Elements of folk psychology; outlines of a psychological history of the development of mankind,

"First published in 1916, reprinted April, 1921."

Folk conceptions of humanness: Beliefs about distinctive and core human characteristics in Australia, Italy, and China

The present research explores cultural understandings of what it means to be human. We used open-ended responses to examine whether the most culturally salient aspects of humanness are captured by two theoretical dimensions: human uniqueness (HU) and human nature (HN). Australians, Italians, and Chinese (N = 315) showed differences in the characteristics considered human and in the emphasis placed on HU and HN. These findings contribute to developing cross-cultural folk psychological models of humanness.

The evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will

This article examines the evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will and hypothesizes that their evaluative nature is strongly connected to the folk concepts of blame and credit. We probed how people apply the concepts of weakness and strength of will to prototypical and non-prototypical scenarios. While regarding prototypical scenarios the great majority applied these concepts according to the predictions following from traditional philosophical analyses, when presented with non-prototypical scenarios, people were divided. Some, against traditional analyses, did not apply these concepts, which we explain in terms of a clash of evaluations involving different sorts of blame and credit. Others applied them according to traditional analyses, which we explain in terms of a disposition to be reflective and clearly set apart the different sorts of blame and credit involved. Still others applied them in an inverse way, seemingly bypassing the traditional components resolution and best judgment, which we explain in terms of a reinterpretation of the scenarios driven by an assumption that everyone knows deep inside that the best thing to do is to act morally. This division notwithstanding, we claim that our results are largely supportive of traditional analyses (qua analyses of folk concepts).

Älykkään suunnittelun teoria : Tutkimus kansanomaisen psykologian ja biologian yhteydestä kreationistiseen ajatteluun

Tutkimuksen kohteena on (uus)kreationistinen älykkään suunnittelun (Intelligent Design) teoria. Tutkimus on luonteeltaan teoreettinen ja lukeutuu kognitiivisen uskonnontutkimuksen alaan. Näkökulmana on tarkastella älykkään suunnittelun teorian mukaista ajattelua ihmisen intuitiivisena taipumuksena ymmärtää luontoa ja luonnossa esiintyviä mekanismeja. Esimerkkinä intuitiivisesta päättelystä tarkastellaan erityisesti kansanomaisen psykologian (folk psychology) ja kansanomaisen biologian (folk biology) mukaista ajattelua. Tutkimuksessa kysytään: ilmeneekö älykkään suunnittelun teoriassa mahdollisesti kansanomaisen psykologian ja biologian mukaista ajattelua? Ensimmäiseksi käsitteellistetään älykkään suunnittelun teoria ja esitellään tutkimuksen aineisto. Esille tulevat yhteydet Yhdysvaltojen uskonnolliseen ilmapiiriin, kristillisten kreationististen suuntausten jatkumoon sekä evoluutioteoriaan. Aineisto koostuu älykkään suunnittelun teoriaa kehitelleen Michael J. Behen todistajanlausunnosta Doverin oikeudenkäynnissä, jossa arvioitavana oli älykkään suunnittelun teorian mahdollinen tieteellisyys ja uskonnollisuus. Tutkimuksen teoreettisessa viitekehyksessä määritellään tarkemmin, minkälaisiin ajattelutapoihin kansanomaisella, tieteellisellä ja uskonnollisella ajattelulla tutkimuksessa viitataan. Tämän jälkeen esitellään teoreettiset työvälineet - kansanomaisen psykologia ja biologia. Teoriaosuudessa tarkennetaan myös kansanomaisen, tieteellisen ja uskonnollisen ajattelun suhdetta intuitiiviseen ja intuitionvastaiseen ajatteluun, sekä määritellään kolmas termi epäintuitiivisuus. Teoriaosuus perustuu pääasiassa kognitiivisen uskonnontutkimuksen alaan lukeutuvien tutkijoiden, kuten Scott Atranin, Pascal Boyerin, Robert N. McCauleyn ja Ilkka Pyysiäisen julkaisuihin. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan myös evoluutioteorian ymmärtämistä tutkineen E. Margaret Evansin tutkimuksia. Analyysissä teoreettisia huomioita havainnollistetaan aineistosta löydettyjen esimerkkien kautta. Teoriaohjaavan sisällönanalyysin kautta Behen todistajanlausunnosta nostetaan esille erityisesti kansanomaisen psykologian ja biologian mukaiset ajattelun tavat. Analyysissä tarkastellaan, mitä tutkimuslöydösten avulla voidaan selittää älykkään suunnittelun teorian edustamasta kreationistisesta ajattelusta. Tutkimustuloksena esitetään, että älykkään suunnittelun teoria mukailee monilta osin sekä kansanomaista psykologiaa että kansanomaista biologiaa. Älykkään suunnittelun teoriassa muodostetaan intuitiivinen ideakokonaisuus maailmasta/ eliökunnasta ja sen aiheuttaneesta intuitionvastaisesta toimijasta. Mahdolliset epäintuitiiviset elementit, kuten luonnonvalinta ja kristillinen teologia, ovat teoriassa olemattomat. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että kreationistista ajattelua voidaan perustellusti tarkastella ihmiselle intuitiivisena taipumuksena ymmärtää luontoa.

