Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 665 - "Research Project on Anti-Semitism" (p. IX 101-IX 112)

Institute of Social Research; "Research Project on Anti-Semitism. General Statement of Scope of Project, Fields to be investigated, First Assignements, Plan of Operation, Joint Conferences" (15.3.1943), a) Typoskript, 5 Blatt, b) Typoskript, 3 Blatt, c) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 5 Blatt; Institute of Social Research: "Notes on Some Methodological Principles and Some Tentative Assumptions for the Work of the Anti-Semitism Project" (15.3.1943), Typoskript, 3 Blatt; "Project on Anti-Semitism. Excerpt from a letter of D.R. (American Jewish Committee), dated 3/31/43" (31.03.1943), Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 2 Blatt; Institute of Social Research: "Research Project on Anti-Semitism. General Statement of Scope of Project, Fields to be investigated, First Assignements etc. Supplement: Los Angeles Group" (26.4.1943), a) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 13 Blatt, b) Typoskript, 13 Blatt, c) Typoskript, 8 Blatt; Heinz Langerhans: "Methods to Evaluate the Attitude of Different Sections of the German Population toward Institutionalized Antisemitism" (6.5.1943), Typoskript mit eigenhändiger Korrektur, 5 Blatt; "Discussion with Messrs. George Mintzer and Newman Levy on present day U.S.A. Antisemitism" (5.3.1943), a) Typoskript, 4 Blatt b) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 4 Blatt; Re.: Antisemitism Project. Statement of Expense 15.03.1943 - 15.06.1943, Preliminary Budget 15.06.1943 - 15.03.1944, Aufstellungen für das American Jewish Committee, 15.06.1943, 4 Blatt; Paul Massing: "Some Notes to Fineberg's 'Overcoming Antisemitism'" (16.06.1943), Typoskript, 4 Blatt; "Luncheon with Mr. Hexter. Present: Dr. Pollock, Weil, Gurland, Massing and Mr. Hexter. Purpose: Discussion of S.A. Fineberg's book 'Overcoming Antisemitism'" (17.06.1943), Typoskript, 2 Blatt; "Luncheon with Mr. R.C. Rothschild in the Yale Club", Über Antisemitismus in den USA, 28.6.1943, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt; Friedrich Pollock: Memoranden über Besprechungen mit R.C. Rothschild, betreffs Anti-Semitism-Project (September 1943): 1. "Remarks of Mr. Rothschild concerning our Psychological Study in a meeting between him, P. and L." (21.9.1943); 2. "Memorandum on work's progress of Anti-Semitism-Project" (15.09.1943), Typoskript, 1 Blatt; 3. "Meeting R.C. Rothschild and Pollock", (15.09.1943), Typoskript, 2 Blatt; 4. "Memorandum No. 1" (14.09.1943), Typoskript, 1 Blatt; "Memorandum re: Antisemitism Project" (29.10.1943), Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 2 Blatt;

Comrades or Culprits? Donor Engagement and Budget Transparency in Aid Dependent Countries

Budget transparency has come to be considered a key aspect of governance. Over the past decade, donors have invested increasing resources in strengthening processes through which budget transparency in developing countries can be enhanced. According to the 2008 Open Budget Index (OBI) Report, however, aid dependency and budget transparency appear to be inversely correlated. This article looks at the role of donor agencies in promoting or preventing budget transparency in aid dependent countries. It analyzes data for a sample of 16 aid-dependent countries included in the OBI, to test some preliminary hypotheses and select six countries for which more detailed findings are then presented. All of these countries have implemented reforms aimed at enhancing budget transparency, with substantial donor support. These, however, often had only limited success, partly because they were not well adapted to the local context, and partly because donors put limited emphasis on improving public access to budget information. Donor efforts were also often offset by other characteristics of donor interventions, namely their fragmentation, lack of transparency, and limited use of program aid modalities such as budget support and pooled sector funding.

