Tracking a non-cooperative target using a Doppler radar wireless sensor network

Tracking or target localization is used in a wide range of important tasks from knowing when your flight will arrive to ensuring your mail is received on time. Tracking provides the location of resources enabling solutions to complex logistical problems. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) create new opportunities when applied to tracking, such as more flexible deployment and real-time information. When radar is used as the sensing element in a tracking WSN better results can be obtained; because radar has a comparatively larger range both in distance and angle to other sensors commonly used in WSNs. This allows for less nodes deployed covering larger areas, saving money. In this report I implement a tracking WSN platform similar to what was developed by Lim, Wang, and Terzis. This consists of several sensor nodes each with a radar, a sink node connected to a host PC, and a Matlab© program to fuse sensor data. I have re-implemented their experiment with my WSN platform for tracking a non-cooperative target to verify their results and also run simulations to compare. The results of these tests are discussed and some future improvements are proposed.

The binding of synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs to human transthyretin: Molecular basis of cooperative and non-cooperative ligand recognition

Transthyretin (TTR) is a tetrameric beta-sheet-rich transporter protein directly involved in human amyloid diseases. Several classes of small molecules can bind to TTR delaying its amyloid fibril formation, thus being promising drug candidates to treat TTR amyloidoses. In the present study, we characterized the interactions of the synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs and thyroid hormone nuclear receptor TR beta-selecfive agonists GC-1 and GC-24 with the wild type and V30M variant of human transthyretin (TTR). To achieve this aim, we conducted in vitro TTR acid-mediated aggregation and isothermal titration calorimetry experiments and determined the TTR:GC-1 and TTR:GC-24 crystal structures. Our data indicate that both GC-1 and GC-24 bind to TTR in a non-cooperative manner and are good inhibitors of TTR aggregation, with dissociation constants for both hormone binding sites (HBS) in the low micromolar range. Analysis of the crystal structures of TTRwt:GC-1(24) complexes and their comparison with the TTRwt X-ray structure bound to its natural ligand thyroxine (T4) suggests, at the molecular level, the basis for the cooperative process displayed by T4 and the non-cooperative process provoked by both GC-1 and GC-24 during binding to TTR. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

Superstars need social benefits: an experiment on network formation

We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior is a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium.

NG2 glia are required for vessel network formation during embryonic development.

The NG2(+) glia, also known as polydendrocytes or oligodendrocyte precursor cells, represent a new entity among glial cell populations in the central nervous system. However, the complete repertoire of their roles is not yet identified. The embryonic NG2(+) glia originate from the Nkx2.1(+) progenitors of the ventral telencephalon. Our analysis unravels that, beginning from E12.5 until E16.5, the NG2(+) glia populate the entire dorsal telencephalon. Interestingly, their appearance temporally coincides with the establishment of blood vessel network in the embryonic brain. NG2(+) glia are closely apposed to developing cerebral vessels by being either positioned at the sprouting tip cells or tethered along the vessel walls. Absence of NG2(+) glia drastically affects the vascular development leading to severe reduction of ramifications and connections by E18.5. By revealing a novel and fundamental role for NG2(+) glia, our study brings new perspectives to mechanisms underlying proper vessels network formation in embryonic brains.

A game-theoretic network formation model

We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and Kearns (2007), we consider a more realistic model in which the cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put transfer payments on the formation of links. Also, they must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. Unlike earlier model, not only the existence of equilibrium networks is guaranteed in our model, but also these networks coincide with the outcomes of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that generates small-world networks. We also analyze the impact of locating players in a hierarchical structure by constructing a strategic model, where a complete b-ary tree is the seed network.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

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Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

A model of competition and interbank network formation

This work aims to understand the interaction between competition and network formation in the banking market. Combining Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Matutes and Vives (2000), we build a model of imperfect bank competition for deposits in which an interbank relationship network is a key strategic decision: it affects banks’ profit and risk position. The competition level exerts influence in the banking network structure since it affects the network outcomes. As result, we have that different competition levels imply different network topologies. Specifically, greater competition imply denser networks. Finally, when we allow for the possibility of collusion, the denser network can come out in the least competitive environment.

Intussusceptive angiogenesis: its role in embryonic vascular network formation

Intussusceptive angiogenesis is a novel mode of blood vessel formation and remodeling, which occurs by internal division of the preexisting capillary plexus without sprouting. In this study, the process is demonstrated in developing chicken eye vasculature and in the chorioallantoic membrane by methylmethacrylate (Mercox) casting, transmission electron microscopy, and in vivo observation. In a first step of intussusceptive angiogenesis, the capillary plexus expands by insertion of numerous transcapillary tissue pillars, ie, by intussusceptive microvascular growth. In a subsequent step, a vascular tree arises from the primitive capillary plexus as a result of intussusceptive pillar formation and pillar fusions, a process we termed "intussusceptive arborization." On the basis of the morphological observations, a 4-step model for intussusceptive arborization is proposed, as follows: phase I, numerous circular pillars are formed in rows, thus demarcating future vessels; phase II, formation of narrow tissue septa by pillar reshaping and pillar fusions; phase III, delineation, segregation, growth, and extraction of the new vascular entity by merging of septa; and phase IV, formation of new branching generations by successively repeating the process, complemented by growth and maturation of all components. In contrast to sprouting, intussusceptive angiogenesis does not require intense local endothelial cell proliferation; it is implemented primarily by rearrangement and attenuation of the endothelial cell plates. In summary, transcapillary pillar formation, ie, intussusception, is a central and probably widespread process, which plays a role not only in capillary network growth and expansion (intussusceptive microvascular growth), but also in vascular plexus remodeling and tree formation (intussusceptive arborization).