950 resultados para Fiscal discipline
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The University of South Carolina Lancaster reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes an executive summary, a description of the leadership system, customer focus and satisfaction and other performance criteria, mission, and program descriptions and budgets.
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The University of South Carolina at Union reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes an executive summary, a description of the leadership system, customer focus and satisfaction and other performance criteria, mission, and program descriptions and budgets.
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The South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services annually publish a statistical report providing a description of the offender population and the agency's programs.
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The South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services annually publish a statistical report providing a description of the offender population and the agency's programs.
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The South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services annually publish a statistical report providing a description of the offender population and the agency's programs.
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The South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services annually publish a statistical report providing a description of the offender population and the agency's programs.
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The South Carolina Retirement System Investment Commission publishes an annual plan for the investment objectives and mission of the Retirement System for the fiscal year.
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Coastal Carolina University reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes a discussion and analysis, major accomplishments, strategic planning and performance measurement.
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Each year the South Carolina Legislative Audit Council produces an annual accountability report for the South Carolina General Assembly and the Budget and Control Board. Included is an executive summary, organizational profile, and discussion of the elements of the Malcolm Baldrige Award criteria.
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The South Carolina Office of the Attorney General reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes a mission statement, program goals and objectives, and performance measures.
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Each year the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense produces an annual accountability report for the South Carolina General Assembly and the Budget and Control Board. Included is a discussion and analysis, major achievements for the year and goals for the future.
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Each year the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources reports to the Office of State Budget that includes the agency's mission, goals and objectives to accomplish the mission, and performance measures regarding the goals and objectives.
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Each year the Office of the Governor presents an Executive Budget to the General Assembly, consisting of a "complete and itemized plan of all proposed expenditures for each state department, bureau, division, officer, board, commission, institution, or other agency or undertaking."
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The South Carolina State Ethics Commission reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes an organization chart, comparative summary of statistics, and report of programs of the Ethics Commission.
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Legislative party discipline and cohesion are important phenomena in the study of political systems. Unless assumptions are made that parties are cohesive and act as unified collectivities with reasonably well-defined goals, it is really difficult, if not impossible, to consider their electoral and legislative roles usefully. But levels of legislative party cohesiveness are also important because they provide us with crucial information about how legislatures/ parliaments function and how they interact with executives/governments. Without cohesive (or disciplined) parties,1 government survival in parliamentary systems is threatened because executive and legislative powers are fused while in separated systems presidents' bases of legislative support become less stable. How do we explain varying levels of legislative party cohesion? The first part of this article draws on the purposive literature to explore the benefits and costs to legislators in democratic legislatures of joining and acting collectively and individualistically within political parties. This leads on to a discussion of various conceptual and empirical problems encountered in analysing intra-party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures on plenary votes. Finally, the article reviews the extant empirical evidence on how a multiplicity of systemic, party-levels and situational factors supposedly impact cohesion/discipline levels. The article ends with a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of building comparative models of cohesion/discipline.