Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

A general class of adaptative strategies

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies,in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the otherplayers; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [1998]) areparticular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in thelong-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

CPT-11 and concomitant hyperfractionated accelerated radiotherapy induce efficient local control in rectal cancer patients: results from a phase II.

Patients with rectal cancer are at high risk of disease recurrence despite neoadjuvant radiochemotherapy with 5-Fluorouracil (5FU), a regimen that is now widely applied. In order to develop a regimen with increased antitumour activity, we previously established the recommended dose of neoadjuvant CPT-11 (three times weekly 90 mg m(-2)) concomitant to hyperfractionated accelerated radiotherapy (HART) followed by surgery within 1 week. Thirty-three patients (20 men) with a locally advanced adenocarcinoma of the rectum were enrolled in this prospective phase II trial (1 cT2, 29 cT3, 3 cT4 and 21 cN+). Median age was 60 years (range 43-75 years). All patients received all three injections of CPT-11 and all but two patients completed radiotherapy as planned. Surgery with total mesorectal excision (TME) was performed within 1 week (range 2-15 days). The preoperative chemoradiotherapy was overall well tolerated, 24% of the patients experienced grade 3 diarrhoea that was easily manageable. At a median follow-up of 2 years no local recurrence occurred, however, nine patients developed distant metastases. The 2-year disease-free survival was 66% (95% confidence interval 0.48-0.83). Neoadjuvant CPT-11 and HART allow for excellent local control; however, distant relapse remains a concern in this patient population.

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La Commission européenne soutient le projet NanoImpactNet - réseau européen sur l'impact des nanomatériaux sur l'environnement et la santé - afin de coordonner la recherche sur le développement sûr et responsable des nanomatériaux. Depuis avril 2008, NanoImpactNet a organisé 14 conférences/ateliers pour toxicologues et écotoxicologues universitaires, sans oublier les hygiénistes des industries fabriquant et utilisant les nanomatériaux en Europe, les fonctionnaires gouvernementaux et la société civile. La communication entre ces 260 membres et toutes les parties prenantes touchées par cette technnologie transversale est impérative, surtout pour les travailleurs en contact direct avec ces matériaux innovants. www.nanoimpactnet.eu