Does the Common Agricultural Policy Reduce Farm Labour Migration? Panel data analysis across EU regions. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 28, July 2012

This paper deals with the determinants of labour out-migration from agriculture across 149 EU regions over the 1990–2008 period. The central aim is to shed light on the role played by payments from the common agricultural policy (CAP) on this important adjustment process. Using static and dynamic panel data estimators, we show that standard neoclassical drivers, like relative income and the relative labour share, represent significant determinants of the intersectoral migration of agricultural labour. Overall, CAP payments contributed significantly to job creation in agriculture, although the magnitude of the economic effect was rather moderate. We also find that pillar I subsidies exerted an effect approximately two times greater than that of pillar II payments.

Entrepreneurial risk and labour's share in output

This paper presents a theoretical model which discusses the role played by the entrepreneurial risk on the distribution of the national income. In a two-period general equilibrium framework with competitive risk-averse entrepreneurs it is shown that the highest the risk borne by firms, the lower will be real wages, employment and the labour's share in output. The model helps explain the fall of the labour's share in the Brazilian output during the 1980s.

Doing marriage and parenthood: The division of household labour across two life course events

The current study is a longitudinal investigation into changes in the division of household labour across transitions to marriage and parenthood in the UK. Previous research has noted a more traditional division of household labour, with women performing the majority of housework, amongst spouses and couples with children. However, the bulk of this work has been cross-sectional in nature. The few longitudinal studies that have been carried out have been rather ambiguous about the effect of marriage and parenthood on the division of housework. Theoretically, this study draws on gender construction theory. The key premise of this theory is that gender is something that is performed and created in interaction, and, as a result, something fluid and flexible rather than fixed and stable. The idea that couples ‘do gender’ through housework has been a major theoretical breakthrough. Gender-neutral explanations of the division of household labour, positing rational acting individuals, have failed to explicate why women continue to perform an unequal share of housework, regardless of socio-economic status. Contrastingly, gender construction theory situates gender as the key process in dividing household labour. By performing and avoiding certain housework chores, couples fulfill social norms of what it means to be a man and a woman although, given the emphasis on human agency in producing and contesting gender, couples are able to negotiate alternative gender roles which, in turn, feed back into the structure of social norms in an ever-changing societal landscape. This study adds extra depth to the doing gender approach by testing whether or not couples negotiate specific conjugal and parent roles in terms of the division of household labour. Both transitions hypothesise a more traditional division of household labour. Data comes from the British Household Panel Survey, a large, nationally representative quantitative survey that has been carried out annually since 1991. Here, data tracks the same 776 couples at two separate time points – 1996 and 2005. OLS regression is used to test whether or not transitions to marriage and parenthood have a significant impact on the division of household labour whilst controlling for host of relevant socio-economic factors. Results indicate that marriage has no significant effect on how couples partition housework. Those couples making the transition from cohabitation to marriage do not show significant changes in housework arrangements from those couples who remain cohabiting in both waves. On the other hand, becoming parents does lead to a more traditional division of household labour whilst controlling for socio-economic factors which accompany the move to parenthood. There is then some evidence that couples use the site of household labour to ‘do parenthood’ and generate identities which both use and inform socially prescribed notions of what it means to be a mother and a father. Support for socio-economic explanations of the division of household labour was mixed although it remains clear that they, alone, cannot explain how households divide housework.

Doing marriage and parenthood: The division of household labour across two life course events

The current study is a longitudinal investigation into changes in the division of household labour across transitions to marriage and parenthood in the UK. Previous research has noted a more traditional division of household labour, with women performing the majority of housework, amongst spouses and couples with children. However, the bulk of this work has been cross-sectional in nature. The few longitudinal studies that have been carried out have been rather ambiguous about the effect of marriage and parenthood on the division of housework. Theoretically, this study draws on gender construction theory. The key premise of this theory is that gender is something that is performed and created in interaction, and, as a result, something fluid and flexible rather than fixed and stable. The idea that couples 'do gender' through housework has been a major theoretical breakthrough. Gender-neutral explanations of the division of household labour, positing rational acting individuals, have failed to explicate why women continue to perform an unequal share of housework, regardless of socioeconomic status. Contrastingly, gender construction theory situates gender as the key process in dividing household labour. By performing and avoiding certain housework chores, couples fulfill social norms of what it means to be a man and a woman although, given the emphasis on human agency in producing and contesting gender, couples are able to negotiate alternative gender roles which, in turn, feed back into the structure of social norms in an ever-changing societal landscape. This study adds extra depth to the doing gender approach by testing whether or not couples negotiate specific conjugal and parent roles in terms of the division of household labour. Both transitions hypothesise a more traditional division of household labour. Data comes from the British Household Panel Survey, a large, nationally representative quantitative survey that has been carried out annually since 1991. Here, data tracks the same 776 couples at two separate time points - 1996 and 2005. OLS regression is used to test whether or not transitions to marriage and parenthood have a significant impact on the division of household labour whilst controlling for host of relevant socio-economic factors. Results indicate that marriage has no significant effect on how couples partition housework. Those couples making the transition from cohabitation to marriage do not show significant changes in housework arrangements from those couples who remain cohabiting in both waves. On the other hand, becoming parents does lead to a more traditional division of household labour whilst controlling for socio-economic factors which accompany the move to parenthood. There is then some evidence that couples use the site of household labour to 'do parenthood' and generate identities which both use and inform socially prescribed notions of what it means to be a mother and a father. Support for socio-economic explanations of the division of household labour was mixed although it remains clear that they, alone, cannot explain how households divide housework.

