Sovereign rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies' ratings

This study estimates default probabilities of 124 emerging countries from 1981 to 2002 as a function of a set of macroeconomic and political variables. The estimated probabilities are then compared with the default rates implied by sovereign credit ratings of three major international credit rating agencies (CRAs) – Moody's Investor's Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings. Sovereign debt default probabilities are used by investors in pricing sovereign bonds and loans as well as in determining country risk exposure. The study finds that CRAs usually underestimate the risk of sovereign debt as the sovereign credit ratings from rating agencies are usually too optimistic.

Transparency Proposals for European Sovereign Bond Markets

The debate over the possible extension of transparency regulation in Europe to include sovereign bonds has opened up a number of other issues in need of serious consideration. One such issue is the appropriateness of the entire infrastructure supporting the trading of European sovereign bonds. In recent years sovereign issuers have supported the development of an electronic inter-dealer market but have remained unconcerned with the opacity of dealer-to-customer trading. The degree of segmentation in this market is high relative to what exists in nearly all other financial markets. This paper explores why European sovereign bond markets have developed in such a segmented way and considers how this structure could be altered to improve transparency without adversely affecting liquidity, efficiency or the benefits enjoyed by primary dealers and issuers. It is suggested that the structure of the market could be improved greatly if the largest and most active investors were permitted access to the inter-dealer electronic trading platforms. This would solve a number of market imperfections and increase the proportion of market activity that is conducted in a transparent way. The paper argues that sovereign issuers in Europe have the means to provide incentives that would influence dealers to support reduced segmentation. Some practical examples of how this could be achieved are provided and the potential benefits are outlined.

A pricing model for sovereign bonde

Similar to the modeling used to evaluate ccnporate boncls, where it is a put optioo. 011 corporate assets, we modeled sovereign bonds. Instead of company's assets as underlining assets, we used foreign excbange reserves. The results show a fundamental pricing model for sovereign bond and an optimum relation between the debt size, term, mix between floating and fixed interest payments, and size of reserves. The model is tested with a Brazilian BradyBond.

Mudança no Critério de Contabilização de Instrumentos Financeiros pelo IASB: estudo de evento sobre os títulos soberanos da Grécia,

A alteração feita pelo IASB em 2008 na classificação dos instrumentos financeiros para reduzir as perdas bancárias com a crise do subprime e de títulos soberanos dos países-membros da União Europeia, após um pedido protocolado pela Comissão da União Europeia, motivou esta pesquisa. A referida alteração ensejou a mudança do critério de avaliação, que passou de valor justo para valor amortizado, para os instrumentos reclassificados, muito embora alguns bancos não tenham aderido à reclassificação, mantendo a orientação original que determinava a avaliação pelo valor justo. Através de Estudo de Evento testou-se a Hipótese de Eficiência de Mercado - HEM, analisando 33 instituições bancárias detentoras de títulos soberanos gregos. Embora a alteração tenha colaborado para que essas instituições bancárias protelassem essas perdas no resultado, não afetou os fluxos de caixa futuros. E como evidenciam os resultados da pesquisa, o mercado foi equitativo com essas instituições, penalizando-as com base no grau de exposição aos títulos gregos, independentemente do critério utilizado, corroborando a HEM: o valor de um ativo é o valor presente dos fluxos de caixa futuros e não dos lucros. Uma consequência importante foi que os governos, através da terceira revisão do Acordo de Capital de Basileia, adotaram medidas para regulamentar com mais rigor as instituições financeiras, no intuito que essas instituições, futuramente, possam suportar melhor os efeitos de uma crise financeira.

