Globalization and risk sharing

We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, weassume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assumethat countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying theirdebts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i)Increases in domestic trade raise the bene.ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade.In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of defaultpenalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade .i.e. globalization.raise the costs of enforcement andhamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lowerwelfare. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods andexplore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.

International consumption risk sharing

This paper formally examines the implications of international consumptionrisk sharing for a panel of industrialized countries. We theoretically derivethe international consumption insurance proposition in a simple setup and showhow it should be modified in more complicated models. We empirically analyzethe implications of the theory for pairs of countries across frequencies of thespectrum and find that aggregate domestic consumption is almost completelyinsured against idiosyncratic real, demographic, fiscal and monetary shocksover short cycles, but that it covaries with these variables over medium andlong cycles. The cross equation restrictions imposed by the theory are, ingeneral, rejected. The policy implications of the results are discussed.

Risk sharing with the monarch: Excusable defaults and contingent debt in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless,there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine thefirst known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip IIof Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended onverifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowedfor effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The data also stronglysuggest that the defaults that occurred were excusable they were simply contingenciesover which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.

On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D

Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.

The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry

The Janssen-Cilag proposal for a risk-sharing agreement regarding bortezomib received a welcome signal from NICE. The Office of Fair Trading report included risk-sharing agreements as an available tool for the National Health Service. Nonetheless, recent discussions have somewhat neglected the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements. We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although attractive due to the principle of paying by results, also entail risks. Too many patients may be put under treatment even with a low success probability. Prices are likely to be adjusted upward, in anticipation of future risk-sharing agreements between the pharmaceutical company and the third-party payer. An available instrument is a verification cost per patient treated, which allows obtaining the first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment, under the risk sharing agreement. Overall, the welfare effects of risk-sharing agreements are ambiguous, and care must be taken with their use.

Applicability of Two International Risk Scores in Cardiac Surgery in a Reference Center in Brazil

Background:The applicability of international risk scores in heart surgery (HS) is not well defined in centers outside of North America and Europe.Objective:To evaluate the capacity of the Parsonnet Bernstein 2000 (BP) and EuroSCORE (ES) in predicting in-hospital mortality (IHM) in patients undergoing HS at a reference hospital in Brazil and to identify risk predictors (RP).Methods:Retrospective cohort study of 1,065 patients, with 60.3% patients underwent coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG), 32.7%, valve surgery and 7.0%, CABG combined with valve surgery. Additive and logistic scores models, the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve (AUC) and the standardized mortality ratio (SMR) were calculated. Multivariate logistic regression was performed to identify the RP.Results:Overall mortality was 7.8%. The baseline characteristics of the patients were significantly different in relation to BP and ES. AUCs of the logistic and additive BP were 0.72 (95% CI, from 0.66 to 0.78 p = 0.74), and of ES they were 0.73 (95% CI; 0.67 to 0.79 p = 0.80). The calculation of the SMR in BP was 1.59 (95% CI; 1.27 to 1.99) and in ES, 1.43 (95% CI; 1.14 to 1.79). Seven RP of IHM were identified: age, serum creatinine > 2.26 mg/dL, active endocarditis, systolic pulmonary arterial pressure > 60 mmHg, one or more previous HS, CABG combined with valve surgery and diabetes mellitus.Conclusion:Local scores, based on the real situation of local populations, must be developed for better assessment of risk in cardiac surgery.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Complete Markets Strikes Back: Revisiting Risk Sharing Tests under Discount Rate Heterogeneity

Recent risk sharing tests strongly reject the hypothesis of complete markets, because in the data: (1) the individual consumption comoves with income and (2) the consumption dispersion increases over the life cycle. In this paper, I revisit the implications of these risk sharing tests in the context of a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity, which is extended to introduce the individual choices of effort in education. I .nd that a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity can pass both types of the risk sharing tests. The endogenous positive correlation between income growth rate and patience makes the individual consumption comove with income, even if the markets are complete. I also show that this model is quantitatively admissible to account for both the observed comovement of consumption and income and the increase of consumption dispersion over the life cycle.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Sovereign risk and secondary markets

Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties.Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will onlyhappen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country.Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk havefocused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countriesmight want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make themvulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.

Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing

We analyze risk sharing and fiscal spending in a two-region model withcomplete markets. Fiscal policy determines tax rates for each state ofnature. When fiscal policy is decentralized, it can be used to affect prices of securities. To manipulate prices to their beneffit, regionschoose pro-cyclical fiscal spending. This leads to incomplete risk sharing,despite the existence of complete markets and the absence of aggregaterisk. When a fiscal union centralizes fiscal policy, securities pricescan no longer be manipulated and complete risk sharing ensues. If regionsare homogeneous, median income residents of both regions prefer the fiscalunion. If they are heterogeneous, the median resident of the rich regionprefers the decentralized setting.

Towards sustainable transport: A comparison of demographic and behavioural characteristics of Finnish and international car sharing users

SStrong evidence suggests that the climate is changing and that these changes are largely caused by human activities. A consensus exists among researchers that human activity is causing global warming and that actions to mitigate global warming need to be taken swiftly. The transportation sector, which relies heavily on fossil fuel burning and primarily oil, is one of the big contributors to air pollution problems at local, regional and global levels. It is the fastest growing source of greenhouse gas emissions and is estimated to be responsible for nearly a quarter of global energyrelated carbon dioxide emissions. Car sharing is a mobility solution encouraging its users to decrease private car usage in favour of communal transit and environmental goals. The idea of car sharing originates from the aspiration to decrease personal car ownership and to reduce vehicle distance travelled. This thesis seeks to complement the understanding of Finnish car sharing users and their usage through better categorization. Through better categorization and segmentation of Finnish car sharing users the thesis seeks to provide information for improved marketing insight. Research is done on the demographic and behavioural characteristics of Finnish car sharing users and they are compared with international findings about the characteristics of International car sharing users. The main research problem is Are Finnish car sharing users similar to international ones? A theoretical research framework on the determinants of individual car sharing usage is built based on international research about demographic and behaviouristic characteristics. After this a quantitative survey is performed to the customers of a Finnish car sharing organization. The data analysed in the thesis consist out of 532 answers received from the car sharing organizations customers. The data is analysed with descriptive and other exploratory methods, which create an understanding of Finnish car sharing users. At the end of the analysis the demographic and behavioural characteristics of Finnish car sharing users are compared with international ones. The research findings of the thesis indicate that the demographic and behavioural characteristics of Finnish car sharing usage largely follow those of their international counterparts. Thanks to the thesis results the car sharing organization is able to better target their customers through improved marketing insight.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.