Mitigating the syndromes of desertification: The requirements for transdisciplinary research and information exchange

In developing meaningful mitigation strategies to combat desertification, it is important to address the complex constellation of desertification under different bio-physical, social, demographic, political and economic conditions. In particular, desertification can be described as a cluster of key processes of global change which together form a typical syndrome. A critical reflection on the potential of research to help mitigate desertification will be a useful first step, before addressing the requirements for research partnerships between institutions at local levels and beyond. A practical example from Eritrea, an ecoregion which has been plagued by desertification for many centuries, is given at the end of the paper. It illustrates options for generating the necessary data and developing useful information in order to enhance the impact of research on sustainable development.

Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities

Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.

Cost analysis of opt-in consent procedures for the Texas statewide immunization information system, ImmTrac

Background. Childhood immunization programs have dramatically reduced the morbidity and mortality associated with vaccine-preventable diseases. Proper documentation of immunizations that have been administered is essential to prevent duplicate immunization of children. To help improve documentation, immunization information systems (IISs) have been developed. IISs are comprehensive repositories of immunization information for children residing within a geographic region. The two models for participation in an IIS are voluntary inclusion, or "opt-in," and voluntary exclusion, or "opt-out." In an opt-in system, consent must be obtained for each participant, conversely, in an opt-out IIS, all children are included unless procedures to exclude the child are completed. Consent requirements for participation vary by state; the Texas IIS, ImmTrac, is an opt-in system.^ Objectives. The specific objectives are to: (1) Evaluate the variance among the time and costs associated with collecting ImmTrac consent at public and private birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area; (2) Estimate the total costs associated with collecting ImmTrac consent at selected public and private birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area; (3) Describe the alternative opt-out process for collecting ImmTrac consent at birth and discuss the associated cost savings relative to an opt-in system.^ Methods. Existing time-motion studies (n=281) conducted between October, 2006 and August, 2007 at 8 birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area were used to assess the time and costs associated with obtaining ImmTrac consent at birth. All data analyzed are deidentified and contain no personal information. Variations in time and costs at each location were assessed and total costs per child and costs per year were estimated. The cost of an alternative opt-out system was also calculated.^ Results. The median time required by birth registrars to complete consent procedures varied from 72-285 seconds per child. The annual costs associated with obtaining consent for 388,285 newborns in ImmTrac's opt-in consent process were estimated at $702,000. The corresponding costs of the proposed opt-out system were estimated to total $194,000 per year. ^ Conclusions. Substantial variation in the time and costs associated with completion of ImmTrac consent procedures were observed. Changing to an opt-out system for participation could represent significant cost savings. ^

The relationship between hospital financial performance and information technology integration strategy selection

In light of the new healthcare regulations, hospitals are increasingly reevaluating their IT integration strategies to meet expanded healthcare information exchange requirements. Nevertheless, hospital executives do not have all the information they need to differentiate between the available strategies and recognize what may better fit their organizational needs. ^ In the interest of providing the desired information, this study explored the relationships between hospital financial performance, integration strategy selection, and strategy change. The integration strategies examined – applied as binary logistic regression dependent variables and in the order from most to least integrated – were Single-Vendor (SV), Best-of-Suite (BoS), and Best-of-Breed (BoB). In addition, the financial measurements adopted as independent variables for the models were two administrative labor efficiency and six industry standard financial ratios designed to provide a broad proxy of hospital financial performance. Furthermore, descriptive statistical analyses were carried out to evaluate recent trends in hospital integration strategy change. Overall six research questions were proposed for this study. ^ The first research question sought to answer if financial performance was related to the selection of integration strategies. The next questions, however, explored whether hospitals were more likely to change strategies or remain the same when there was no external stimulus to change, and if they did change, they would prefer strategies closer to the existing ones. These were followed by a question that inquired if financial performance was also related to strategy change. Nevertheless, rounding up the questions, the last two probed if the new Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act had any impact on the frequency and direction of strategy change. ^ The results confirmed that financial performance is related to both IT integration strategy selection and strategy change, while concurred with prior studies that suggested hospital and environmental characteristics are associated factors as well. Specifically this study noted that the most integrated SV strategy is related to increased administrative labor efficiency and the hybrid BoS strategy is associated with improved financial health (based on operating margin and equity financing ratios). On the other hand, no financial indicators were found to be related to the least integrated BoB strategy, except for short-term liquidity (current ratio) when involving strategy change. ^ Ultimately, this study concluded that when making IT integration strategy decisions hospitals closely follow the resource dependence view of minimizing uncertainty. As each integration strategy may favor certain organizational characteristics, hospitals traditionally preferred not to make strategy changes and when they did, they selected strategies that were more closely related to the existing ones. However, as new regulations further heighten revenue uncertainty while require increased information integration, moving forward, as evidence already suggests a growing trend of organizations shifting towards more integrated strategies, hospitals may be more limited in their strategy selection choices.^

A system to communicate hidden information using color images

The objective of this paper is to present a system to communicate hidden information among different users by means of images. The tasks that the system is able to carry on can be divided in two different groups of utilities, implemented in java. The first group of utilities are related with the possibility to hide information in color images, using a steganographic function based on the least significant bit (LSB) methods. The second group of utilities allows us to communicate with other users with the aim to send or receive images, where some information have been previously embedded. Thus, this is the most significant characteristic of the implementation, we have built an environment where we join the email capabilities to send and receive text and images as attached files, with the main objective of hiding information.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

