885 resultados para Contract prices
Resumo:
Social tariffs are, along with transfer payments and energy efficiency measures, an instrument to alleviate energy poverty. The name of the Spanish social tariff is “bono social”, and it was established in 2009. To qualify for bono social, the electricity consumer should meet any of the socioeconomic requirements stipulated by law and contract the electricity supply with a “comercializadora de referencia”, companies that are required to offer the bono social by law.Renewable energy cooperatives, a recent phenomenon in Spain, are not comercializadoras de referencia, so they are not obliged to offer the bono social. This does not mean there are no cooperative members at risk of energy poverty or vulnerable consumers.This study has two objectives. The first is to sketch the socioeconomic profile of members of the renewable energy cooperatives. The second is to analyze if these members are entitled to the bono social, or would be to other subsidized prices with different requirements to those of the bono social.For this purpose, we conducted a survey to members of the largest renewable energy cooperative in Spain, Som Energia. The results show that the members of renewable energy cooperatives are exposed to energy poverty risk, although its reach depends on the definition of vulnerable consumer.
Resumo:
The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Two methodologies are employed to explore this model's ability to generate volatile and persistent exchange rates. In the first, actual data is used for the exogenous driving processes. In the second, the model is simulated using estimated forcing processes. The theory, in both cases, is capable of explaining the high volatility and persistence of real and nominal exchange rates as well as the high correlation between real and nominal rates. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
We present a simple framework in which both the exchange rate disconnect and forward bias puzzles are simultaneously resolved. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habitpersistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with ‘deep’ habits along the lines of the work of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology. It offers a neo-classical explanation of the Meese–Rogoff puzzle and mimics the failure of fundamentals to explain nominal exchange rates in a linear setting. Finally, the model naturally generates the negative slope in the standard forward market regression.
Resumo:
The article presents primary research on rural wages and the prices of agricultural goods and draws conclusions concerning the trend in the living conditions of rural workers in the century before the Great Irish Famine of 1845-1850.
Resumo:
English law has long struggled to understand the effect of a fundamental common mistake in contract formation. Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 recognises that a common mistake which totally undermines a contract renders it void. Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 recognises a doctrine of 'mistake in equity' under which a serious common mistake in contract formation falling short of totally undermining the contract could give an adversely affected party the right to rescind the contract. This article accepts that the enormous difficulty in differentiating these two kinds of mistake justifies the insistence by the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace [2003] QB 679 that there can be only one doctrine of common mistake. However, the article proceeds to argue that where the risk of the commonly mistaken matter is not allocated by the contract itself a better doctrine would be that the contract is voidable.
Resumo:
The 1867 Reform Act in Britain extended the electoral franchise to the skilled but propertyless urban working classes. Using stock market data and exploiting the fact that foreign and domestic equities traded simultaneously on the London market, this paper finds that investors in British firms reacted negatively to the passage of this Act. We suggest that this finding is consistent with investors foreseeing future alterations of property rights arising from the pressure that the large newly enfranchised group would bring to bear on government policy. We also suggest that our findings appear to be more consistent with the Tory political competition explanation for the Act rather than the Whig threat-of-revolution explanation.
Resumo:
We study the residential demand for electricity and gas, working with nationwide household-level data that cover recent years, namely 1997-2007. Our dataset is a mixed panel/multi-year cross-sections of dwellings/households in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States as of 2008. We estimate static and dynamic models of electricity and gas demand. We find strong household response to energy prices, both in the short and long term. From the static models, we get estimates of the own price elasticity of electricity demand in the -0.860 to -0.667 range, while the own price elasticity of gas demand is -0.693 to -0.566. These results are robust to a variety of checks. Contrary to earlier literature (Metcalf and Hassett, 1999; Reiss and White, 2005), we find no evidence of significantly different elasticities across households with electric and gas heat. The price elasticity of electricity demand declines with income, but the magnitude of this effect is small. These results are in sharp contrast to much of the literature on residential energy consumption in the United States, and with the figures used in current government agency practice. Our results suggest that there might be greater potential for policies which affect energy price than may have been previously appreciated. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.