When did Britain industrialise? The sectoral distribution of the labour force and labour productivity in Britain, 1381-1851

Britain's labour force industrialised early. The industrial and service sectors already accounted for 40% of the labour force in 1381, and a substantial further shift of labour out of agriculture occurred between 1522 and 1700. From the early seventeenth century rising agricultural labour productivity underpinned steadily increasing employment in industry and services, so that by 1759 agriculture's share of the labour force had shrunk to 37% and industry's grown to 34%. Thereafter, industry's output acceleration during the Industrial Revolution owed more to gains in labour productivity consequent upon mechanisation than the expansion of employment.

Income ineqaulity from 1960-2012: a brief time-series history of capital and labour

This commentary examines two principal forms of inequality and their evolution since the 1960s: the division of national income between capital and labour, and the share of total income held by the top 1 per cent of earners. Trends are linked to current discussions of inequality drivers such as financialisation, and a brief time-series analysis of the effects of trade and financial sector growth on top incomes is presented.

The allometry of non-employment. What can compositional data analysis tell us about labour market performance across the UK's regions?

The low levels of unemployment recorded in the UK in recent years are widely cited as evidence of the country’s improved economic performance, and the apparent convergence of unemployment rates across the country’s regions used to suggest that the longstanding divide in living standards between the relatively prosperous ‘south’ and the more depressed ‘north’ has been substantially narrowed. Dissenters from these conclusions have drawn attention to the greatly increased extent of non-employment (around a quarter of the UK’s working age population are not in employment) and the marked regional dimension in its distribution across the country. Amongst these dissenters it is generally agreed that non-employment is concentrated amongst older males previously employed in the now very much smaller ‘heavy’ industries (e.g. coal, steel, shipbuilding). This paper uses the tools of compositiona l data analysis to provide a much richer picture of non-employment and one which challenges the conventional analysis wisdom about UK labour market performance as well as the dissenters view of the nature of the problem. It is shown that, associated with the striking ‘north/south’ divide in nonemployment rates, there is a statistically significant relationship between the size of the non-employment rate and the composition of non-employment. Specifically, it is shown that the share of unemployment in non-employment is negatively correlated with the overall non-employment rate: in regions where the non-employment rate is high the share of unemployment is relatively low. So the unemployment rate is not a very reliable indicator of regional disparities in labour market performance. Even more importantly from a policy viewpoint, a significant positive relationship is found between the size of the non-employment rate and the share of those not employed through reason of sickness or disability and it seems (contrary to the dissenters) that this connection is just as strong for women as it is for men

Suck the living labour

The project, commissioned by Ort, Birmingham, explores geriatric vampirism. Austerity measures have indebted the young and the old through the privatisation of education and health. These age groups have been thrown into a relationship of mutual dependency and conflicting interests. As well as a new film, the exhibition featured six videos that have been outsourced using the services of sellers on the website Fiverr, ‘a place for people to share things they're willing to do for $5’. Interrogating the means of production and the meaning of work under post-Fordism, the Suck the Living Labour extends Marx’s metaphor, comparing Capital to a vampiric force that thirsts for infinite surplus.

Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about

This paper examines the current global scene of distributional disparities within-nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world’s population now live in regions whose median country has a Gini not far from 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the ‘upwards’ side of the ‘Inverted-U’ between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the statistical support there was for the hypothesis that posits that, for whatever reason, ‘things have to get worse before they can get better’). Third, among middle-income countries Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is ‘centrifugal’, and leads to an increased diversity in the shares appropriated by the top 10 and bottom 40 per cent. The other is ‘centripetal’, and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world’s population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes; the other half, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, Globalisation is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich — because the rest ‘follows’ (middle classes able to defend their shares, and workers with ever more precarious jobs in ever more ‘flexible’ labour markets). Therefore, anybody attempting to understand the within-nations disparity of inequality should always be reminded of this basic distributional fact following the example of Clinton’s campaign strategist: by sticking a note on their notice-boards saying “It’s the share of the rich, stupid”.