Trading the differences in expectations between the CDS and bond markets

This paper uses the framework developed by Vrugt (2010) to extract the recovery rate and term-structure of risk-neutral default probabilities implied in the cross-section of Portuguese sovereign bonds outstanding between March and August 2011. During this period the expectations on the recovery rate remain firmly anchored around 50 percent while the instantaneous default probability increases steadily from 6 to above 30 percent. These parameters are then used to calculate the fair-value of a 5-year and 10- year CDS contract. A credit-risk-neutral strategy is developed from the difference between the market price of a CDS of the same tenors and the fair-value calculated, yielding a sharpe ratio of 3.2

Descomposición de la estructura a términos de las tasas de interés de los bonos soberanos de Estados Unidos y Colombia

En el presente documento se descompone la estructura a términos de las tasas de interés de los bonos soberanos de EE.UU. y Colombia. Se utiliza un modelo afín de cuatro factores, donde el primero de ellos corresponde a un factor de pronóstico de los retornos y, los demás, a los tres primeros componentes principales de la matriz de varianza-covarianza de las tasas de interés. Para la descomposición de las tasas de interés de Colombia se utiliza el factor de pronóstico de EE.UU. para capturar efectos de spillovers. Se logra concluir que las tasas en EE.UU. no tienen un efecto sobre el nivel de tasas en Colombia pero sí influyen en los excesos de retorno esperado de los bonos y también existen efectos sobre los factores locales, aunque el factor determinante de la dinámica de las tasas locales es el “nivel”. De la descomposición se obtienen las expectativas de la tasa corta y la prima por vencimiento. En ese sentido, se observa que el valor de la prima por vencimiento y su volatilidad incrementa con el vencimiento y que este valor ha venido disminuyendo en el tiempo.

Why an ESM programme could be a kiss of death: Recovery values and subordination. CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2012

Spain, needing a bailout for its banks, was granted a vague promise by EZ leaders for up to €100 billion. The details remain obscure, yet they matter enormously. This column argues that the so-called ‘subordination effect’ of fresh official lending could put Spain on the slippery road to ruin. It argues that if sovereign bonds must be bought, this should be done in the secondary market which, would be on an equal footing with private investors and thus avoid the subordination trap.

Permanent trading impacts and bond yields

We analyze four years of transaction data for euro-area sovereign bonds traded on the MTS electronic platforms. In order to measure the informational content of trading activity, we estimate the permanent price response to trades. We find not only strong evidence of information asymmetry in sovereign bond markets, but we also show the relevance of information asymmetry in explaining the cross-sectional variations of bond yields across a wide range of bond maturities and countries. Our results confirm that trades of more recently issued bonds and longer maturity bonds have a greater permanent effect on prices. We compare the price impact of trades for bonds across different maturity categories and find that trades of French and German bonds have the highest long-term price impact in the short maturity class whereas trades of German bonds have the highest permanent price impacts in the long maturity class. More importantly, we study the cross-section of bond yields and find that after controlling for conventional factors, investors demand higher yields for bonds with larger permanent trading impact. Interestingly, when investors face increased market uncertainty, they require even higher compensation for information asymmetry.

Haircut undone? The Greek drama and prospects for investment arbitration

As a result of the sovereign debt crisis that engulfed Europe in 2010, investors are much more likely to pursue dispute resolution options when faced with losses. This paper seeks to examine the position of investors who suffered losses in the Greek haircut of 2012 in the context of investment treaty arbitration. The paper evaluates arguments that investments in Greek sovereign bonds have been expropriated by the introduction of retrofit CACs and that compensation is payable as a result of the protections offered by BITs. The paper investigates whether sovereign bonds come within the definition of protected investment in BITs, assesses the degree to which CACs act as a jurisdictional bar to investor-state claims and attempts an evaluation of whether claims could be successful. The analysis uses as an illustration recent cases brought against Greece at ICSID. The paper concludes by considering whether the Greek haircut was expropriatory and reflects on the possible outcome of current arbitrations.

Prêmio sobre o risco (risk premium) dos títulos soberanos e política fiscal discricionária vs. regras de política fiscal para um país em desenvolvimento: o caso do Brasil

O projeto de pesquisa é parte do projeto entitulado "Credibilidade de Políticas Monetárias e Fiscais para o Brasil: Risco Soberano, Instituições, Âncoras Nominais, e Acesso aos Mercados Financeiros Internacionais". Dentro do atual plano de estabilização, um estudo empírico sobre a economia brasileira fornece um exemplo vívido do impacto de vários fatores, como o grau de institucionalização das políticas monetárias e orçamentárias que tem sido utilizadas desde a implementação do Plano Real, que aumentariam a credibilidade, sustentando a política cambial e o fluxo positivo do capital internacional, na percepção do mercado do risco de suspensão de pagamento (default risk) da dívida externa de um país em desenvolvimento. O foco dentro deste projeto de pesquisa será na questão de pesquisa: "Prêmio sobre o risco (risk premium) dos títulos soberanos e política fiscal discricionária vs regras de política fiscal para um país em desenvolvimento: o caso do Brasil".

