Consumer perceptions of bundles and time-limited promotion deals: Do contracts matter?

Marketers use various types of deals to positively influence consumers' product evaluations. Across two experiments, we manipulated print advertisements to examine whether the commonly used deal content of both bundling and time-limited promotions affect consumers' perceived confusion, risk and value. In study 1, the influence of this content was tested in the context of a 2-year telecommunications (telco) contract. Here, consumers associated a three-item bundle with greater perceived value than a single item, but perceived value was reduced and risk heightened when it was only available for a limited time. We speculate that this is because of the long-term nature of the contract. Study 2 removed the contract restriction, examining the bundling of a video game console and game(s), again with a time-limited promotion. However, in this context, we failed to locate any interaction effects. It appears that consumers further appraise the drawbacks of a long-term telco contract when accompanied by a time-limited promotion and may perceive the switching costs for study 1 three-item telco bundle to be particularly risky. Our studies represent the first empirical investigation of the effect on consumers' perceptions of offering a bundle in conjunction with a time-limited promotion. Testing these effects in contract and no contract conditions adds to the contribution of our studies by delineating a boundary condition. From a managerial perspective, our findings are thought-provoking in respect to information integration, or how consumers process different deal content together.

How does the cookie crumble? legal costs under a uniform interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods

A family owned Mexican company, Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. ("Zapata"), sold approximately US$950,000 worth of cookie tins over a period of four years to the Maurice Lenell Cooky Company ("Lenell"), an American company that produced baked goods. Lenell failed to pay Zapata for the cookie tins so Zapata sought legal advice and instituted legal proceedings against Lenell for breach of contract in the Federal District Court of Illinios. The cookie tin sale contracts were governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). Zapata succeeded in its Federal District Court claim and, as part of the Court's order, was awarded US$550,000 as foreseeable loss under Article 74 of the CISG, being the amount of legal fees incurred by Zapata in bringing proceedings against Lenell. On appeal to the Federal Appellate Court, however, the award of legal fees was overturned. The parties now find themselves contesting a leave application to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States of America in a much anticipated debate over who should pay the lawyers.

Harmonisation and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods

After many years of negotiation, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) came into force in 1988. Today, 62 states have adopted the CISG. Together these countries account for over two-thirds of all world trade.2 On this basis alone, the CISG is an outstanding success in the legal harmonisation of the law governing the international sale of goods. However, the CISG has its critics and much comment has been made on the failure of the CISG to achieve its goal of promoting international trade through a body of uniform rules.The primary motivation driving the push for a harmonised law on the international sale of goods is economic: a harmonised law makes it easier and more efficient for the business person to sell and buy goods across state borders. However, the engine driving the push for harmonisation is political and cultural; and the task of creating the harmonised law belongs to the diplomat.3 A study of the CISG demonstrates that the political and cultural demands on the diplomat also act as shackles that restrain the achievement of a harmonised law.This paper will consider the CISG and discuss the constraints on treaty making as a mechanism for legal harmonisation. Part one discusses the constraints faced when creating a uniform text.Part two discusses the problems with the text of the CISG that result from the negotiation process. Finally, part three discusses the constraints faced in maintaining the uniformity of the CISG.

Perceptions of fairness in the psychological contracts of allied health professionals

Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between components of the psychological contract, organisational justice, and negative affectivity (NA), with key employee outcomes (i.e. organisational commitment, job satisfaction, depression, and psychological distress) among allied health professionals. Design/methodology/approach-In total, 134 (response rate of 46 per cent) Australian allied health professional completed a questionnaire. Findings-Multiple regressions revealed that higher NA was associated with lower organisational commitment, lower job satisfaction, and higher levels of depression. The psychological contract variable, breach, was associated with depression. Informational justice was associated with organisational commitment. Distributive justice was associated with job satisfaction. Research limitations/implications-This research is limited by its cross-sectional design and that the data were self-reported. The results obtained suggest the potential utility of collecting longitudinal data to replicate and extend the results. Practical implications-While NA may be beyond management control, it may be ameliorated by attention to improving communication of management decisions and by sensitivity to the elements implicit in psychological contracts. The negative consequences of contract breach may be offset by informational and distributive justice. Originality/value-This study is one of the first to examine multiple measures of the psychological contract in addition to organisational justice and NA. Further, this study adds to the literature for allied health professionals, where little is known about factors contributing to their turnover.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states

A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. However, empirical studies which document evidence about the return on campaign donations are rare (Großer, Reuben and Tymula, 2013). In this paper we estimate the net expected return of a campaign donation in eight Brazilian states using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to separate the return of winning and losing state deputy candidates in the electoral coalition in 2006. Our results show that that the net return is quite high (i.e., the investment of donor firms is almost 2% of the net expected return), and is larger among traditional electoral parties than any other parties, on average. Looking at the heterogeneity of local executive and legislative levels, we find that net returns are higher when donor firms finance deputies within a governor’s electoral coalition than deputies outside this coalition.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Informal labor contracts: an analysis of the Brazilian experience

For representing an expressive souree of labor absorption, the jobs with informal labor eontraet have been reeeiving a eonsiderable attention among the speeialists in the Brazilian labor rnarket. This paper presents, eoneisely, some stylized faets about this labor rnarket segment, as well as some oftheir most eommon interpretations. We argue that sue h interpretations are, in general, not very integrated and a model trying to make them eompatible is developed. The model ineorporates both segmentation and workers with heterogeneity in qualifieation. The results of the analysis are shown to be eompatible with most of the observed faets.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.