Vulnerability to risk among small farmers in Tajikistan: results of a 2011 survey

Tajikistan is judged to be highly vulnerable to risk, including food insecurity risks and climate change risks. By some vulnerability measures it is the most vulnerable among all 28 countries in the World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia Region – ECA (World Bank 2009). The rural population, with its relatively high incidence of poverty, is particularly vulnerable. The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) in Tajikistan (2011) provided an opportunity to conduct a farm-level survey with the objective of assessing various dimensions of rural population’s vulnerability to risk and their perception of constraints to farming operations and livelihoods. The survey should be accordingly referred to as the 2011 PPCR survey. The rural population in Tajikistan is highly agrarian, with about 50% of family income deriving from agriculture (see Figure 4.1; also LSMS 2007 – own calculations). Tajikistan’s agriculture basically consists of two groups of producers: small household plots – the successors of Soviet “private agriculture” – and dehkan (or “peasant”) farms – new family farming structures that began to be created under relevant legislation passed after 1992 (Lerman and Sedik, 2008). The household plots manage 20% of arable land and produce 65% of gross agricultural output (GAO). Dehkan farms manage 65% of arable land and produce close to 30% of GAO. The remaining 15% of arable land is held in agricultural enterprises – the rapidly shrinking sector of corporate farms that succeeded the Soviet kolkhozes and sovkhozes and today produces less than 10% of GAO (TajStat 2011) The survey conducted in May 2011 focused on dehkan farms, as budgetary constraints precluded the inclusion of household plots. A total of 142 dehkan farms were surveyed in face-to-face interviews. They were sampled from 17 districts across all four regions – Sughd, Khatlon, RRP, and GBAO. The districts were selected so as to represent different agro-climatic zones, different vulnerability zones (based on the World Bank (2011) vulnerability assessment), and different food-insecurity zones (based on WFP/IPC assessments). Within each district, 3-4 jamoats were chosen at random and 2-3 farms were selected in each jamoat from lists provided by jamoat administration so as to maximize the variability by farm characteristics. The sample design by region/district is presented in Table A, which also shows the agro-climatic zone and the food security phase for each district. The sample districts are superimposed on a map of food security phases based on IPC April 2011.

