Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Assessment of current anglo-saxon proposals about criminal justice and the justification of legal punishment: Moore, Duff and Finnis on retribution, and the challenging compatibility with the up-and-coming Restorative Justice

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Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Time and retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focussing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.

"Swift and effective retribution" : the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the confrontation with Qaddafi /

Shipping list no.: 97-0159-P.

Divine penology : the philosophy of retribution and the doctrine of future punishment considered in the light of reason, science, revelation, and redemption /

Mode of access: Internet.

Three essays : On the intermediate state of the dead; The resurrection from the dead; and On the Greek terms rendered judge, judgment, condemned, condemnation, damned, damnation, etc. in the New Testament; with remarks on Mr. Hudson's letters in vindication of a future retribution, addressed to Mr. Hosea Ballou /

Mode of access: Internet.

A series of letters addressed to Rev. Hosea Ballou of Boston : being a vindication of the doctrine of a future retribution against principal arguments used by him, Mr. Balfour, and others /

Mode of access: Internet.

Familiar letters to a brother : on the final restoration of all mankind to holiness and happiness, through a righteous judgment, and an equitable retribution /

Mode of access: Internet.

An examination of the doctrine of future retribution : on the principles of morals, analogy and the Scriptures / by Hosea Ballou.

Includes index.

A system of temporal retribution, vindicated by various considerations drawn from scripture and observation microform /

Reproduction of original in: Acadia University. Library.

Future punishment : comprising four parochial sermons : with an introduction on the scriptural doctrine of retribution and an essay on prayers for the dead /

Bibliographical footnotes.

Familiar letters to a brother; in two series: on the final restoration of all mankind to holiness and happiness; through a righteous judgment and an equitable retribution.

Mode of access: Internet.

Conceções éticas de estudantes universitários portugueses sobre as sentenças penais: reabilitar ou retribuir?

A presente investigação tem como objetivo analisar as perceções dos estudantes universitários portugueses sobre as finalidades das sentenças penais tendo subjacentes as Teorias Absolutas e das Teorias Relativas. Pretendeu-se avaliar que objetivos de sentença são mais apoiados entre os estudantes e perceber se existem outras variáveis como preditores significativos, tais como, género, orientação politica, religião, curso e experiência prévia de vitimação. Uma amostra de 344 estudantes universitários, a frequentar os cursos de Ciências Sociais (40,8%), Engenharia (34,9%) e Direito (24,3%), com idades compreendidas entre os 17 e os 48 anos, selecionada por conveniência, preencheu o instrumento de 20 itens adaptado de Cullen, Cullen, e Wozniak. Os resultados apontam para a estabilidade da estrutura dimensional do instrumento adaptado, definido por 2 fatores e 16 itens: o fator punição e o fator reabilitação. O fator mais apoiado entre os participantes foi o de reabilitação o que contraria que a opinião pública a respeito da sentença é mais influenciada pelo retribucionismo. Os participantes apoiam várias finalidades da sentença. Não foram encontradas diferenças estatisticamente significativas em função da orientação política, da religião e da experiência de vitimização. Contudo, diferenças estatisticamente significativas foram encontradas para o sexo dos participantes e para o curso.