data mining that has received a great deal of attention in the last few years. The lack of rigorous techniques for verifying these properties is thus an important problem that needs to be addressed. In this dissertation we introduce several quantitative program logics to reason about this class of security notions. Our main theoretical contribution is, in particular, a quantitative variant of a full-fledged relational Hoare logic for probabilistic programs. The soundness of these logics is fully formalized in the Coq proof-assistant and tool support is also available through an extension of CertiCrypt, a framework to verify cryptographic proofs in Coq. We validate the applicability of our approach by building fully machine-checked proofs for several systems that were out of the reach of the verified security methodology. These comprise, among others, a construction to build “safe” hash functions into elliptic curves and differentially private algorithms for several combinatorial optimization problems from the recent literature.
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"UIUCDCS-R-75-698"
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Bibliography: p. 101-102.
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"UILU-ENG 78 1719."
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"UILU-ENG 77 1726."
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Bibliography: p. 49.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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"Work supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant no. GJ-40221."