The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Through studying German, Polish and Czech publications on Silesia, Mr. Kamusella found that most of them, instead of trying to objectively analyse the past, are devoted to proving some essential "Germanness", "Polishness" or "Czechness" of this region. He believes that the terminology and thought-patterns of nationalist ideology are so deeply entrenched in the minds of researchers that they do not consider themselves nationalist. However, he notes that, due to the spread of the results of the latest studies on ethnicity/nationalism (by Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Erikson Buillig, amongst others), German publications on Silesia have become quite objective since the 1980s, and the same process (impeded by under funding) has been taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic since 1989. His own research totals some 500 pages, in English, presented on disc. So what are the traps into which historians have been inclined to fall? There is a tendency for them to treat Silesia as an entity which has existed forever, though Mr. Kamusella points out that it emerged as a region only at the beginning of the 11th century. These same historians speak of Poles, Czechs and Germans in Silesia, though Mr. Kamusella found that before the mid-19th century, identification was with an inhabitant's local area, religion or dynasty. In fact, a German national identity started to be forged in Prussian Silesia only during the Liberation War against Napoleon (1813-1815). It was concretised in 1861 in the form of the first Prussian census, when the language a citizen spoke was equated with his/her nationality. A similar census was carried out in Austrian Silesia only in 1881. The censuses forced the Silesians to choose their nationality despite their multiethnic multicultural identities. It was the active promotion of a German identity in Prussian Silesia, and Vienna's uneasy acceptance of the national identities in Austrian Silesia which stimulated the development of Polish national, Moravian ethnic and Upper Silesian ethnic regional identities in Upper Silesia, and Polish national, Czech national, Moravian ethnic and Silesian ethnic identities in Austrian Silesia. While traditional historians speak of the "nationalist struggle" as though it were a permanent characteristic of Silesia, Mr. Kamusella points out that such a struggle only developed in earnest after 1918. What is more, he shows how it has been conveniently forgotten that, besides the national players, there were also significant ethnic movements of Moravians, Upper Silesians, Silesians and the tutejsi (i.e. those who still chose to identify with their locality). At this point Mr. Kamusella moves into the area of linguistics. While traditionally historians have spoken of the conflicts between the three national languages (German, Polish and Czech), Mr Kamusella reminds us that the standardised forms of these languages, which we choose to dub "national", were developed only in the mid-18th century, after 1869 (when Polish became the official language in Galicia), and after the 1870s (when Czech became the official language in Bohemia). As for standard German, it was only widely promoted in Silesia from the mid 19th century onwards. In fact, the majority of the population of Prussian Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia were bi- or even multilingual. What is more, the "Polish" and "Czech" Silesians spoke were not the standard languages we know today, but a continuum of West-Slavic dialects in the countryside and a continuum of West-Slavic/German creoles in the urbanised areas. Such was the linguistic confusion that, from time to time, some ethnic/regional and Church activists strove to create a distinctive Upper Silesian/Silesian language on the basis of these dialects/creoles, but their efforts were thwarted by the staunch promotion of standard German, and after 1918, of standard Polish and Czech. Still on the subject of language, Mr. Kamusella draws attention to a problem around the issue of place names and personal names. Polish historians use current Polish versions of the Silesian place names, Czechs use current Polish/Czech versions of the place names, and Germans use the German versions which were in use in Silesia up to 1945. Mr. Kamusella attempted to avoid this, as he sees it, nationalist tendency, by using an appropriate version of a place name for a given period and providing its modern counterpart in parentheses. In the case of modern place names he gives the German version in parentheses. As for the name of historical figures, he strove to use the name entered on the birth certificate of the person involved, and by doing so avoid such confusion as, for instance, surrounds the Austrian Silesian pastor L.J. Sherschnik, who in German became Scherschnick, in Polish, Szersznik, and in Czech, Sersnik. Indeed, the prospective Silesian scholar should, Mr. Kamusella suggests, as well as the three languages directly involved in the area itself, know English and French, since many documents and books on the subject have been published in these languages, and even Latin, when dealing in depth with the period before the mid-19th century. Mr. Kamusella divides the policies of ethnic cleansing into two categories. The first he classifies as soft, meaning that policy is confined to the educational system, army, civil service and the church, and the aim is that everyone learn the language of the dominant group. The second is the group of hard policies, which amount to what is popularly labelled as ethnic cleansing. This category of policy aims at the total assimilation and/or physical liquidation of the non-dominant groups non-congruent with the ideal of homogeneity of a given nation-state. Mr. Kamusella found that soft policies were consciously and systematically employed by Prussia/Germany in Prussian Silesia from the 1860s to 1918, whereas in Austrian Silesia, Vienna quite inconsistently dabbled in them from the 1880s to 1917. In the inter-war period, the emergence of the nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia led to full employment of the soft policies and partial employment of the hard ones (curbed by the League of Nations minorities protection system) in Czechoslovakian Silesia, German Upper Silesia and the Polish parts of Upper and Austrian Silesia. In 1939-1945, Berlin started consistently using all the "hard" methods to homogenise Polish and Czechoslovakian Silesia which fell, in their entirety, within the Reich's borders. After World War II Czechoslovakia regained its prewar part of Silesia while Poland was given its prewar section plus almost the whole of the prewar German province. Subsequently, with the active involvement and support of the Soviet Union, Warsaw and Prague expelled the majority of Germans from Silesia in 1945-1948 (there were also instances of the Poles expelling Upper Silesian Czechs/Moravians, and of the Czechs expelling Czech Silesian Poles/pro-Polish Silesians). During the period of communist rule, the same two countries carried out a thorough Polonisation and Czechisation of Silesia, submerging this region into a new, non-historically based administrative division. Democratisation in the wake of the fall of communism, and a gradual retreat from the nationalist ideal of the homogeneous nation-state with a view to possible membership of the European Union, caused the abolition of the "hard" policies and phasing out of the "soft" ones. Consequently, limited revivals of various ethnic/national minorities have been observed in Czech and Polish Silesia, whereas Silesian regionalism has become popular in the westernmost part of Silesia which remained part of Germany. Mr. Kamusella believes it is possible that, with the overcoming of the nation-state discourse in European politics, when the expression of multiethnicity and multilingualism has become the cause of the day in Silesia, regionalism will hold sway in this region, uniting its ethnically/nationally variegated population in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity championed by the European Union.

