Open Source und Kartellrecht

„Open source and European antitrust laws: An analysis of copyleft and the prohibition of software license fees on the basis of art. 101 TFEU and the block exemptions“ Open source software and open source licenses (like the GNU GPL) are not only relevant for computer nerds or activists – they are already business. They are for example the fundament of LINUX, the only real rival of MICROSOFT’s WINDOWS-line in the field of operating systems for IBM PC compatibles. Art. 101 TFEU (like the identical predecessor art. 81 TEC) as part of the EU antitrust laws prohibits contract terms like price fixing and some forms of technology control. Are copyleft – the „viral effect“, the „cancer“ – and the interdiction of software license fees in the cross hairs of this legal rule? On the other side the European Union has since 2004 a new Technology Transfer Block Exemption with software license agreements for the first time in its scope: a safe harbour and a dry place under a umbrella for open source software? After the introduction (A) with a description of open source software the following text analyses the system of the European Unions competition law respectivley antitrust law and the requirements of the block exemptions (B). Starting point of antitrust analysis are undertakings – but who are the untertakings (C) in the field of widespread, independent developers as part of the „bazar organization“? To see how much open source has to fear from the law of the European Union, at the end the anti competitive and pro competitive effects of open source are totalized within the legal framework (D). The conclusion (E) shows: not nothing, but not much.

EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.

An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.

Competência do CADE na disciplina antitruste das operações envolvendo fundos de private equity

Este trabalho tem por objeto a análise dos critérios de submissão de atos de concentração envolvendo fundos de investimento para apreciação pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), com enfoque nos fundos de private equity. Nos últimos anos os fundos de investimento têm adquirido crescente importância na economia brasileira em setores estratégicos. No entanto, o tratamento pela autoridade antitruste brasileira das operações destes veículos se revela instável resultando em certa insegurança sobre quais devem ser submetidas ao controle de concentrações. Assim, este trabalho propõe uma forma de se acessarem essas operações que ao mesmo tempo atenda aos objetivos visados com o controle das estruturas no Direito Concorrencial brasileiro e não crie obstáculos à atuação destes importantes veículos para a economia moderna. Para tanto, buscou-se respaldo na experiência de países onde a tradição antitruste e o fenômeno analisado são muito mais antigos do que no Brasil. No entanto, uma vez que nem mesmo nestes países a questão está livre de revisões periódicas e alguma controvérsia, este trabalho não tem como pretensão apresentar uma solução definitva para o problema. O primeiro capítulo expõe o objeto de estudo, seu funcionamento e sua importância para a economia. No segundo capítulo são abordados os objetivos do controle de estruturas no Brasil, os critérios de conhecimento de operações pela autoridade concorrencial brasileira e a sua interpretação pelo CADE, notadamente no que toca aos fundos de investimento. No terceiro capítulo são abordadas as ligações estruturais entre concorrentes mais relevantes do ponto de vista concorrencial quando se trata de aquisições perpetradas por fundos de investimento: participações minoritárias e interlocking directorates.

O uso de medidas antidumping como mecanismo de barreira à entrada no mercado brasileiro

As medidas antidumping são uma exceção ao livre comércio e como tal deveriam ser usadas com restrição. No entanto, desde o GATT 1947 há preocupação com o uso abusivo de tais medidas, podendo ser o mecanismo utilizado não apenas para possibilitar a recuperação da indústria doméstica prejudicada pelas importações objeto de dumping, objetivo do Acordo Antidumping (AAD), mas com o fim de proteger a indústria nacional da concorrência estrangeira. Desta forma, o objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar as principais características do AAD firmado ao final da Rodada Uruguai que culminou na constituição da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), incluindo seus antecedentes históricos e a possibilidade de aplicação discricionária, demonstrando como uma norma surgida no plano internacional em decorrência de um acordo multilateral vem sendo utilizada pelo Brasil, com a finalidade de se demonstrar a possibilidade de uso das medidas antidumping como barreira à entrada no mercado brasileiro. Confirmada a possibilidade de uso abusivo desse instrumento de defesa comercial, ainda que no plano teórico, uma vez que não é possível analisar os efeitos reais das medidas aplicadas, serão apresentadas as formas de contrabalanço ao protecionismo atualmente existentes no próprio AAD e sua incorporação e utilização pelo Brasil bem como a possibilidade de questionamento de tais medidas como práticas anticompetitivas com fundamento na legislação antitruste perante as autoridades de defesa da concorrência. Serão ainda analisadas outras possibilidades de contrabalanço ao uso exacerbado das medidas antidumping em debate e viabilidade das mesmas no cenário atual em que se verifica, de um lado, o aumento de uso de tais medidas pelos países Membros da OMC, destacando-se o Brasil e, de outro lado, impasse nas negociações multilaterais, cabendo aos Membros tomarem decisões unilaterais sobre a aplicação de tais medidas, seu grau de intensidade e forma de aplicação a depender da proteção que se pretende garantir à indústria nacional.