Innovating, gaining market share and fostering social inclusion: success stories in SME development

Includes bibliography

Reflections on the use of labour market indicators in designing policies with a gender-based approach

Includes bibliography

A poverty profile and functional aspects of Brazilian labour markets

Includes bibliography

The employment situation in Latin America and the Caribbean: Labour productivity and distribution issues

Although the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean grew more slowly in 2011 than in 2010, there were some improvements on the employment front. Workers benefited from the region’s satisfactory economic performance in an increasingly complex international setting. The unemployment rate fell from 7.3% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2011 thanks to a halfpercentage- point gain in the urban employment rate. Both rates are at levels that have not been seen for a long time. The proportion of formal jobs with social benefits rose as well, and underemployment declined. The average wage and the minimum wage both increased in real terms, albeit only moderately. Economic performance and the employment situation varied widely among the subregions. The unemployment rate dropped by 0.6 percentage points in South America but 0.4 percentage points in the countries of the northern part of Latin America. In the countries of the Caribbean, the employment rate was up by 0.2 percentage points. The data show that substantial labour market gaps and serious labour-market insertion issues remain. This is especially the case for women and young people, for whom unemployment rates and other labour indicators are still unfavourable. The second part of this report looks at whether the fruits of economic growth and rising productivity have been distributed equitably between workers and companies. Between 2002 and 2008 (the most recent expansionary economic cycle), wages as a percentage of GDP fell in 13 of the 21 countries of the region for which data are available and rose in just 8. This points to redistribution that is unfavourable to workers, which is worrying in a region which already has the most unequal distribution of income in the world. Underlying this trend is the fact that, worldwide, wages have grown less than productivity. Beyond the ethical dimension of this issue, it jeopardizes the social and economic sustainability of growth. For example, one of the root causes of the recent financial crisis was that households in the United States responded to declining wage income by borrowing more to pay for consumption and housing. This turned out to be unsustainable in the long run. Over time, it undermines the labour market’s contribution to the efficient allocation of resources and its distributive function, too, with negative consequences for democratic governance. Among the triggers of this distributive worsening most often cited in the global debate are market deregulation and its impact on financial globalization, technological change that favours capital over labour, and the weakening of labour institutions. What is needed here is a public policy effort to help keep wage increases from lagging behind increases in productivity. Some countries of the region, especially in South America, saw promising developments during the second half of the 2000s in the form of a positive trend reversal in wages as a percentage of GDP. One example is Brazil, where a minimum wage policy tailored to the dynamics of the domestic market is considered to be one of the factors behind an upturn in the wage share of GDP. The region needs to grow more and better. Productivity must grow at a steady pace, to serve as the basis for sustained improvements in the well-being of the populace and to narrow the gap between the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean and the more advanced economies. And inequality must be decreased; this could be achieved by closing the productivity gap between upgraded companies and the many firms whose productivity is low. As set out in this report, the region made some progress between 2002 and 2010, with labour productivity rising at the rate of 1.5% a year. But this progress falls short of that seen in other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (2.1%) and, above all, East Asia (8.3%, not counting Japan and the Republic of Korea). Moreover, in many of the countries of the region these gains have not been distributed equitably. Therein lies a dual challenge that must be addressed: continue to increase productivity while enhancing the mechanisms for distributing gains in a way that will encourage investment and boost worker and household income. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimate that the pace of economic growth in the region will be slightly slower in 2012 than in 2011, in a global economic scenario marked by the cooling of several of the main economic engines and a high degree of uncertainty concerning, above all, prospects for the euro zone. The region is expected to continue to hold up well to this worsening scenario, thanks to policies that leveraged more favourable conditions in the past. This will be felt in the labour markets, as well, so expectations are that unemployment will edge down by as much as two tenths of a decimal point.

Rural Labour Market Developments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 5, September 2011

The significant changes in the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of human resources in rural Macedonia can be explained by the continued trend of emigration from villages to urban areas and abroad. The intensity of emigration has altered the demographic structure and reproductive base of the rural population, along with the income of rural households. The rural and agricultural labour market faces a mismatch with respect to the unfavourable age, education and spatial distribution of the total labour force. A reduction in the participation of women in the agricultural labour force is a new feature. The overall transformation is apparent in the income structure of rural households. An increase in the share of households with mixed income sources notably stems from households that receive remittances and foreign currency funds from family members abroad. The demographic revitalisation of rural areas depends on economic revitalisation, with a more rational use of the labour force and human resources, as well as a restructuring of agricultural production and agricultural holdings. In addition, improvements are necessary in the functioning of market institutions to better meet the needs of smaller farmers and the rural economy.