The Economics of Subsidies for R&D: The Intrinsic Difficulty of Determining Optimum Subsidies and Implications for Reform of EU State Aid Rules on R&D. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 26/February 2013

The European Commission is reforming state aid rules. An important element of the reform is to prevent the granting of excessive subsidies. This paper shows that the determination of the optimum subsidy for research is difficult. What appears to be the socially optimum level of research effort depends on the benchmark of comparison and whether this benchmark is the situation before subsidies or the situation after subsidies. In the presence of asymmetric information, policy makers should induce firms to reveal their true costs and should grant subsidies to the relatively more efficient firms by allocating subsidies not on a first-come-first- serve basis but through a competitive process. However, competitive selection of subsidy recipients is not a panacea as it may not be possible to be effectively used in all cases and for all research programmes. This is because in principle public subsidies should support those programmes with the largest value for society, rather than with the lowest costs. Although this paper focuses on R&D, its findings are relevant to any subsidy whose aim is to remedy market failure caused by positive externalities.

Essays on coordination problems in economics

No estudo da economia, há diversas situações em que a propensão de um indivíduo a tomar determinada ação é crescente na quantidade de outras pessoas que este indivíduo acredita que tomarão a mesma ação. Esse tipo de complementaridade estratégica geralmente leva à existência de múltiplos equilíbrios. Além disso, o resultado atingido pelas decisões decentralizadas dos agentes pode ser ineficiente, deixando espaço para intervenções de política econômica. Esta tese estuda diferentes ambientes em que a coordenação entre indivíduos é importante. O primeiro capítulo analisa como a manipulação de informação e a divulgação de informação afetam a coordenação entre investidores e o bem-estar em um modelo de corridas bancárias. No modelo, há uma autoridade reguladora que não pode se comprometer a revelar a verdadeira situação do setor bancário. O regulador observa informações idiossincráticas dos bancos (através de um stress test, por exemplo) e escolhe se revela essa informação para o público ou se divulga somente um relatório agregado sobre a saúde do sistema financeiro como um todo. O relatório agregado pode ser distorcido a um custo – um custo mais elevado significa maior credibilidade do regulador. Os investidores estão cientes dos incentivos do regulador a esconder más notícias do mercado, mas a manipulação de informação pode, ainda assim, ser efetiva. Se a credibilidade do regulador não for muito baixa, a política de divulgação de informação é estado-contingente, e existe sempre um conjunto de estados em que há manipulação de informação em equilíbrio. Se a credibilidade for suficientemente baixa, porém, o regulador opta por transparência total dos resultados banco-específicos, caso em que somente os bancos mais sólidos sobrevivem. Uma política de opacidade levaria a uma crise bancária sistêmica, independentemente do estado. O nível de credibilidade que maximiza o bem-estar agregado do ponto de vista ex ante é interior. O segundo e o terceiro capítulos estudam problemas de coordenação dinâmicos. O segundo capítulo analisa o bem-estar em um ambiente em que agentes recebem oportunidades aleatórias para migrar entre duas redes. Os resultados mostram que sempre que a rede de pior qualidade (intrínseca) prevalece, isto é eficiente. Na verdade, um planejador central estaria ainda mais inclinado a escolher a rede de pior qualidade. Em equilíbrio, pode haver mudanças ineficientes que ampliem a rede de qualidade superior. Quando indivíduos escolhem entre dois padrões ou redes com níveis de qualidade diferentes, se todos os indivíduos fizessem escolhas simultâneas, a solução eficiente seria que todos adotassem a rede de melhor qualidade. No entanto, quando há fricções e os agentes tomam decisões escalonadas, a solução eficiente difere ix do senso comum. O terceiro capítulo analisa um problema de coordenação dinâmico com decisões escalonadas em que os agentes são heterogêneos ex ante. No modelo, existe um único equilíbrio, caracterizado por thresholds que determinam as escolhas para cada tipo de agente. Apesar da heterogeneidade nos payoffs, há bastante conformidade nas ações individuais em equilíbrio. Os thresholds de diferentes tipos de agentes coincidem parcialmente contanto que exista um conjunto de crenças arbitrário que justifique esta conformidade. No entanto, as estratégias de equilíbrio de diferentes tipos nunca coincidem totalmente. Além disso, a conformidade não é ineficiente. A solução eficiente apresentaria estratégias ainda mais similares para tipos distintos em comparação com o equilíbrio decentralizado.

M. U. Economics Building

Built in 1856. First chemical laboratory at a state university. Building served medical students and others as both laboratory and classroom. Situated just west and south of the original medical building. Additions made to the one-story building in 1861, 1866, 1868, 1874. In 1880 a two-story addition was added with subsequent additions in 1889 and 1901. Became Economics Building in 1908. Pharmacology occupied north wing 1908-1981. Destroyed by fire Christmas Eve 1981. On verso: M.U. Information Services #1182 July 1959.

M. U. Economics Bldg.

Built in 1856. First chemical laboratory at a state university. Building served medical students and others as both laboratory and classroom. Situated just west and south of the original medical building. Additions made to the one-story building in 1861, 1866, 1868, 1874. In 1880 a two-story addition was added with subsequent additions in 1889 and 1901. Became Economics Building in 1908. On verso: M.U. Information Services. Econ 3. April 1952.