955 resultados para Indivisible goods


Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Receipt from Adam, Meldrum and Anderson Dry Goods and Carpets, Buffalo, New York for curtains, materials and hooks, Sept. 6, 1886.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Receipt from Henry Carlisle, Importer of Dry Goods and Millinery, St. Catharines for hats, Dec. 31, 1886.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Receipt from The Big 22, Dry Goods, Millinery and Mantles, St. Catharines for payment on account, Jan26, 1887.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Receipt from McSloy Bros., St. Catharines for baked goods, July 15, 1887.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Receipt from McSloy Bros., St. Catharines for baked goods, Dec. 2, 1887.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Receipt from McSloy Bros., St. Catharines for baked goods, Feb. 1888

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Bill of Landing (copy) for packaged goods received at Port Hamilton, Oct. 14, 1839.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Inventory of goods and chattels belonging to Samuel Wood and delivered to the Honourable William Dickson (double-sided, handwritten page), Dec. 10, 1828.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

List of goods shipped to Henry Nelles of Grimsby by Gerrard, Gillespie and Moffat Co. of Montreal (6 ½ page list, handwritten) for blankets, food, clothing and other items Sept. 14, 1821.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

List of goods including pots, food and nails ordered by Robert Nelles (2 ½ pages, handwritten). The item is stained and slightly torn, but legible, July 4, 1824.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.