Are Good or Bad Borrowers Discouraged From Applying for Loans?

This paper takes the concept of a discouraged borrower originally formulated by Kon and Storey [Kon, Y., Storey, D.J., 2003. A theory of discouraged borrowers. Small Business Economics 21, 37–49] and examines whether discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. Using US data it finds riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement, which increase with longer financial relationships, suggesting discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. It also finds low risk borrowers are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that, in concentrated markets, high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships. We conclude discouragement is more efficient in concentrated, than in competitive, markets.

Ensaios em gestão de risco e regulação bancária

Esta tese é constituída por três ensaios. O primeiro ensaio analisa a informação pública disponível sobre o risco das carteiras de crédito dos bancos brasileiros, sendo dividido em dois capítulos. O primeiro analisa a limitação da informação pública disponibilizada pelos bancos e pelo Banco Central, quando comparada a informação gerencial disponível internamente pelos bancos. Concluiu-se que existe espaço para o aumento da transparência na divulgação das informações, fato que vem ocorrendo gradativamente no Brasil através de novas normas relacionadas ao Pilar 3 de Basileia II e à divulgação de informações mais detalhas pelo Bacen, como, por exemplo, aquelas do “Top50” . A segunda parte do primeiro ensaio mostra a discrepância entre o índice de inadimplência contábil (NPL) e a probabilidade de inadimplência (PD) e também discute a relação entre provisão e perda esperada. Através da utilização de matrizes de migração e de uma simulação baseada na sobreposição de safras de carteira de crédito de grandes bancos, concluiu-se que o índice de inadimplência subestima a PD e que a provisão constituída pelos bancos é menor que a perda esperada do SFN. O segundo ensaio relaciona a gestão de risco à discriminação de preço. Foi desenvolvido um modelo que consiste em um duopólio de Cournot em um mercado de crédito de varejo, em que os bancos podem realizar discriminação de terceiro grau. Neste modelo, os potenciais tomadores de crédito podem ser de dois tipos, de baixo ou de alto risco, sendo que tomadores de baixo risco possuem demanda mais elástica. Segundo o modelo, se o custo para observar o tipo do cliente for alto, a estratégia dos bancos será não discriminar (pooling equilibrium). Mas, se este custo for suficientemente baixo, será ótimo para os bancos cobrarem taxas diferentes para cada grupo. É argumentado que o Acordo de Basileia II funcionou como um choque exógeno que deslocou o equilíbrio para uma situação com maior discriminação. O terceiro ensaio é divido em dois capítulos. O primeiro discute a aplicação dos conceitos de probabilidade subjetiva e incerteza Knigthiana a modelos de VaR e a importância da avaliação do “risco de modelo”, que compreende os riscos de estimação, especificação e identificação. O ensaio propõe que a metodologia dos “quatro elementos” de risco operacional (dados internos, externos, ambiente de negócios e cenários) seja estendida à mensuração de outros riscos (risco de mercado e risco de crédito). A segunda parte deste último ensaio trata da aplicação do elemento análise de cenários para a mensuração da volatilidade condicional nas datas de divulgação econômica relevante, especificamente nos dias de reuniões do Copom.

Managing time: integration of care and paid work amongst low income families and the role of the United Kingdom’s tax credit system

Under the New Labour Governments in the UK, successive reforms of the tax and benefit system sought to improve the financial benefits of paid work. Drawing on two waves of qualitative interviews with low-income working families this article examines the role of the UK tax credit system in shaping decisions about employment and unpaid care work. The article suggests that the financial support provided for lone parent participants by the tax credit system enhanced their temporal autonomy, permitting participation in paid work to align more closely with temporally situated notions of parental responsibility for caring. For couple families however, parental perceptions of responsibility for pre-school children, along with childcare constraints and the structure of the tax credit system served to constrain the autonomy of the main carer and implicitly encourage a gendered specialisation in caring or employment.

A Study of Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises with particular reference to Bank of Baroda in state of Kerala

While the quantum of advances from the public sector banks (PSBs) to the MSEs has increased over the years in absolute terms, from Rs.46, 045 crore in March 2000 to Rs.1, 85,208 crore in March 2009, the share of the 7credit to the MSE sector in the Net Bank Credit (NBC) has declined from 12.5 per cent to 10.9 per cent. Similarly, there has been a decline in the share of micro sector as a percentage of Net Bank Credit (NBC) from 7.8 per cent in March 2000 to 4.9% in March 2009. (TKA.Nair, 2010)9.The major reasons for low availability of bank finance to this sector are high risk perception of the banks in lending to MSEs and high transaction costs in processing of loan applications of MSEs. The problem is more serious for micro enterprises requiring small loans and the first generation entrepreneursThe thesis studies the divergence in guidelines by, CGTMSE, RBI & Bank of Baroda on collateral free lending and analyses the awareness of MSE about CGTMSE lending. The researcher tries to assess the problems faced by borrowers in availing advance under CGTMSE from Bank of Baroda, Kerala.

Production credit associations ... characteristics of loans and member borrowers.

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Homes in Arkansas : one million acres of choice river bottom and uplands for sale, on credit or for cash, at low rates, by the Little Rock and Fort Smith R.R. Co.

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Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2007 Qualified Allocation Plan, April 3, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2008 Qualified Allocation Plan, June 14, 2007

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 First Amended Qualified Allocation Plan, February 10, 2012

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 Second Amended Qualified Allocation Plan, October 14, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 10, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2010 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 9, 2009

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.