Poder da marca: interações entre direito antitruste e direito industrial

O presente trabalho busca analisar os diferentes tratamentos dispensados à marca no âmbito do controle preventivo e no controle repressivo de condutas. A análise da função social das marcas demonstrou que esta é uma propriedade que se realiza na concorrência e pela concorrência. Nesse sentido, não há dúvidas de que está sujeita aos princípios do Direito Concorrencial. Todavia, a maneira como esses princípios balizam a marca no controle de atos de concentração, de um lado, e no controle repressivo de condutas, de outro, difere. No âmbito do controle de atos de concentração, a atuação da autoridade concorrencial é orientada por uma variante do princípio da precaução, o que a autoriza a tomar decisões e impor restrições aos direitos marcários mesmo em um contexto de incerteza. No âmbito do controle repressivo de condutas, todavia, a intervenção do CADE está sujeita aos princípios do Processo Administrativo Sancionador. Neste contexto, as condutas que envolvem o uso de direitos de propriedade intelectual, incluindo as marcas, devem ser analisadas à luz do princípio da estrita legalidade. Um critério jurídico objetivo é necessário para distinguir o lícito do ilícito, sobretudo em um cenário no qual estão em jogo duas políticas públicas distintas: a de proteção à concorrência e a de proteção à direitos de propriedade industrial. Sendo essas duas políticas instrumentais e parciais, voltadas a um fim maior de política econômica, devem harmonizar-se, e não sobrepor-se uma a outra. Ademais, o escopo de atuação da autoridade concorrencial em processos que investiguem o uso abusivo de direitos marcários e atos de concorrência desleal deve ser esclarecido. O direito concorrencial, enquanto ramo autônomo do direito, com princípios e métodos interpretativos próprios, pode analisar institutos e figuras de outros ramos que com ele guardem relação sem ter de ficar adstrito ao posicionamento de outras instâncias.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform? Research Papers in Law, 5/2008

From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.

The Dragon awakes: Is Chinese competition policy a cause for concern? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/14, 22 October 2013

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, adopted in 2007, is largely compatible with antitrust law in the European Union, the United States and other jurisdictions. Enforcement activity by the Chinese authorities is also approaching the level seen in the EU. The Chinese law, however, leaves significant room for the use of competition policy to further industrial policy objectives. The data presented in this Policy Contribution indicates that Chinese merger control might have asymmetrically targeted foreign companies, while favouring domestic companies. However, there are no indications that antitrust control has been used to favour domestic players. A strategy to achieve convergence in global antitrust enforcement should include support for Chinese competition authorities to develop the institutional tools they already have, and to improve merger control by promoting the adoption of a consumer-oriented test and enforcing M&A notification rules.

Multilateral Interchange Fees: Competition and regulation in light of recent legislative developments. ECRI Research Report No. 14, 31 January 2014

Two-sided payment card markets generate costs that have to be distributed among the participating actors. For this purpose, payment card networks set an interchange fee, which is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction. While in recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world - including the European Commission - have opened proceedings against card brands in order to verify whether agreements to collectively establish the level of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the Reserve Bank of Australia – as a regulator - has directly tried to address market failures by lowering the level of interchange fees and changing some network rules. The US has followed with new legislation on financial consumer protection, which also intervenes on interchange fees. This has opened a strong debate not only on legitimacy of interchange fees, but also on the appropriateness of different public tools to address such issues. Drawing from economic and legal theories and a comparative analysis of recent case law in the EU and other jurisdictions, this work investigates whether a regulation rather than a purely competition policy approach would be more appropriate in this field, considering in particular, at EU level, all of the competition and regulatory concerns that have arisen from the operation of SEPA with multilateral interchange fees. The paper concludes that a wider regulation approach could address some of the shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, proving to be highly beneficial to the development of an efficient European single payments area.

Impact evaluations of Federal Trade Commission vertical restraints cases /

Item 535

A general charter for trade associations. Correspondence between the attorney general and the secretary of commerce. Permissible activities of trade associations. Text of Supreme court decision condemning certain practices. Text of act legalizing agricultural cooperative marketing associations, together with a treatise on the application of these pronouncements.

Mode of access: Internet.

Law-enforcement activities affecting small business : report of Subcommittee No. 1 on Law Enforcement and Subsidies Affecting Small Business, to the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, Eighty-fifth Congress, second session, pursuant to H. Res. 56 .

"Union calendar no. 1144."

The insurance industry. Hearings, Eighty-fifth Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 231 .

Continuous paging.