Análise dos determinantes dos spreads soberanos dos países emergentes

O objetivo deste trabalho é estimar os efeitos da crise financeira recente sobre os spreads dos títulos soberanos dos países emergentes. Os resultados corroboram a visão de que a atual crise financeira teve um impacto significativo sobre a percepção de risco dos países emergentes, elevando o prêmio de risco. A taxa de crescimento da economia, a taxa de câmbio real, as reservas internacionais, as dívidas interna e externa e o VIX também afetaram significativamente os spreads soberanos. Por fim, mostramos que a percepção de risco do Brasil foi menos afetada pela crise que nos demais países emergentes.

ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? CEPS Working Document No. 397, June 2014

Paul De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis states that member countries of a monetary union such as the eurozone are highly vulnerable to a self-fulfilling mechanism by which the efforts of investors to avoid losses from default can end up triggering the very default they fear. The authors test this hypothesis by applying an eclectic methodology to a time window around Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” (to keep the eurozone on firm footing) pledge on 26 July 2012. This pledge was soon followed by the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme (the prospective and conditional purchase by the European Central Bank of sovereign bonds of eurozone countries having difficulty issuing debt). The principal components of eurozone credit default swap spreads validate this choice of time frame. An event study reveals significant pre announcement contagion emanating from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria. Furthermore, time-series regression confirms frequent clusters of large shocks affecting the credit default swap spreads of the four eurozone countries but solely during the pre-announcement period. The findings of this report support the fragility hypothesis for the eurozone and endorse the Outright Monetary Transactions programme.

Time for the ECB to bite the bullet. CEPS Commentary, 19 January 2015

This Commentary summarises the main reasons why the ECB can no longer delay launching a massive bond-buying programme, also including sovereigns of eurozone member countries, and why such interventions will indeed be effective in raising inflation, thus restoring the ECB’s credibility and spurring economic activity. A credible programme must continue either until an explicit inflation target has been achieved or the ECB balance sheet has reached the €2 trillion target already announced by the ECB’s Governing Council. Regardless of how such interventions will be undertaken, they will reduce interest-rate spreads between eurozone markets, but it is nevertheless important that the ECB designs its operations so as to avoid any implication of direct support or deficit financing facilitation for the eurozone’s most indebted countries. Finally, some kind of guarantee against first losses by the ECB on its sovereign bonds may be appropriate, while entrusting open market operations to each national central bank for their own sovereigns could threaten the very survival of monetary union.

The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments. CEPS Policy Brief No. 328, March 2015

The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.

European Central Bank quantitative easing: the detailed manual. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2015/02, March 2015

• The European quantitative easing programme, the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), started on 9 March 2015 and will last at least until September 2016. Purchases will be composed of sovereign bonds and securities from European institutions and national agencies. • The European Central Bank Governing Council imposed limits to ensure that the Eurosystem will not breach the prohibition on monetary financing. However, these limits will constrain the size and duration of the programme, especially if it is sustained after September 2016. The possibility for national central banks to also buy national agency securities could alleviate this, but the small number of eligible agencies could limit their role as a back-up purchase. • The Eurosystem should find other eligible agencies, especially in countries in which public debt is small, or waive the limits for countries respecting the investment grade eligibility criteria. The same issue arises with European institutions: their number and outstanding debt securities are limited. The waiver of the limits proposed for sovereigns should be applied to institutions with high ratings. • The PSPP profits that will ultimately be repatriated to national treasuries will be small. This was to be expected, given current very low yields. Profits will also come from the major increase in reserves resulting from the implementation of QE, combined with the negative deposit rates on excess reserves at the ECB.