Gothic Taste and Russian Culture of the 18th Century

This project was an experiment in widening the traditional borders of study in the field and looking at the phenomenon of Gothic taste in many genres and kinds of art. The Gothic taste was a major element in the cultural image of the Enlightenment both in western Europe and in Russia. It was an essential component in the world outlook of an educated person and without studying this phenomenon it is impossible to fully understand the thinking of artistic professionals, amateurs and users in Russian society in the 18th century. Mr. Khatchatourov first analysed the reasons for the importance of Gothic taste in the culture of the European Enlightenment and then studied its linguistic and lexicographic evolution in 18th century Russian culture. He sought to determine the semantic context which actively formed the human mind set in the Enlightenment, including potential users and producers of articles in the Gothic taste. He then looked at the process of absorption of this concept by those forms of art which express it most strongly, in particular architecture and the theatre. His study was based on a comprehensive historical and culturological study using a wide range of sources, a formal stylistic method approach considering the interaction of non-classical styles of the Enlightenment with the dominant classicism, and an iconographic approach which revealed the essential aspects in a new image synthesis of the culture of the Enlightenment.

A Comparative Chronology of the History of Eastern Europe and the Climate

Two main areas were examined in this project: * The detailed climatic history of the second part of the Holocene (approximately the last 5500 calendar years) for the Zapadnodvinskaya lowland, making it possible to reconstruct general climatic changes in eastern Europe (taking other palynological, dendrochronological, historical and instrumental data into account). * The most important historical events for the period of the 9th-17th centuries that had an impact on Russian history. The comparative chronology of the main climatic changes and events of Russian social history showed that as local climatic conditions became worse (i.e. falling average annual temperature or precipitation rate) the density of significant events in society rose. This suggests that climatic deterioration is both a stimulus and an outstanding factor in social development.

Schul-, Praxis- und habituelles Herrschaftswissen. Bildung ländlicher Eliten mit Blick auf die korporative Selbstverwaltung in der frühmodernen Schweiz (18. und 19. Jahrhundert)

Knowledge taught at schools, everyday skills and practical know-how. The relevancy of formation for local elites and the corporative self-government of Early Modern Switzerland Daniel Schläppi, Bern There were different kinds of rural elites in Early Modern Switzerland. The diverse parts of the country developed in very dissimilar ways politically and economically. Some regions were dominated by traditional types of agriculture. Some territories were ruled by major cities. In some of the rural Cantons like Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus and Zug a political elite took control over generations and practiced a cultural lifestyle comparable to the famous aristocracies in cities like Bern, Basel, Freiburg, Luzern, Solothurn and Zurich. Intense proto-industrialization formed a completely different sort of elite with strong affinities to industry and trade in other regions. Meanwhile the habitants of the valley close-by stayed farmers like their ancestors (like in Appenzell). In the most conservative parts of the country mercenary business played an important role till the very end of the Ancien Regime and even furthermore. In summery the variety of historical circumstances caused heterogeneous elites all over. Such socio-political diversity provoked a variety of educational backgrounds. I an academic understanding of the term we know only little about literacy in local rural elites. But there is strong evidence that a lively culture of reading and story-telling existed. This means that even simple countrymen seem to have been in possession of some books. The organisation and capacity of the school system is subject of controversial discussions among up to date researchers. The state of research makes us suppose that the people designed to political careers learned their essential skills not only in school but also in everyday life or on the job. Based on the fact that every community and countless public corporations managed their affairs by their own it’s evident that the local elite’s key-players had a large repertoire of techniques and skills like writing, calculating, strategic thinking or knowledge of oral tradition, old usage or important rituals. Unfortunately the historical actors left not that many sources that would tell us precisely how knowledge and know-how were transferred in former times. Hardly any private account books or common correspondence have been conserved. But a huge bunch of sources that originate from corporative self-administration shows us that most local elites were well-educated and had the necessary skills anyway. Above all other sources like for instance the «Topographische Beschreibungen» (topographic descriptions) that were initiated by the «Ökonomische Gesellschaft» of Berne since the sixties of the 18th century provide an insight into pre-modern classrooms. More important information on the historical formation-reality can be gained by the autobiography of the famous poor peasant Ulrich Bräker (1735‒1798) or some of the novels by Albert Bitzius (1797‒1854, better known as Jeremias Gotthelf). The pedagogic writings by Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746‒1827) and the influences by his mentors Johann Rudolf Tschiffeli (1716‒1780) or Philipp Emanuel von Fellenberg (1771‒1884) are quite illustrative as well.

