The role of strategic intelligence in anticipating transnational organised crime: A literary review

Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) has become a focal point for a range of private and public stakeholders. While not a new phenomenon, the rapid expansion of TOC activities and interests, its increasingly complex structures and ability to maximise opportunity by employing new technologies at a rate impossible for law enforcement to match complicates law enforcement’s ability to develop strategies to detect, disrupt, prevent and investigate them. In an age where the role of police has morphed from simplistic response and enforcement activities to one of managing human security risk, it is argued that intelligence can be used to reduce the impact of strategic surprise from evolving criminal threats and environmental change. This review specifically focuses on research that has implications for strategic intelligence and strategy setting in a TOC context. The review findings suggest that current law enforcement intelligence literature focuses narrowly on the management concept of intelligence-led policing in a tactical, operational setting. As such the review identifies central issues surrounding strategic intelligence and highlights key questions that future research agendas must address to improve strategic intelligence outcomes, particularly in the fight against TOC.

Communication Interception Technology (CIT) and its use in the fight against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Australia : a review of the literature

In recent times, technology has advanced in such a manner that the world can now communicate in means previously never thought possible. Transnational organised crime groups, who have exploited these new technologies as basis for their criminal success, however, have not overlooked this development, growth and globalisation. Law enforcement agencies have been confronted with an unremitting challenge as they endeavour to intercept, monitor and analyse these communications as a means of disrupting the activities of criminal enterprises. The challenge lies in the ability to recognise and change tactics to match an increasingly sophisticated adversary. The use of communication interception technology, such as phone taps or email interception, is a tactic that when used appropriately has the potential to cause serious disruption to criminal enterprises. Despite the research that exists on CIT and TOC, these two bodies of knowledge rarely intersect. This paper builds on current literature, drawing them together to provide a clearer picture of the use of CIT in an enforcement and intelligence capacity. It provides a review of the literature pertaining to TOC, the structure of criminal enterprises and the vulnerability of communication used by these crime groups. Identifying the current contemporary models of policing it reviews intelligence-led policing as the emerging framework for modern policing. Finally, it assesses the literature concerning CIT, its uses within Australia and the limitations and arguments that exist. In doing so, this paper provides practitioners with a clearer picture of the use, barriers and benefits of using CIT in the fight against TOC. It helps to bridge the current gaps in modern policing theory and offers a perspective that can help drive future research.

Strategic intelligence in law enforcement : anticipating transnational organised crime

This thesis is an explorative study of four national level law enforcement agencies' applications of strategic intelligence against transnational organised crime. The thesis develops a hybrid conceptual model for strategic intelligence in law enforcement, which explains how strategic intelligence influences police management. Dr Coyne explored case studies of strategic intelligence in the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Serious and Organised Crime Agency United Kingdom, Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police. The research provides an understanding of the impact of strategic intelligence across strategic responses to transnational organised crime and the implications this has for police management and intelligence theory.

Transnational organised crime and the International Criminal Court developments and debates

Limitation to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court (ICC) - proposal to strengthen the universal criminalisation of transnational organised crimes by enabling them to be prosecuted through an international authority - debate on whether existing offences under the ICC Statute encompass certain transnational organised crimes - whether the Statute should be expanded to include crimes that have been recognised in international treaties.

Transnational organised crime and international law: The Palermo Convention

The last decade has witnessed a significant growth in transnational organised crime activities. It has also seen multiple efforts by the international community to come to terms with this rise of organised crime and to work towards an international instrument to combat the activities of criminal organisations. In December 2000, the United Nations opened for signature the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001), also known as the Palermo Convention, a treaty that is supplemented by three protocols on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and trafficking in firearms and ammunition. The conclusion of the Convention marks the end of more than eight years of consultations on a universal instrument to criminalise and counteract transnational criminal organisations. This article illustrates the developments that led to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and reflects on the amendments and concessions that have been made to earlier proposals during the elaboration process. This article highlights the strengths of the Convention in the areas of judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, and the shortcomings of the new Convention, in particular in failing to establish a universal, unequivocal definition of “transnational organized crime”.

