Optimal Monetary Policy with Asymmetric Preferences for Output

Using a model of an optimizing monetary authority which has preferences that weigh inflation and unemployment, Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) finds empirical evidence that the authority has asymmetric preferences for unemployment. We extend this model to weigh inflation and output and show that the empirical evidence using these series also supports an asymmetric preference hypothesis, only in our case, preferences are asymmetric for output. We also find evidence that the monetary authority targets potential output rather than some higher output level as would be the case in an extended Barro and Gordon (1983) model.

Optimal monetary policy under administered prices

This work aims to analyze the interaction and the effects of administered prices in the economy, through a DSGE model and the derivation of optimal monetary policies. The model used is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy with two sectors companies. In the first sector, free prices, there is a continuum of firms, and in the second sector of administered prices, there is a single firm. In addition, the model has positive trend inflation in the steady state. The model results suggest that price movements in any sector will impact on both sectors, for two reasons. Firstly, the price dispersion causes productivity to be lower. As the dispersion of prices is a change in the relative price of any sector, relative to general prices in the economy, when a movement in the price of a sector is not followed by another, their relative weights will change, leading to an impact on productivity in both sectors. Second, the path followed by the administered price sector is considered in future inflation expectations, which is used by companies in the free sector to adjust its optimal price. When this path leads to an expectation of higher inflation, the free sector companies will choose a higher mark-up to accommodate this expectation, thus leading to higher inflation trend when there is imperfect competition in the free sector. Finally, the analysis of optimal policies proved inconclusive, certainly indicating that there is influence of the adjustment model of administered prices in the definition of optimal monetary policy, but a quantitative study is needed to define the degree of impact.

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.

Robustness and stabilization properties of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Based on three versions of a small macroeconomic model for Brazil, this paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of parameter uncertainty on monetary policy rules and on the robustness of optimal and simple rules over different model specifications. By comparing the optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty with the rule calculated under purely additive uncertainty, we find that parameter uncertainty should make policymakers react less aggressively to the economy's state variables, as suggested by Brainard's "conservatism principIe", although this effect seems to be relatively small. We then informally investigate each rule's robustness by analyzing the performance of policy rules derived from each model under each one of the alternative models. We find that optimal rules derived from each model perform very poorly under alternative models, whereas a simple Taylor rule is relatively robusto We also fmd that even within a specific model, the Taylor rule may perform better than the optimal rule under particularly unfavorable realizations from the policymaker' s loss distribution function.

Credit spreads and monetary policy in a small open economy: an analysis of the colombian economy

This paper estimates Bejarano and Charry (2014)’s small open economy with financial frictions model for the Colombian economy using Bayesian estimation techniques. Additionally, I compute the welfare gains of implementing an optimal response to credit spreads into an augmented Taylor rule. The main result is that a reaction to credit spreads does not imply significant welfare gains unless the economic disturbances increases its volatility, like the disruption implied by a financial crisis. Otherwise its impact over the macroeconomic variables is null.

Time Variation in an Optimal Asymmetric Preference Monetary Policy Model

This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be motivated through several means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary authority.We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter improves the model fit and it helps to provide an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across subsamples.

Optimal rules for monetary policy in Brazil

This paper presents optimal rules for monetary policy in Brazil derived from a backward looking expectation model consisting of a Keynesian IS function and an Augmented Phillips Curve (ISAS). The IS function displays'a high sensitivity of aggregate demand to the real interest rate and the Phillips Curve is accelerationist. The optimal monetary rules show low interest rate volatility with reaction coefficients lower than the ones suggested by Taylor (1993a,b). Reaction functions estimated through ADL and SUR models suggest that monetary policy has not been optimal and has aimed to product rather than inflation stabilization.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Monetary policy rules and estimated reaction functions for the European Central Bank

This thesis studies the interest-rate policy of the ECB by estimating monetary policy rules using real-time data and central bank forecasts. The aim of the estimations is to try to characterize a decade of common monetary policy and to look at how different models perform at this task.The estimated rules include: contemporary Taylor rules, forward-looking Taylor rules, nonlinearrules and forecast-based rules. The nonlinear models allow for the possibility of zone-like preferences and an asymmetric response to key variables. The models therefore encompass the most popular sub-group of simple models used for policy analysis as well as the more unusual non-linear approach. In addition to the empirical work, this thesis also contains a more general discussion of monetary policy rules mostly from a New Keynesian perspective. This discussion includes an overview of some notable related studies, optimal policy, policy gradualism and several other related subjects. The regression estimations are performed with either least squares or the generalized method of moments depending on the requirements of the estimations. The estimations use data from both the Euro Area Real-Time Database and the central bank forecasts published in ECB Monthly Bulletins. These data sources represent some of the best data that is available for this kind of analysis. The main results of this thesis are that forward-looking behavior appears highly prevalent, but that standard forward-looking Taylor rules offer only ambivalent results with regard to inflation. Nonlinear models are shown to work, but on the other hand do not have a strong rationale over a simpler linear formulation. However, the forecasts appear to be highly useful in characterizing policy and may offer the most accurate depiction of a predominantly forward-looking central bank. In particular the inflation response appears much stronger while the output response becomes highly forward-looking as well.

Monetary Policy When Wages Are Downwardly Rigid: Friedman Meets Tobin

In a monetary economy with downwardly rigid wages, the central banker should target a low, but strictly positive, inflation rate.

Flexible rules cum constrained discretion: a new consensus in monetary policy

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under 'normal' circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated discretion in 'exceptional' circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The opposition of 'rules versus discretion' has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of 'rules cum discretion', in essence as inflation-forecast targeting. But such synthesis is not without major theoretical problems, as we argue in this contribution. Furthermore, the very recent real-world events have made it obvious that the inflation targeting strategy of monetary policy, which rests upon the new consensus paradigm in modern macroeconomics is at best a 'fair weather' model. In the turbulent economic climate of highly unstable inflation, deep financial crisis and world-wide, abrupt economic slowdown nowadays this approach needs serious rethinking to say the least, if not abandoning it altogether

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.