What once was old is new again: reviving an early-modern form of interdisciplinarity for socio-legal studies

Socio-legal studies are an essentially interdisciplinary enterprise. However, there is currently only one form of interdisciplinarity that most socio-legal scholars (and criminologists) recognise and work with. This form is derived from the idea that 'society itself' - and by this most scholars mean 'civil society' - drives the law. However, another, rival understanding of society, which we term the authoritarian-liberal statist understanding that slipped from view in the late seventeenth century and remained obscure from then until now, may be used to generate another form of interdisciplinarity for sOcio-legal studies (and for criminology). However, this rival understanding of society does not simply allow us to reconfigure our notion of 'society'; it radically changes the role society plays in relation to the law. Two crucial points emerge from this rival account: first, society can no longer be understood as separable from (even though interacting with) the law; and second, society can no longer be understood as driving the law.

Revisiting intersectionality for EU Anti-Discrimination Law in an economic crisis –a critical legal studies perspective

This article discusses the role of EU anti-discrimination law in challenging EU anti-crisis measures from a critical legal studies perspective. Critical legal scholarship is defined through its challenge of ‘lex’ through the vision of ‘ius’ and its critical links with social movements. EU anti-discrimination law attracts critique for constituting a compartmentalised socio-legal field, which prevents justice for those at intersections of inequalities. By defining as the aim of anti-discrimination law the combat of disadvantage resulting from ascribed otherness around the nodes sex/gender, race/ethnicity, and disability, the article suggests a convincing normative vision suitable to de-compartmentalise the field and adequately address intersectionality. This critical legal perspective on intersectionality differs from its sociological counterparts by omitting class as a category. The article demonstrates that this distinction is necessary for EU anti-discrimination law to maintain its critical edge.

Cambridge legal studies,

Mode of access: Internet.

Introduction: Exploring the Comparative in Socio-Legal Studies

Among the diverse approaches to comparison in socio-legal studies those that employ qualitative research, richness of detail, and attention to context are the focus of this special issue. The Introduction draws on comparative law and social science literature to argue that comparison amongst studies of laws in contexts can follow different trajectories: the comparison may start from an assumption of similarity—in form, purposes, or context—in order to identify significant differences; or it may identify significant similarity across social and cultural divides. What unites many of the projects of comparison undertaken by qualitative empirical researchers is that the points of relevant comparison are identified within the complexity of the empirical studies at hand; and they are allowed to emerge, or change, as the researcher comes to understand the facts and issues more deeply.

Foucault Goes to Law School : Using Foucault to Examine Australian Legal Education

This paper will consider the way that Foucault’s work has been utilised to examine Australian legal education, particularly in the context of understanding the construction of the legal identity. While remaining sensitive to the many potential ‘uses’ of Foucault’s tools, as well as his problematisation of the author as an organising feature of discourse, this paper will argue that legal education scholarship overwhelmingly utilises concepts such as ‘discourse’ and ‘power-knowledge’, which, while useful, cannot provide a nuanced understanding of the construction of the legal identity. Consequently, this paper suggests that future legal education research utilise Foucault’s concepts of ‘ethics’ and ‘governmentality’ to address these issues.

The impact of “empirical facts” on legal scholarship and legal research training

Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (‘empirical facts’). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how ‘empirical facts’ are used in Australian and other common law courts. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best applied to law.

Protecting the protectors : legal liabilities from the use of Web 2.0 for Australian disaster response

The traditional model for information dissemination in disaster response is unidirectional from official channels to the public. However recent crises in the US, such as Hurricane Katrina and the Californian Bushfires show that civilians are now turning to Web 2.0 technologies as a means of sharing disaster related information. These technologies present enormous potential benefits to disaster response authorities that cannot be overlooked. In Australia, the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission has recently recommended that Australian disaster response authorities utilize information technologies to improve the dissemination of disaster related, bushfire information. However, whilst the use of these technologies has many positive attributes, potential legal liabilities for disaster response authorities arise. This paper identifies some potential legal liabilities arising from the use of Web 2.0 technologies in disaster response situations thereby enhancing crisis related information sharing by highlighting legal concerns that need to be addressed.

Book review : "Community engagement in contemporary legal education : Pro Bono, Clinical legal education and services learning"

The result of a forum on community engagement held in November 2008 at Bond University, Community Engagement in Contemporary Legal Education is a compilation of papers presented at the forum by academics and professionals throughout Australia. Although found initially to be a topic of legal interest, it was not until the reviewer came across the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD) “Standards for Australian Law Schools” (adopted 17 November 20093) then the full importance and potential of this book was revealed. Clause 2.2.4 of the CALD Standards recognises the importance of “experiential learning opportunities” for law students and cites examples such as clinical programs, internships, practical experience and pro-bono work. Clause 2.3.3 acknowledges the need to develop professional ethics and again cites pro-bono obligations as an example. Clause 9.6.2 encourages interaction of law schools with the profession and the community and again, pro-bono community service is identified as one method of doing so. Yet nowhere in the document are there any uniform standards or binding obligations that law schools must commit to. In the current climate where the importance of practical experience is continually emphasised and student numbers exceed the number of available paid legal positions, there should be more focus on the details of how these commitments should be converted to be included in a law school’s curriculum.

The legal framework of the Australian health system

This chapter is about the role of law in the creation and operation of Australian health systems. Accordingly, this chapter discusses how law regulates the way in which health services in Australia are funded, organised, regulated, managed, operated and governed. (The question of how health professionals are regulated is discussed in Chapter 15.) Although the focus of much of health law is on legal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes or disagreements between the state, health providers, professionals, patients and families and friends, and through dispute resolutions processes setting standards for practice, these are only some of the “jobs” that health law performs. In health systems where the state undertakes a significant role in regulating, funding, managing and providing health services, health law also performs an important constitutive function. Health law declares the values upon which the health system is based, shapes social processes to achieve public ends and provides a structure for the complex interactions that occur within a modern health system. Health law regulates decision-makers in health systems by establishing who has the power to participate in decisions and in what circumstances, establishing processes through which decisions are made and creating mechanisms for decision-makers to be held publicly accountable. It is this broader constitutive function of health law that is a primary focus of much of this chapter — how and why governments use their legislative powers to structure and shape the health system.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice