El islamismo y la utilización del "FIQH" con fines políticos: el caso del Líbano actual

El proyecto de investigación que se presenta a continuación se centra en el estudio de los partidos y los movimientos islamistas, sobre todo, desde el ámbito jurídico. Lo que se pretende es una desconstrucción del discurso islamista para la evaluación y el análisis del uso que realiza el islamismo de las fuentes textuales religiosas, así como de la manipulación que hace de las mismas. Para lograr este objetivo, hemos precisado utilizar las mismas fuentes que dichas agrupaciones manejan. Otro de los aspectos a destacar en nuestra investigación es la politización actual que se hace del Islam por parte del islamismo, siendo así parte de una ideología moderna y desconocida a lo largo de la historia islámica. Pensamos que en muchos casos, y sobre todo en relación al islamismo más radical, no existe una comprensión adecuada de la doctrina islámica, por ello cuestionamos que la base ideológica de dichas formaciones tengan un verdadero respaldo jurídico, así como tampoco encontramos una justificación ideológica que legitime sus posiciones y su propia existencia. Ya que las premisas de las que parten son religiosas, pensamos, que es el ámbito científico de las disciplinas religioso-jurídicas el que hay que utilizar para combatir a las formaciones violentas. Es aquí donde nuestra investigación cobra relevancia, debido a la falta de estudios que existen desde esta perspectiva. Nuestro objetivo es deslegitimar la autoridad de dichas agrupaciones, sobre todo de las más radicales, a través de su propio discurso religioso-legal. De aquí se deriva que nos hagamos varias preguntas, ¿existe en el islam un modelo de estado islámico o califal como es representado por los movimientos islamistas radicales?, ¿el corpus de la charía justifica las fetuas de dichos grupos? ¿Utilizan dichos grupos la metodología de la jurisprudencia para derivar normativa legal, y si es así, que precedentes y material usan del hadiz o el Corán? ¿Tienen en cuenta el factor espacio-tiempo en el que fueron reveladas las suras y aleyas coránicas a la hora de entender el texto de manera literal? ¿Por qué la costumbre ha acabado imponiéndose al texto religioso? Estos movimientos hacen mención constante de su existencia en relación a los textos sagrados, pero ¿es qué hacen una relectura diferente a la de otros grupos de su misma comunidad religiosa?...

New Middle East Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran's Rivalry

The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

Large Upper Devonian arthrodires from Iran / Hans-Peter Schultze --

v.23:no.5(1973)

The mammalian fauna of Warwasi rock shelter, West-central Iran / Priscilla F. Turnbull --

v.33:no.8(1975)

Ibn Marwan e a fitna: islamismo e feudalismo no Gharb al-Andalus

Esta tese tem como objectivo, de um modo geral, analisar o impacto social, político e até mesmo civilizacional, que levaria ao clima de guerra civil que assolou a Península Ibérica muçulmana no século IX. De um modo mais restrito, analisaremos estes acontecimentos a partir de um dos seus personagens principais, ‘Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Marwan al-Jilliqi, a figura-chave desta dissertação. Como referência, temos o estudo de Manuel Acién Almansa sobre a mesma temática, Entre el Feudalismo y Islam; ‘Umar ibn Hafsun en las Fuentes y Historiografia, partindo de um outro personagem central da fitna: ‘Umar ibn Hafsun. Para além da obra de M. Acién, também consideramos o estudo de Jesus Lorenzo Jimenez, La Dawla de los Banu Qasi, uma dawla de grande protagonismo em toda a fitna. A proposta será analisar o caso de Ibn Marwan à luz dos mesmos problemas elencados por estes dois académicos, mas tendo como cenário o Gharb. Estabelecemos assim um ponto de partida para problematizar dentro da questão social ocidental e oriental, a que pertinentemente M. Acién acrescenta uma outra: a islâmica.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

Does the key to a WMD-free Middle East lie in a nuclear Iran? CEPS Commentary, 10 June 2013

After the presidential elections on June 14th, the Iranian regime will continue its catch-me-if-you-can game with the international community until it has reached the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, the key to a solution on the nuclear issue might just lie in discussions on a WMD-free Middle East, but only after Iran has obtained nuclear military capability. At that point, and in the context of a new arms race, both regional and international players may be persuaded that the Middle East has more to gain from negotiations on non-proliferation than from prolonged isolation and the prospect of intractable war.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.