892 resultados para Game Quiz
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A publication produced by the Legislative Services Agency. A 12 question quiz of the capital with the answers.
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Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.
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The following paper introduces a new approach to the analysis of offensive game in football. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to create an instrument for collecting information for the analysis of offensive action and interactions game. The observation instrument that was used to accomplish the main objective of this work consists of a combination of format fields (FC) and systems of categories (SC). This methodology is a particular strategy of the scientific method that has as an objective to analyse the perceptible behaviour that occurs in habitual contexts, allowing them to be formally recorded and quantified and using an ad hoc instrument in order to obtain a behaviour systematic registration that, since they have been transformed in quantitative data with the necessary reliability and validity determined level, will allow analysis of the relations between these behaviours. The codifications undertaken to date in various games of football have shown that it serves the purposes for which it was developed, allowing more research into the offensive game methods in football.
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It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.
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World Of Wars es un videojuego de acción para plataformas Android basándose en los estilos shoot em¿up arcades antiguos pero adaptándolos a los nuevos tiempos y nuevas formas de juego que existen en la actualidad. Se ha utilizado la librería Cocos2D-x, así como el lenguaje de programación C++ para el desarrollo de el.
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En este trabajo se recoge información útil que se debe tener en cuenta para desarrollar un serious game pertinente para el entrenamiento de profesionales de la salud, que aporte destrezas y habilidades necesarias para afrontar las cirugías reales. Se propone un serious game a modo de simulador de diferentes operaciones quirúrgicas traumatológicas, que permite al usuario las etapas preoperatorias, intraoperatorias y postoperatorias de una cirugía, en las que se debe describir qué acciones se llevan a cabo, quiénes la realizan y si es necesario algún material específico.
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Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.
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La hiérarchie de Wagner constitue à ce jour la plus fine classification des langages ω-réguliers. Par ailleurs, l'approche algébrique de la théorie de langages formels montre que ces ensembles ω-réguliers correspondent précisément aux langages reconnaissables par des ω-semigroupes finis pointés. Ce travail s'inscrit dans ce contexte en fournissant une description complète de la contrepartie algébrique de la hiérarchie de Wagner, et ce par le biais de la théorie descriptive des jeux de Wadge. Plus précisément, nous montrons d'abord que le degré de Wagner d'un langage ω-régulier est effectivement un invariant syntaxique. Nous définissons ensuite une relation de réduction entre ω-semigroupes pointés par le biais d'un jeu infini de type Wadge. La collection de ces structures algébriques ordonnée par cette relation apparaît alors comme étant isomorphe à la hiérarchie de Wagner, soit un quasi bon ordre décidable de largeur 2 et de hauteur ω. Nous exposons par la suite une procédure de décidabilité de cette hiérarchie algébrique : on décrit une représentation graphique des ω-semigroupes finis pointés, puis un algorithme sur ces structures graphiques qui calcule le degré de Wagner de n'importe quel élément. Ainsi le degré de Wagner de tout langage ω-régulier peut être calculé de manière effective directement sur son image syntaxique. Nous montrons ensuite comment construire directement et inductivement une structure de n''importe quel degré. Nous terminons par une description détaillée des invariants algébriques qui caractérisent tous les degrés de cette hiérarchie. Abstract The Wagner hierarchy is known so far to be the most refined topological classification of ω-rational languages. Also, the algebraic study of formal languages shows that these ω-rational sets correspond precisely to the languages recognizable by finite pointed ω-semigroups. Within this framework, we provide a construction of the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy. We adopt a hierarchical game approach, by translating the Wadge theory from the ω-rational language to the ω-semigroup context. More precisely, we first show that the Wagner degree is indeed a syntactic invariant. We then define a reduction relation on finite pointed ω-semigroups by means of a Wadge-like infinite two-player game. The collection of these algebraic structures ordered by this reduction is then proven to be isomorphic to the Wagner hierarchy, namely a well-founded and decidable partial ordering of width 2 and height $\omega^\omega$. We also describe a decidability procedure of this hierarchy: we introduce a graph representation of finite pointed ω-semigroups allowing to compute their precise Wagner degrees. The Wagner degree of every ω-rational language can therefore be computed directly on its syntactic image. We then show how to build a finite pointed ω-semigroup of any given Wagner degree. We finally describe the algebraic invariants characterizing every Wagner degree of this hierarchy.
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In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.
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This study described elite football (soccer) goalkeepers' activity and performance in critical game situations. The 11 best French players (M age = 15.5 yr., SD = 0.5) participated in the study. Interviews focused on goalkeepers' experiences were conducted to identify meaningful events involved in failed actions. Players formulated 23 critical game situations. Verbatim encoding using a thematic analysis indicated that four main categories (coming off the line, goal-line clearance, one-on-one, and diving) represented the most critical situations encountered during matches. The relations among experience and action, inner states, background, attention contents, and intentions were elucidated. The discussion is grounded on the properties of such critical game situations and their implications for improving goalkeepers' performance.