Introduction – transnational organised crime and terrorism:different peas, same pod

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists in a strategic alliance between two non-state actors, able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the degree of dangerousness that both organised crime and terrorism currently represent in the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this edited volume aims at contributing to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization.

Policing Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption : Exploring the Role of Communication Interception Technology

Technology has advanced in such a manner that the world can now communicate in means previously never thought possible. These new technologies have not been overlooked by transnational organized crime groups and networks of corruption, and have been exploited for criminal success. This text explores the use of communication interception technology (CIT), such as phone taps or email interception, and its potential to cause serious disruption to these criminal enterprises. Exploring the placement of communication interception technology within differing policing frameworks, and how they integrate in a practical manner, the authors demonstrate that CIT is best placed within a proactive, intelligence-led policing framework. They also indicate that if law enforcement agencies in Western countries are serious about fighting transnational organized crime and combating corruption, there is a need to re-evaluate the constraints of interception technology, and the sceptical culture that surrounds intelligence in policing. Policing Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption will appeal to scholars of Law, Criminal Justice and Police Science as well as intelligence analysts and police and security intelligence professionals.

Transnational organised environmental crime

Transnational environmental crime must become a government priority, as organised criminal networks continue to exploit the environment with unprecedented profits. Such earnings come at a substantial social, economic and environmental expense for communities and their livelihoods. Indeed, organised environmental crime is identified by the United Nations as a key factor in the impoverishment, displacement and violent conflicts affecting millions of people — notably in developing societies.2 It is widely recognised that organised environmental crime syndicates, motivated by substantial financial rewards, continue to flourish and expand in disadvantaged societies with porous borders, where corruption is widespread and regulation is poor. The theft of biodiversity and the demise of animal species and habitats have resulted not only in financial loss, but also in an increase in “environmental refugees” — people dislocated and forced to migrate due to loss of livelihoods.

Transnational organized crime in Oceania

Oceania has a relatively low level of crime prevalence yet in the smaller and under-developed PICs we have shown that transnational crime has become increasingly common. A risk contained but potentially dangerous if state failure or fragility undermines law enforcement capacities. We predict that as the pace of globalization quickens and the demand for raw materials and resources grows some parts of the Pacific will be prone to criminal enterprises run by both indigenous and foreign crime groups. Australia and New Zealand will remain attractors of illicit goods notably ATS but will in turn be source countries for diminishing fish stock such as beche de mere and abalone as well forest timber. Finally the role of states such as Australia and New Zealand in helping to maintain law enforcement capacities throughout the region will be crucial if organized crime in Oceania is to be kept in check while demand for illicit resources grow.

A case study analysis of Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) (1990-2005) : applying the Crime Business Analysis Matrix (CBAM)

Israeli Organised Crime (IOC) gained prominence in the 1990s for its involvement in the manufacturing and wholesale distribution of MDMA through traditional trafficking networks across Europe. Equipped with astute business acumen and an entrepreneurial spirit, IOC dominated MDMA trafficking in Europe for more than a decade and remains as a major participant in this drug market. The paper analyses the entrepreneurial activities of IOC within the context of the MDMA market in Europe between 1990 and 2005 using the Crime Business Analysis Matrix (CBAM) as proffered by Dean, et al (2010). The study is in two parts. Part A provides a review of the literature as it pertains to IOC and its involvement in the European drug market, while Part B provides a qualitative analysis of their criminal business practices and entrepreneurialism of IOC within this context.

Models of South-East Asian organised crime drug operations in Queensland

In 2002, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) issued a report entitled Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries which established five models of organised crime. This paper reviews these and other common organised crime models and drug trafficking models, and applies them to cases of South East Asian drug trafficking in the Australian state of Queensland. The study tests the following hypotheses: (1) South-East Asian drug trafficking groups in Queensland will operate within a criminal network or core group; (2) Wholesale drug distributors in Queensland will not fit consistently under any particular UN organised crime model; and (3) Street dealers will have no organisational structure. The study concluded that drug trafficking or importation closely resembles a criminal network or core group structure. Wholesale dealers did not fit consistently into any UN organised crime model. Street dealers had no organisational structure as an organisational structure is typically found in mid- to high-level drug trafficking.