Chasing globalisation: Germany's economic relations with the BRIC countries. OSW Report, November 2013

The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%. The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts. The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.

ECB Banking Supervision and beyond. CEPS Task Force Report, December 2014

With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur. José María Roldán, Presidente, Asociación Española de Banca, served as Chairman of the Task Force.

Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible. OSW Commentary No. 63, 2011-10-14

When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF reform only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis. For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conservative and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankruptcy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduction of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the new, poorer members of the eurozone.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

Why Is Sovereign Debt Restructuring a Challenge? The Case of Greece. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 24/2012

The reduction of Greek sovereign debt by €106 billion, agreed in the second bailout package of February 2012, is the largest in history. Nevertheless, immediately after publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose whether it would achieve its goals: to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 120.5% in 2020 and to ensure the return of Greece to market financing by 2015. This Briefing gives a timely input to the debate as it develops an analytical framework through which the expected failure of the Greek debt reduction can be assessed. It surveys the economic literature to identify three groups of factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring: (1) sovereign’s fundamentals, (2) inefficiencies inherent in the restructuring process and (3) costs of restructuring; and applies them to the case of Greece. Based on this analysis, three policy implications are formulated, with relevance to Greece and the wider eurozone. Firstly, the importance of increased policy effort by Greece to enact current structural and growth-enhancing reforms is underlined. Secondly, the introduction of uniform CACs is proposed that will reduce the market participants’ uncertainty, discipline the runs on government debt and address the holdout inefficiency. Finally, sovereign debt restructuring is not recommended as a universal solution for over- indebtedness in the EU, given the direct and reputation costs of sovereign debt restructuring and the self-fulfilling nature of sovereign debt crises.

Exports and Firm Productivity: The effect of US steel safeguards. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 19/January 2011

This paper investigates possible negative effects of the 2002 US steel safeguards on productivity of Eurozone steel companies. The analysis is based on an extensive literature which predicts that exporting firms not only are bigger and more productive, but also that exporting itself has positive effects, improving efficiency and leading to better utilization of firm resources. The paper investigates a large sample of EU-13 steel producing firms, in the 1998 - 2005 period. Using three methods of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation among which the Olley-Pakes semiparametric estimator, we first calculate the productivity levels of companies, and then check for any unusual fluctuation in this performance variable. We find that in 2002 there has been a significant drop in TFP. The paper is an invitation for further research in this field, given the possible important effects of safeguard measures on exporters.

Focal points and fiscal discipline. ACES Cases No. 2013.2

Many studies suggest that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Typically, this is explained as a result of a legal deterrence logic, in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, determines its effectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument, and we assess this model using data on US states. We then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.

The Euro blame game and its implications for policy and financial markets. ACES Cases No. 2012.2

The recent financial crisis in some of the eurozone member countries has received a great deal of attention by investors, policy makers and commentators alike. Often these events are interpreted as a failure of the euro and the sustainability of the eurozone is called into question. This paper shows that this analysis and its emphasis are flawed. Fiscal imbalances and financial market imperfections are at the core of the problem, and they need to be addressed directly to prevent future crises.

Time for the ECB to bite the bullet. CEPS Commentary, 19 January 2015

This Commentary summarises the main reasons why the ECB can no longer delay launching a massive bond-buying programme, also including sovereigns of eurozone member countries, and why such interventions will indeed be effective in raising inflation, thus restoring the ECB’s credibility and spurring economic activity. A credible programme must continue either until an explicit inflation target has been achieved or the ECB balance sheet has reached the €2 trillion target already announced by the ECB’s Governing Council. Regardless of how such interventions will be undertaken, they will reduce interest-rate spreads between eurozone markets, but it is nevertheless important that the ECB designs its operations so as to avoid any implication of direct support or deficit financing facilitation for the eurozone’s most indebted countries. Finally, some kind of guarantee against first losses by the ECB on its sovereign bonds may be appropriate, while entrusting open market operations to each national central bank for their own sovereigns could threaten the very survival of monetary union.

Danish currency wobbles: A positive unintended side effect of the ECB’s QE? CEPS Commentary, 6 February, 2015

In response to the sustained pressure recently experienced by the Danish krone, Denmark may be forced to abandon its 30-year old peg to the euro. If this scenario unfolds, this CEPS Commentary argues that it will be no bad thing for the eurozone.

The Greek Austerity Myth. CEPS Commentary, 10 February 2015

Since Syriza’s victory in Greece’s recent general election, some fear a return to the uncertainty of 2012, when many thought that a Greek default and exit from the eurozone were imminent and that a Greek debt crisis could destabilise – and perhaps even bring down – Europe’s monetary union. CEPS Director Daniel Gros explains in this CEPS Commentary how this time really is different.

Labour Mobility in Europe: An untapped resource? CEPS Policy Brief No. 327, March 2015

Despite public perceptions, labour mobility is low in the EU, particularly within the euro area. The authors of this Policy Brief make four main points: first, that the economic and financial crisis has affected mobility patterns by redirecting flows away from the periphery, thus showing the limits of labour mobility potential within the current eurozone - largely due to the negligible mobility of nationals from large countries hit by the crisis. Second, east-west mobility has not been fundamentally affected by the crisis, and ten years after the eastern enlargement the number of East Europeans living in EU15 should be of no overall concern. Third, the long-term economic effects of mobility are uncertain, but potential negative effects are more likely to show up in sending countries than in receiving ones. Finally, in view of the lessons learned from the economic crisis, the Commission and member states should adopt a longer-term view on labour mobility. The authors recommend a further upgrade of job-matching tools, namely the EURES system, and should foster better recognition of qualifications and the exchange of best practices among mobility networks. In order to improve mobility in the longer term, the Commission and member states should improve the mobility of third-country nationals – starting with those completing tertiary education at an EU institution and able to find employment. The aim of improving mobility gives new impetus to the ‘mother tongue + two foreign languages’ objective and the European Benchmark of Language Competences Initiative, in particular competence in the first foreign language taught at school.

The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments. CEPS Policy Brief No. 328, March 2015

The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.