Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Petitioners in Obergefell v. Hodges

Supreme Court precedent establishes that the government may not punish children for matters beyond their control. Same-sex marriage bans and non-recognition laws (“marriage bans”) do precisely this. The states argue that marriage is good for children, yet marriage bans categorically exclude an entire class of children – children of same-sex couples – from the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage. This amicus brief recounts a powerful body of equal protection jurisprudence that prohibits punishing children to reflect moral disapproval of parental conduct or to incentivize adult behavior. We then explain that marriage bans punish children of same-sex couples because they: 1) foreclose their central legal route to family formation; 2) categorically void their existing legal parent-child relationships incident to out-of-state marriages; 3) deny them economic rights and benefits; and 4) inflict psychological and stigmatic harm. States cannot justify marriage bans as good for children and then exclude children of same-sex couples based on moral disapproval of their same-sex parents’ relationships or to incentivize opposite-sex couples to “procreate” within the bounds of marriage. To do so, severs the connection between legal burdens and individual responsibility and creates a permanent class or caste distinction.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Summary of major legislation, and of federal court decisions on its constitutionality, 1933-1940 : summary of major legislation, 1933-1940, with the various amendments to each basic act, and decisions of the federal courts as to the constitutionality of the basic and amending acts.

"This document was prepared by W. H. McClenon, in charge of the Federal Law Section."--p. iii.

The Constitution of the United States of America, analysis and interpretation : 1976 supplement. Annotations of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to July 6, 1976 /

Mode of access: Internet.

Judicial settlement of controversies between states of the American union : an analysis of cases decided in the Supreme Court of the United States /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Review of a report to the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the case of William Vans. With observations upon the dispensing power of the Legislature, and upon a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court, "nullifying" the said power.

"Postscript by William Vans": p. [13]-15 at end.

A general view of the origin and nature of the Constitution and government of the United States : deduced from the political history and condition of the colonies and states from 1774 until 1788, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, together with opinions in the cases decided at January term, 1837, arising on the restraints on the powers of the states /

Includes index.

Defence of the third article of the Massachusetts Declaration of rights / as delivered by Chief Justice Parsons, as the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, in the case of Barnes vs. Falmouth ...

Sabin

John Marshall and the Constitution ; a chronicle of the Supreme court /

"Bibliographical note": p. 233-236.

Judicial proceedings respecting constitutional validity of the Industrial disputes investigation act, 1907,

Mode of access: Internet.

The constitution of the State of Maryland : formed and adopted by the Convention which assembled at the city of Annapolis, May 8, 1867, and submitted to and ratified by the people on the 18th day of September, 1867 : with all amendments to the same to February, 1894, with decisions of the Court of Appeals, and an index.

Includes index.

The Supreme Court and civil liberties; how far has the Court protected the Bill of rights?

Mode of access: Internet.

Singapore 'shared values' and law: Non east versus west constitutional hermeneutic

This article examines the apparent contradictions in Singaporean interpretation and application of its Westminster modeled Constitution in which the Constitution is treated as any other piece of legislation and Western style individual rights are easily overrun. It also examines the Government's particularist claim to Asian values as an explanation for its handling of the Constitution and seeks an alternative approach to understand the Constitution with reference to the Government publication, the Shared Values. The author suggests that this Document serves as a quasi-Constitution, and finds that interpreting two leading cases with this hermeneutic leads to a more satisfactory understanding of the court's decisions. The article concludes that the Government's approach toward the law to create the society it envisioned and published in the Document is a different and pragmatic issue, rather than a result of any fundamental East versus West cultural difference.