Iowa Budget Report, Building on our Progress: Protecting our Priorities, 2009

*********** Some files are large and will take time to load. *********** Seven Files: 1)Report Cover, 2)Table of Contents, 3)Statewide Financial Summaries, 4)Department Budgets, 5)Capitol Projects, 6)Associated Financial Documents, 7)Budget Report. To Members of the 82nd General Assembly, As we begin the second year of our Administration, we are pleased to submit the Fiscal Year 2009 budget for the State of Iowa pursuant to Iowa Code Section 8.21 and our constitutional authority. This budget recognizes the progress that we began last year with improvements in education, economic development, energy independence, and health care; provides funding for new policy initiatives in these areas; and is based on fiscally sound budget practices. Building on last year’s accomplishments, our Fiscal Year 2009 General Fund budget proposes an additional $75 million for increasing teachers’ salaries as part of our goal to move Iowa closer to the national average. We lay the foundation for student achievement by recommending $32.1 million for pre-school education, and we also propose $177.5 million in total for community colleges and $726.2 million in total for Regents universities. To make our State more energy independent, our General Fund budget appropriates the second-year funding of $25 million for the new Iowa Power Fund. The newly established Office of Energy Independence will soon start making awards from the Power Fund. Apart from the budget, we will be making several proposals to implement the new State energy plan. We have pledged to expand the number of Iowans who have health-care coverage. As a result, we are recommending additional funding for enrollment growth in the State Children Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). These additional funds will help the State provide coverage for another 25 percent of children who are eligible but not yet enrolled in hawk-i and the Iowa Medicaid Program. To protect the safety of Iowans, we are recommending issuance of revenue bonds for approximately $260 million in net proceeds to build a new state penitentiary in Ft. Madison, renovate and expand the Women’s Correctional Institution at Mitchellville, upgrade kitchen facilities at the Rockwell City and Mt. Pleasant Correctional Institutions, and expand Community-Based Correctional Facilities in Ottumwa, Sioux City, Waterloo, and Des Moines. Additionally, we are including funding for developing a prototype program for providing parolees and low-risk offenders with mental health and drug abuse treatment and educational services to help them make a crime-free re-entry into our communities. As part of this Capitals Budget, we also propose using $20 million for the State’s matching share for building new facilities at the Iowa Veterans Home. Iowa Budget Report iv Fiscal Year 2009 Importantly, our budget continues to fully fund our State’s Reserve Funds to help buffer Iowa from any future economic downturn. We recommend reimbursing $78.2 million to the Property Tax Credit Fund as part of our multi-year proposal to correct bad budgeting practices and eventually restore $160.0 million to this Fund. To provide more transparency, we are transferring operational expenditures in the Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund to the General Fund and expenditures from the Endowment for Healthy Iowans and Healthy Iowans Tobacco Trust Funds to the General Fund. We believe that Iowa has charted a new course of becoming energy independent, providing quality pre-school education, recognizing the importance of our teachers, and providing greater health coverage for children. Our Fiscal Year 2009 budget and policy priorities reflect our continuing faith in Iowa’s ability to be the best state in the nation. We look forward to working with you in a bi-partisan and all-inclusive manner to build on our progress and protect our priorities. Sincerely, Chester J. Culver Governor Patty Judge Lt. Governor

Location of hubs in a competitive environment

We offer a formulation that locates hubs on a network in a competitiveenvironment; that is, customer capture is sought, which happenswhenever the location of a new hub results in a reduction of thecurrent cost (time, distance) needed by the traffic that goes from thespecified origin to the specified destination.The formulation presented here reduces the number of variables andconstraints as compared to existing covering models. This model issuited for both air passenger and cargo transportation.In this model, each origin-destination flow can go through either oneor two hubs, and each demand point can be assigned to more than a hub,depending on the different destinations of its traffic. Links(``spokes'' have no capacity limit. Computational experience is provided.

Locating emergency services with different priorities: The priority queuing covering location problem

Previous covering models for emergency service consider all the calls to be of the sameimportance and impose the same waiting time constraints independently of the service's priority.This type of constraint is clearly inappropriate in many contexts. For example, in urban medicalemergency services, calls that involve danger to human life deserve higher priority over calls formore routine incidents. A realistic model in such a context should allow prioritizing the calls forservice.In this paper a covering model which considers different priority levels is formulated andsolved. The model heritages its formulation from previous research on Maximum CoverageModels and incorporates results from Queuing Theory, in particular Priority Queuing. Theadditional complexity incorporated in the model justifies the use of a heuristic procedure.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique.We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.

Consumer choice in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

A new direction of research in Competitive Location theory incorporatestheories of Consumer Choice Behavior in its models. Following thisdirection, this paper studies the importance of consumer behavior withrespect to distance or transportation costs in the optimality oflocations obtained by traditional Competitive Location models. To dothis, it considers different ways of defining a key parameter in thebasic Maximum Capture model (MAXCAP). This parameter will reflectvarious ways of taking into account distance based on several ConsumerChoice Behavior theories. The optimal locations and the deviation indemand captured when the optimal locations of the other models are usedinstead of the true ones, are computed for each model. A metaheuristicbased on GRASP and Tabu search procedure is presented to solve all themodels. Computational experience and an application to 55-node networkare also presented.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Supply chain management as a competitive advantage in the Spanish grocery sector

Adversarial relationships have long dominated business relationships,but Supply Chain Management (SCM) entails a new perspective. SCM requiresa movement away from arms-length relationships toward partnership stylerelations. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper analyses the relationship between internal andexternal integration processes, their effect on firms performance andtheir contribution to the achievement of a competitive advantage.Performance improvements are analysed through costs, stock out and leadtime reductions. And, the achievement of a better competitive positionis measured by comparing the firm s performance with its competitors performance. To analyse this, an empirical study has been conducted inthe Spanish grocery sector.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Incorporating waiting time in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

In this paper we propose a metaheuristic to solve a new version of the Maximum CaptureProblem. In the original MCP, market capture is obtained by lower traveling distances or lowertraveling time, in this new version not only the traveling time but also the waiting time willaffect the market share. This problem is hard to solve using standard optimization techniques.Metaheuristics are shown to offer accurate results within acceptable computing times.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

Historical contingency affects signaling strategies and competitive abilities in evolving populations of simulated robots.

One of the key innovations during the evolution of life on earth has been the emergence of efficient communication systems, yet little is known about the causes and consequences of the great diversity within and between species. By conducting experimental evolution in 20 independently evolving populations of cooperatively foraging simulated robots, we found that historical contingency in the occurrence order of novel phenotypic traits resulted in the emergence of two distinct communication strategies. The more complex foraging strategy was less efficient than the simpler strategy. However, when the 20 populations were placed in competition with each other, the populations with the more complex strategy outperformed the populations with the less complex strategy. These results demonstrate a tradeoff between communication efficiency and robustness and suggest that stochastic events have important effects on signal evolution and the outcome of competition between distinct populations.

Updated list of ant species (Hymenoptera, Formicidae) recorded in Santa Catarina State, southern Brazil, with a discussion of research advances and priorities

Updated list of ant species (Hymenoptera, Formicidae) recorded in Santa Catarina State, southern Brazil, with a discussion of research advances and priorities. A first working list of ant species registered in Santa Catarina State, southern Brazil was published recently. Since then, many studies with ants have been conducted in the state. With data compiled from published studies and collections in various regions of the state, we present here an updated list of 366 species (and 17 subspecies) in 70 ant genera in Santa Catarina, along with their geographical distribution in the seven state mesoregions. Two hundred and seven species are recorded in the Oeste mesoregion, followed by Vale do Itajaí (175), Grande Florianópolis (150), Norte (60), Sul (41), Meio Oeste (23) and Planalto Serrano (12). The increase in the number of records since 1999 results from the use of recently adopted sampling methods and techniques in regions and ecosystems poorly known before, and from the availability of new tools for the identification of ants. Our study highlights the Meio Oeste, Planalto Serrano, Sul and Norte mesoregions, as well as the deciduous forest, mangrove, grassland and coastal sand dune ecosystems as priority study areas in order to attain a more complete knowledge of the ant fauna in Santa Catarina State.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

Surviving in a competitive spatial market: The threshold capture model

Most facility location decision models ignore the fact that for a facility to survive it needs a minimum demand level to cover costs. In this paper we present a decision model for a firm thatwishes to enter a spatial market where there are several competitors already located. This market is such that for each outlet there is a demand threshold level that has to be achievedin order to survive. The firm wishes to know where to locate itsoutlets so as to maximize its market share taking into account the threshold level. It may happen that due to this new entrance, some competitors will not be able to meet the threshold and therefore will disappear. A formulation is presented together with a heuristic solution method and computational experience.