Preliminary Observations on Program Instability

This white paper reports emerging findings at the end of Phase I of the Lean Aircraft Initiative in the Policy focus group area. Specifically, it provides details about research on program instability. Its objective is to discuss high-level findings detailing: 1) the relative contribution of different factors to a program’s overall instability; 2) the cost impact of program instability on acquisition programs; and 3) some strategies recommended by program managers for overcoming and/or mitigating the negative effects of program instability on their programs. Because this report comes as this research is underway, this is not meant to be a definitive document on the subject. Rather, is it anticipated that this research may potentially produce a number of reports on program instability-related topics. The government managers of military acquisition programs rated annual budget or production rate changes, changes in requirements, and technical difficulties as the three top contributors, respectively, to program instability. When asked to partition actual variance in their program’s planned cost and schedule to each of these factors, it was found that the combined effects of unplanned budget and requirement changes accounted for 5.2% annual cost growth and 20% total program schedule slip. At a rate of approximately 5% annual cost growth from these factors, it is easy to see that even conservative estimates of the cost benefits to be gained from acquisition reforms and process improvements can quickly be eclipsed by the added cost associated with program instability. Program management practices involving the integration of stakeholders from throughout the value chain into the decision making process were rated the most effective at avoiding program instability. The use of advanced information technologies was rated the most effective at mitigating the negative impact of program instability.

Preliminary Observations on Program Instability

This white paper reports emerging findings at the end of Phase I of the Lean Aircraft Initiative in the Policy focus group area. Specifically, it provides details about research on program instability. Its objective is to discuss high-level findings detailing: 1) the relative contribution of different factors to a program’s overall instability; 2) the cost impact of program instability on acquisition programs; and 3) some strategies recommended by program managers for overcoming and/or mitigating the negative effects of program instability on their programs. Because this report comes as this research is underway, this is not meant to be a definitive document on the subject. Rather, is it anticipated that this research may potentially produce a number of reports on program instability-related topics. The government managers of military acquisition programs rated annual budget or production rate changes, changes in requirements, and technical difficulties as the three top contributors, respectively, to program instability. When asked to partition actual variance in their program’s planned cost and schedule to each of these factors, it was found that the combined effects of unplanned budget and requirement changes accounted for 5.2% annual cost growth and 20% total program schedule slip. At a rate of approximately 5% annual cost growth from these factors, it is easy to see that even conservative estimates of the cost benefits to be gained from acquisition reforms and process improvements can quickly be eclipsed by the added cost associated with program instability. Program management practices involving the integration of stakeholders from throughout the value chain into the decision making process were rated the most effective at avoiding program instability. The use of advanced information technologies was rated the most effective at mitigating the negative impact of program instability.

The climate sensitivity and its components diagnosed from Earth Radiation Budget data

One of the major uncertainties in the ability to predict future climate change, and hence its impacts, is the lack of knowledge of the earth's climate sensitivity. Here, data are combined from the 1985-96 Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE) with surface temperature change information and estimates of radiative forcing to diagnose the climate sensitivity. Importantly, the estimate is completely independent of climate model results. A climate feedback parameter of 2.3 +/- 1.4 W m(-2) K-1 is found. This corresponds to a 1.0-4.1-K range for the equilibrium warming due to a doubling of carbon dioxide (assuming Gaussian errors in observable parameters, which is approximately equivalent to a uniform "prior" in feedback parameter). The uncertainty range is due to a combination of the short time period for the analysis as well as uncertainties in the surface temperature time series and radiative forcing time series, mostly the former. Radiative forcings may not all be fully accounted for; however, all argument is presented that the estimate of climate sensitivity is still likely to be representative of longer-term climate change. The methodology can be used to 1) retrieve shortwave and longwave components of climate feedback and 2) suggest clear-sky and cloud feedback terms. There is preliminary evidence of a neutral or even negative longwave feedback in the observations, suggesting that current climate models may not be representing some processes correctly if they give a net positive longwave feedback.