The Catholic Internet discussion on cloning : A study in cognitive rhetoric

This work combines the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought with the classical Aristotelian theory of artistic proof in rhetoric. The first half of the work discusses the common ground shared by the elements of artistic proof (logos, pathos, ethos) and the elements of folk-theoretical thought (naïve physics, folk biology, folk psychology, naïve sociology). Combining rhetoric with the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought creates a new point of view for argumentation analysis. The logos of an argument can be understood as the inferential relations established between the different parts of an argument. Consequently, within this study the analysis of logos is to be viewed as the analysis of the inferential folk-theoretical elements that make the suggested factual states-of-things appear plausible within given argumentative structures. The pathos of an argumentative structure can be understood as determining the quality of the argumentation in question in the sense that emotive elements play a great part in what can be called a distinction between good and deceptive rhetoric. In the context of this study the analysis of pathos is to be viewed as the analysis of the emotive content of argumentative structures and of whether they aim at facilitating surface- or deep cognitive elaboration of the suggested matters. The ethos of an argumentative structure means both the speaker-presentation and audience-construct that can be discerned within a body of argumentation. In the context of this study, the analysis of ethos is to be understood as the analysis of mutually manifest cognitive environments in the context of argumentation. The theory is used to analyse Catholic Internet discussion concerning cloning. The discussion is divided into six themes: Human Dignity, Sacred Family, Exploitation / Dehumanisation, Playing God, Monsters and Horror Scenarios and Ensoulment. Each theme is analysed for both the rhetorical and the cognitive elements that can be seen creating persuasive force within the argumentative structures presented. It is apparent that the Catholic voices on the Internet extensively oppose cloning. The voices utilise rhetoric that is aggressive and pejorative more often than not. Furthermore, deceptive rhetoric (in the sense presented above) plays a great part in argumentative structures of the Catholic voices. The theory of folk-theoretical thought can be seen as a useful tool for analysing the possible reasons why the Catholic speakers think about cloning and choose to present cloning in their argumentation as they do. The logos utilized in the argumentative structures presented can usually be viewed as based on folk-theoretical inference concerning biology and psychology. The structures of pathos utilized generally appear to aim at generating fear appeal in the assumed audiences, often incorporating counter-intuitive elements. The ethos utilised in the arguments generally revolves around Christian mythology and issues of social responsibility. These structures can also be viewed from the point of view of folk psychology and naïve sociological assumptions.

Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.

Psychology and folk-lore,

Printed in Great Britain.

Are more city dwellers caught drink driving than country folk? An analysis by random breath testing apprehension rates

Background Random Breath Testing (RBT) remains a central enforcement strategy to deter and apprehend drink drivers in Queensland (Australia). Despite this, there is little published research regarding the exact drink driving apprehension rates across the state as measured through RBT activities. Aims The aim of the current study was to examine the prevalence of apprehending drink drivers in urban versus rural areas. Methods The Queensland Police Service provided data relating to the number of RBT conducted and apprehensions for the period 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2011. Results In the period, 35,082,386 random breath tests (both mobile and stationary) were conducted in Queensland which resulted in 248,173 individuals being apprehended for drink driving offences. Overall drink driving apprehension rates appear to have decreased across time. Close examination of the data revealed that the highest proportion of drink driving apprehensions (when compared with RBT testing rates) was in the Northern and Far Northern regions of Queensland (e.g., rural areas). In contrast, the lowest proportions were observed within the two Brisbane metropolitan regions (e.g., urban areas). However, differences in enforcement styles across the urban and rural regions need to be considered. Discussion and conclusions The research presentation will further outline the major findings of the study in regards to maximising the efficiency of RBT operations both within urban and rural areas of Queensland, Australia.

Folk theory of social change

People have a folk theory of social change (FTSC). A typical Western FTSC stipulates that as a society becomes more industrialized, it undergoes a natural course of social change, in which a communal society marked by communal relationships becomes a qualitatively different, agentic society where market-based exchange relationships prevail. People use this folk theory to predict a society’s future and estimate its past, to understand contemporary cross-cultural differences, and to make decisions about social policies. Nonetheless, the FTSC is not particularly consistent with the existing cross-cultural research on industrialization and cultural differences, and needs to be examined carefully.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Folk Concepts of Intentional Action in the Contexts of Amoral and Immoral Luck

This paper concerns a recently discovered, puzzling asymmetry in judgments of whether an action is intentional or not (Knobe 2003a, b). We report new data replicating the asymmetry in the context of scenarios wherein an agent achieves an amoral or immoral goal due to luck. Participants’ justifications of their judgments of the intentionality of the agent’s action indicate that two distinct folk concepts of intentional action played a role in their judgments. When viewed from this perspective, the puzzle disappears, although the asymmetry remains

Intermediate types among primitive folk; a study in social evolution

Pt. 1 originally published in the American Journal of Religious Psychology, 1911, and in the Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie, 1911