Color adjectives and radical contextualism

Radical contextualists have observed that the content of what is said by the utterance of a sentence is shaped in far-reaching ways by the context of utterance. And they have argued that the ways in which the content of what is said is shaped by context cannot be explained by semantic theory. A striking number of the examples that radical contextualists use to support their view involve sentences containing color adjectives (“red”, “green”, etc.). In this paper, I show how the most sophisticated analysis of color adjectives within the explanatory framework of compositional truth conditional semantics—recently developed by Kennedy and McNally (Synthese 174(1):79–98 2010)—needs to be modified to handle the full range of contextual variation displayed by color adjectives.

Time and retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focussing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.

Effort and affect: engaging with film performance

In order to consider our emotional and physical involvement with film this chapter explores the rapport between camera and performer and how this impacts on the construction of engagement, drawing on critical approaches across the disciplines of film, dance and philosophy to describe our spatial, emotional and sensuous relationship to characters and bodies on-screen. Concern with the relationship between what is happening on screen and the shaping of our engagement is developed through attention to the effort of a particular performance, using close analysis to make sense of the affect invited by qualities of movement and how they are presented in moment from Rosemary’s Baby (Polanski, 1968).

Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life

I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy. There are salient aspects of both Kant’s and Cavell’s philosophy that are crucial to understanding perfectionism and, let me call it, perfectionist education, that I wish to emphasize in response to Guyer. In responding to Guyer’s text, I shall do three things. First, I shall explain why I think it is misleading to speak of Cavell’s view that moral perfectionism is involved in a struggle to make oneself intelligible to oneself and others in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral perfection. Rather, I will suggest that the constant work on oneself that is at the core of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a constant work for intelligibility. Second, I shall recall a feature of Cavell’s perfectionism that Guyer does not explicitly speak of: the idea that perfectionism is a theme, “outlook or dimension of thought embodied and developed in a set of texts.” Or, as Cavell goes on to say, “there is a place in mind where good books are in conversation. … [W]hat they often talk about … is how they can be, or sound, so much better than the people that compose them.” This involves what I would call a perfectionist conception of the history of philosophy and the kinds of texts we take to belong to such history. Third, I shall sketch out how the struggle for intelligibility and a perfectionist view of engagement with texts and philosophy can lead to a view of philosophy as a form of education in itself. In concluding these three “criticisms,” I reach a position that I think is quite close to Guyer’s, but with a slightly shifted emphasis on what it means to read Kant and Cavell from a perfectionist point of view.

The rhetorics of violence in Joshua: Foucauldian Power, Israelite Identity, and the Ethics of Interpretation

The goals of this project are manifold. First, I will attempt to discover evidence in the book of Joshua that will lend support to the theory of a Josianic influence enacted in the 7th century BCE. I will do this through an analysis of the rhetoric in selected stories in Joshua using the ideas of Foucault. Second, I will address the significance of this kind of analysis as having potential for the emancipation of oppressed peoples. The first section delineates scholarly discussion on the literary and historical context of the book of Joshua. These scholarly works are foundational to this study because they situate the text within a particular period in history and within certain ideologies. Chapter 2 discusses the work of Foucault and how his ideas will be applied to particular texts of the book of Joshua. The focused analysis of these texts occurs within chapters 3 to 6. Chapter 7 presents an integration of the observations made through the analyses performed in the previous chapters and expands on the ethical significance of this study.

Consumed by Faith: The development of Christian Fundamentalism and its applications in contemporary society

My research aims to understand how and why fundamentalists justify violence against people who do not fit their profile of "righteous" or "saved" persons, such as abortion doctors and clinic workers, gays and lesbians, and Jews. The first section of this paper travels through the history of fundamentalism since its origins in the British and American apocalipticism, or belief in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. However, my history of Protestant Fundamentalism in the United States will focus on the ways in which Fundamentalism developed in response to many changes in American social structure. I interpret Fundamentalism as an anti-modern movement seeking to reassert "traditional" Christian values.

The eagle and the starlings: Galileo's argument for the autonomy of science-how pertinent is it today?

After Galileo's argument for the autonomy of science is analysed and adapted to take into account later developments of scientific practices, we conclude that, in the final analysis, it is not compelling. Nevertheless, Galileo's argument still provides a useful point of reference, for aspects of it can be interpreted to anticipate central components of the often acclaimed ideal of science as value free, so that appraising it contributes to the larger purpose of exploring how well that ideal stands up today. Finally, we will argue that residue from Galileo's struggle with the Church remains with us, making it difficult to identify the conditions that would need to be put into place today for any robust sense of the autonomy of science to be defensible. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Faith and the Sublation of Modernity: Kierkegaard and the Transformation of Fideism

This article retraces the “genealogy” of the fideist perspective in philosophy as well as literature, especially within the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and the novel Don Quixote. It contends that a demythologized perspective of the fideist-humanist sort, based upon Erasmian tolerance and intellectual creativity and updated with the insights of post-analytic theory (e.g., the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, and Jeffrey Stout), without revoking the vocabulary of transcendence, can reinforce the weathered but still valuable post-Enlightenment moral vocabulary, and can reiterate the humaneness of liberal hope without undue encumbrance from the dogmatic baggage of traditional theological jargon and metaphysics.

The Art of Aidagara: Ethics, Aesthetics, and the Quest for an Ontology of Social Existence in Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku

This paper provides an analysis of the key term aidagara (“betweenness”) in the philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), in response to and in light of the recent movement in Japanese Buddhist studies known as “Critical Buddhism.” The Critical Buddhist call for a turn away from “topical” or intuitionist thinking and towards (properly Buddhist) “critical” thinking, while problematic in its bipolarity, raises the important issue of the place of “reason” versus “intuition” in Japanese Buddhist ethics. In this paper, a comparison of Watsuji’s “ontological quest” with that of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Watsuji’s primary Western source and foil, is followed by an evaluation of a corresponding search for an “ontology of social existence” undertaken by Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962). Ultimately, the philosophico-religious writings of Watsuji Tetsurō allow for the “return” of aesthesis as a modality of social being that is truly dimensionalized, and thus falls prey neither to the verticality of topicalism nor the limiting objectivity of criticalism.

Eros and Transgression in an Age of Immanence: Georges Bataille’s (Religious) Critique of Kinsey

This paper explores the religious implications of eroticism in Western culture since the Sexual Revolution, a period at once applauded for its open and immanent view of sexuality and denounced for its shamelessness and promiscuity. After discussing the work and effects of Alfred C. Kinsey, the father of the Sexual Revolution, I focus on a critical appraisal of Kinsey written by French theorist Georges Bataille (“Kinsey, the Underworld and Work,” in L’Erotisme, 1957). Bataille situates contemporary Western sexuality within a larger historical movement towards the “desacralization” of all aspects of human life: sex, under the scientific gaze of the Kinsey team, became simply another “object” to be analyzed and classified, and “good” sex defined solely in terms of frequency and explosiveness of orgasm. For many, including Hugh Hefner, this approach to sex occasioned a refreshing awakening from the long dark night of Victorian sexual repression. However, as Bataille’s protégé Foucault has shown, the scientific approach to sexuality often masks a desire to control and delimit sexual behaviour, not “liberate” it. Moreover, Bataille makes the point that the desacralization of sexuality denudes sex of a vital component—eroticism—which is necessary for real pleasure and ecstasy. Beyond the “moral” critiques one often hears leveled against Kinsey and his work, Bataille provides a “religious” critique, one that stands, perhaps surprisingly, on the “near side” of sexuality.