Clausewitz’s “Wondrous Trinity” as a Coordinate System of War and Violent Conflict

Rather than discarding Clausewitz’s theory of war in response to the revolutionary changes in modern warfare, this article articulates a broader theory of war based on his concept of the “wondrous trinity,” identifying it as his true legacy. The author shows that the concept of trinitarian war attributed to Clausewitz by his critics, which seems to be applicable only to wars between states, is a caricature of Clausewitz’s theory. He goes on to develop Clausewitz’s theory that war is composed of the three tendencies of violence/force, fighting, and the affiliation of the combatants to a warring community. Each war can be analyzed as being composed of these three tendencies and their opposites.

Victims of War must be loyal to deserve protection: International law and national legislation on enemy aliens 1907-1918

In international law the internment of civilians has only been regulated in writing in the context of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949. Nevertheless this did not mean that civilians were not protected by at least some rules of customary international law before that date and especially in World War I. Furthermore specialists of international law expected states – at least those considered to be part of the community of civilized nations – to continue to treat all men equal before the law even in wartime. As research already conducted (Bird, Panayi, Fischer) has shown, this was not the case during World War I. Based on these findings the presentation proposed here wants to look into the development of international law and into some national preparations for treating so called “enemy aliens” in the period before 1914 (Austria-Hungary, Australia, United Kingdom), in order to see to what extent principles of international law protecting civilians from the consequences of war can be detected in the pre-war preparations. As far as can be judged so far the issue of loyalty was central in this context. Looking at the war itself, the presentation proposed here will try to look at how far the principles of international law alluded to above continued to influence the policies on “enemy aliens” in the countries mentioned and to see, how the International Committee of the Red Cross tried to use them to legitimize and expand its protective policies in regard to civilians interned in belligerent as well as neutral countries throughout the war.

«The Broken Years»: War Crimes and the laws of war under the impact of the First World War

When the First World War began, the international co-operation of legal academics, which had been a characteristic of the late 19th and early 20th century came to a halt. In the context of the atrocities in Belgium as well as Serbia academics on both sides became involved in the propaganda campaigns of the belligerents on both sides. Not many of them were able to divest themselves. The presentation will claim that as a consequence the time between the First World War and the beginning of the Second can be characterized as «Broken Years» not only in regard to war veterans (Gammage 1974), but also in regard to the international academic discourse on issues of war crimes and the laws of war. This shall be substantiated by a look at academic activities in the interwar period within the International Law Association, the Institut de Droit International, the Interparliamentary Union, the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal and the Internationale Kriminalistische Vereinigung.

Portughese man of war

Louise von Panhuys

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.