European summer temperature response to annually dated volcanic eruptions over the past nine centuries

The drop in temperature following large volcanic eruptions has been identified as an important component of natural climate variability. However, due to the limited number of large eruptions that occurred during the period of instrumental observations, the precise amplitude of post-volcanic cooling is not well constrained. Here we present new evidence on summer temperature cooling over Europe in years following volcanic eruptions. We compile and analyze an updated network of tree-ring maximum latewood density chronologies, spanning the past nine centuries, and compare cooling signatures in this network with exceptionally long instrumental station records and state-of-the-art general circulation models. Results indicate post-volcanic June–August cooling is strongest in Northern Europe 2 years after an eruption (−0.52 ± 0.05 °C), whereas in Central Europe the temperature response is smaller and occurs 1 year after an eruption (−0.18 ± 0.07 °C). We validate these estimates by comparison with the shorter instrumental network and evaluate the statistical significance of post-volcanic summer temperature cooling in the context of natural climate variability over the past nine centuries. Finding no significant post-volcanic temperature cooling lasting longer than 2 years, our results question the ability of large eruptions to initiate long-term temperature changes through feedback mechanisms in the climate system. We discuss the implications of these findings with respect to the response seen in general circulation models and emphasize the importance of considering well-documented, annually dated eruptions when assessing the significance of volcanic forcing on continental-scale temperature variations.

CAP Reform vs WTO: Crop Diversification or Crop Rotation? : Legal opinion prepared by Dr. Christian Häberli at the request of APRODEV, the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe

The European Commission’s proposals for the Legislative Framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the period 2014-2020 include, inter alia, the introduction of a “strong greening component”. For the first time, all EU farmers in receipt of support are to “go beyond the requirements of cross compliance and deliver environmental and climate benefits as part of their everyday activities crop diversification as a contribution to all EU farmers in receipt of support go beyond the requirements of cross compliance and deliver environmental and climate benefits as part of their everyday activities.” In a legal opinion prepared at the request of APRODEV, the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (www.aprodev.eu), Christian Häberli examines the WTO implications of this proposal, as compared with an alternative proposal to rather link direct payments to crop rotation. The conclusions are twofold: 1. Crop rotation is at least as likely to be found Green Box-compatible as crop diversification. Moreover, it will be more difficult to argue that crop diversification is “not more than minimally production-distorting” because it entails for most farmers less cost and work. 2. Even if (either of the two cropping schemes) were to be found “amber”, the EU would not have to relinquish this conditionality. This is because the direct payments involved would in all likelihood not, together with the other price support instruments, exceed the amount available under the presently scheduled maximum.

Consumption and food production in crisis time: Swiss consumption co-operations as farmers at the End of World War I

During the last two years of World War I food supply in Switzerland declined and caused shortcomings in consume, leading to social distress and conflict. Mainly two important factors caused these problems: First, Switzerland was highly dependent on food imports and during the war traditional supply lines faded. Second, weather extremes in the years 1916–1917 caused crop failure all over Europe and North America, which intensified the decline of food trade between the nations. In 1918 a conflict between classic urban consumers, such as workers, and famers erupted due to the food shortcomings and led to a lasting discord between urban and agrarian regions in Switzerland. But there was not only disharmony and conflict between the urban and agrarian regions. As a matter of fact several agents (urban and agrarian) interested in presenting adequate coping strategies to overcome the food shortages developed ideas of alternative ways of food production and supply since 1917. The aim of the paper is to outline these strategies that were undertaken to create a new era of food production that was not solely dependent on the agrarian sector or the import-trade. Actual growing of vegetables in estate areas is an important, but just one, factor of establishing a new system of food production, distribution and consume. The market-leading grocery stores in Switzerland nowadays (Coop and Migros) started their business during that time as co-operatives establishing new forms of distribution and food-production. So the interest of the paper is not only in actual «urban farming», but it wants to share some light on how swiss urban and agrarian spheres overlapped their functions in order to create a modern system of agro food-chains at the beginning of the interwar period.